Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1973

YUGOSLAVIA

Nationalist Revival
Gary K. Bertsch

Postwar Migrations
George W. Hoffman

The USSR and East Asia
Thomas W. Robinson

Venezuelan Marxism
Benedict Cross

Book Reviews
John Erickson
Holland Hunter
Philip E. Uren
A. M. Halpern
Andrew Gyorgy

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NOV-DEC 1973 VOL. XXII

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SUBSCRIPTIONS: Within the United States, annual subscriptions or single copies of *Problems of Communism* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402. Price per copy: $1.20. Subscription price: $6.90. Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may in most cases be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the United States Information Service. The journal can also be ordered directly from the US Government Printing Office for foreign mailing, at a price of $1.50 per copy and $8.65 per subscription.

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INDEXING: Articles in *Problems of Communism* are indexed, *inter alia*, in the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*, the *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), and *ABC POL SCI*.

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Cover: Left, a young woman of Dubrovnik; right, a Sarajevo shopkeeper; Photos by Catherine Ursillo for Photoreporters, Kosheleff for FPG.

NOTE: The Editors regretfully announce a new rise in the rates to be charged by the US Government Printing Office for *Problems of Communism*, effective January 1, 1974. See subscription information in the left-hand column.

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Currents in Yugoslavia

EDITORS' NOTE: A factor of major importance in the complex postwar transformation of Yugoslav society has been the Communist regime's vision of a modern, industrialized, urbanized community in which the nation's diverse peoples would live together in productive harmony. While this ambitious program has clearly wrought significant social and economic changes, reality still remains short of the expectations nurtured by it—with important consequences, as the two articles below demonstrate. In the first selection, Mr. Bertsch presents the hypothesis that recent national tensions in Yugoslavia were triggered by various national elites who became disillusioned by the discovery that their capabilities for achieving social and economic progress within the Yugoslav federation were insufficient to satisfy burgeoning aspirations. In turn, Mr. Hoffman's study of postwar population migrations reveals how the program of industrialization-*cum*-modernization unleashed a flood of ambitious rural migrants which even a rapidly urbanizing Yugoslavia proved unable to accommodate fully.

The Revival of Nationalisms

By Gary K. Bertsch

The question of nationality continues to pose a serious challenge to leaders of multinational states who hope to mold political community in settings of ethno-cultural diversity.[1] Recent events resulting from the multinational condition in Yugoslavia suggest that this socialist state possesses no special immunity from the larger, worldwide pattern. For although the development of a Yugoslav socialist community (*Jugoslovenska socijalisticka zajednica*) has been a foremost goal of the Titoist regime, the recurrence of national-based conflict indicates persisting difficulties in the achievement of this ideal.[2]

The task of community-building in a diverse mul-

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[1] In the foreword to a special issue of the *Journal of International Affairs* on "Political Integration in Multinational States," the editor writes: "If anyone should doubt that political integration in multinational states is far from being a given attribute on the world stage today, he need only reflect on some of the events of recent years." *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), No. 1, 1973.

[2] Community may be defined as a grouping of people who have learned to communicate and cooperate with one another and to understand one another beyond the normal interchange of goods and services. See Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication,* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1966, p. 78. Community-building is used in this essay to refer to any developments conducive to such communication, cooperation, and understanding. For a similar conception, see Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development,* Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1971, p. 74.

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tinational society is not an easy one, and to criticize the Titoist strategy or to underemphasize or disparage Yugoslavia's progress would be patently unfair. Indeed, one might reasonably argue that Yugoslav achievements have been remarkable—particularly in view of the historical difficulties of presocialist Yugoslavia. Few of the atrocities committed before or during World War II, for example, have been repeated in the Titoist state. Moreover, the ethnic, religious, and/or racial violence evidenced in a number of so-called developed countries (*e.g.*, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States) and certainly in such less-developed countries as Nigeria or Sudan has been far more serious than in multinational Yugoslavia. At the same time, the fact remains that manifestations of nationalism are still being expressed in Yugoslavia over a quarter of a century after the establishment of a Marxist system that so fervidly sought to resolve the historical animosities by replacing them with "brotherhood and unity." [3] While recognizing and acknowledging that forms of nationalism exist within the country, the Yugoslav government has hoped to eradicate their more undesirable features in the interests of societal integration. Under these circumstances, the important question is why such manifestations of nationalism continue to appear. This article will endeavor to explore that question.

Historical Developments

A consideration of post-World War II developments shows a definite sensitivity on the part of the Titoist government to the conflict between nationalism and the development of a Yugoslav socialist community. In order to deal with the multinational condition and all the attendant difficulties in the early years of development, the postwar Communist regime emulated the federal structure of the Soviet state. Under the federal system, each of the major Slavic groups (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians) was granted a republic within which its language and culture would predominate. An additional republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, was established for the diverse Serb, Croat, and Slavic Moslem (or Bosniak) inhabitants of this mountainous inland region. Finally, two autonomous provinces were created for the largest non-Slavic minorities, the Hungarians in Vojvodina and the Albanians in Kosovo.

This regional structure, representing the federal political formula of the new state, was set out in Article 1 of the original Constitution:

The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right of self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state.

The phrase "a community of peoples" in this article pointed up the special problem confronting the new Yugoslav state—namely, how to build an integrated community from a mosaic of diverse and often conflicting peoples, all of whom possessed distinct cultural traditions and separate national identities. At the same time, the article expressed the hope and ideal of a brighter South Slavic future in envisioning a wider community of peoples based upon equal rights, including—at least theoretically—the ultimate right of separation.

The new regime's initial community-building strategy was founded upon the idea of "Yugoslavism," a concept which tended to promote a policy of political and economic centralization.[4] During this temporary stage, which Yugoslavs refer to as the "administrative phase" of development, manifestations of nationalism were by and large repressed in the quest for a unified society. Under the "Yugoslavism" approach, the party leadership envisioned the rapid development of a higher-order, South Slavic identity and a sense of "Yugoslav nationhood," along with the consolidation of the anti-fascist, socialist state. The rationale underlying this strategy was that a new, supranational identity would evolve along with the dissolution of more traditional (*i.e.*, national, religious, cultural) and anti-socialist sentiments.

Through the 1950's and early 1960's, the Yugoslav leaders attempted to strike a delicate balance between unity and diversity, or centralism and federalism. While working toward the ideal of unity, they were cautious not to exhibit undue disrespect

[3] Besides the slogan *"bratsvo jedinstvo"* (brotherhood and unity), there exists *"bratsvo i jednakost"* (brotherhood and equality). Among the advocates of greater republic autonomy, the *"jedinstvo"* slogan smacks of unitarism and centralism, while the latter stresses the national autonomy that goes with genuine federalism.

[4] For an excellent analysis of the nationalities policies of the Titoist regime, including the various changes over the years, see Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.

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The Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia approved constitutional amendments spelling out expanded rights for Yugoslavia's constituent republics within the Federation at this March 1971 meeting. Pictured, from left, are Edvard Kardelj, head of the commission which drafted the amendments, President Tito, and Miko Tripalo, then leader of the Croatian League of Communists.

—Photo by *Borba*, as reproduced in Review (Belgrade), March 1971, p. 7.

for the national units of which the multinational state was comprised. But because of the necessities of postwar development and a variety of external events of major import (*e.g.*, the battle over control of Trieste, the Cominform expulsion), the Titoist building strategy was inclined to tend toward centralism, with the League of Communists firmly in command.

By the middle of the 1960's, however, the idea of "Yugoslavism" and the more centralistic policy it implied were almost entirely discredited. It became increasingly apparent to the leadership that the former attachments to national cultures, traditions, and interests were not to be easily dissolved into the more abstract notion of a higher-order, Yugoslav identity. To some national groups, the centralist policy smacked of assimilation and constituted an overt threat to their own identities and cultures. In addition, most of the non-Serb groups tended to associate the more centralistic strategy with the idea of a "Greater Serbia." Hence, the policy of "Yugoslavism" was perceived by most groups as a threat, and it therefore often seemed to intensify rather than to attenuate national differences.

During the 1946-65 period, then, a variety of forces were undermining the centralistic "Yugoslavism" strategy. Perhaps the most significant was the reform policy of political and economic decentralization that allocated increasing power to the republics and lower-level political units. As one might anticipate, the centralism emphasized under the older policy and the decentralization of the new reforms proved contradictory, and by the early 1960's the former policy and any mention of "Yugoslavism" began to fade. In contrast to the largely "centralist-assimilationist" approach of the earlier strategy, the guidelines of the new phase seemed to be the "four D's" of contemporary Yugoslav development: decentralization, deétatization, depoliticization, and democratization. The resultant policy placed greater importance on national (*i.e.*, regional) autonomy and the decentralization of decision-making power.

The reform movement picked up steam through the late 1960's and culminated in the far-reaching set of constitutional amendments approved by the Federal Assembly on June 30, 1971.[5] According to many observers, these constitutional changes would in effect make the republics the key units of government and thus bring the Yugoslav political system close to a confederation. Although subsequent developments have rendered both implementation and interpretation of the amendments somewhat difficult, their major purpose was to delimit further the functions and responsibilities of the central government, while simultaneously expanding those of the regional and local authorities. With the new constitutional changes, in short, the system seemed to be entering its third structural phase of development—*i.e.*, from unitary (1946-65) to federal (1966-71) to confederal (1972-?).

Under the amendments, the republics were to gain the power to control the central government through a variety of constitutional guarantees, including the right to make appointments to leading governmental bodies at the federation level; however, the degree of uncertainty and debate regarding the amendments was high, and it was further heightened by what Tito and the "hardliners" perceived in 1971 as "nationalist deviations" within certain sectors of the populace and, more significant, within high or-

[5] See discussions of the amendments in Paul Shoup, "The National Question in Yugoslavia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1972, pp. 25-27; and R. V. Burks, *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, October 1971, pp. 31-39.

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gans of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Tito's response to the "national excesses" was to force the resignation and replacement of the highest-level Croatian leaders (among them Miko Tripalo, Secretary of the Croatian League of Communists, and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, President of the Croatian Central Committee) in December 1971.

What was initially viewed in some quarters as an anti-Croat campaign soon developed into a broader shakeup of the republic-level party leaderships. During 1972, the LCY leadership structure throughout the country underwent a major reshuffling, marked by the forced resignations of such highly-placed leaders as Marko Nikezic and Latinka Perovic, President and Secretary of the Serbian Central Committee, respectively. For the first time since the war, party leaders (including Tito) began to speak of a "national crisis" threatening the unity of socialist Yugoslavia. The initial LCY response to the national situation blossomed into a wider political movement against the "enemies" of Yugoslav socialism—"étatistic bureaucratism, technocratism, nationalism, and all anti-self-managing and anti-socialist tendencies." [6] Its main feature was an assault by Tito and the "hardliners" (notably Stane Dolanc, Jure Bilic, and others) on what they considered to be the revival of nationalism in some sectors of the society, particularly among high-ranking LCY officials in some of the constituent republics.

The serious concern accorded the national situation was evident from the attention that the Yugoslav Party Presidium devoted to it in 1972. For example, at the 34th Session of the Presidium held July 11 and 12 on the island of Brioni, five members of the Presidium (Todo Kurtovic, Edvard Kardelj, Latinka Perovic, Milka Planinc, and Veljko Vlahavic) lashed out at nationalistic tendencies of two major kinds. Their identification of two types was noteworthy in that it involved condemnation of the notion of "unitarism" as well as the idea of "separatism." The former, which had always been associated primarily with the Serbs and the policy of "Yugoslavism," had not been subject to open attack in the past. Criticisms of nationalist "excesses" had previously been directed exclusively at the "separatist" variety, which had been most closely linked with Croatian nationalism and foresaw a brighter future for Croatia outside the Yugoslav federation. The lumping together of the two varieties was at least in part intended to counter feelings that the central party leadership was carrying on an anti-Croat campaign.

Overall, the party's strategy was to break the power of the strong regional party organizations in the interests of greater unity and (re)centralization within the LCY structure. In the view of the central leadership, the excesses of decentralization and the concomitant revival of nationalism required a reassertion of antinationalist and pro-Yugoslav forces. Such forces were to be found in the revitalized ranks of the LCY.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, it is not unfair to say that nationality continues to be a major and irritating political force in conflict with the government's hope for unity.[7] To the credit of the LCY leaders, it should be noted that they have acknowledged that nationalism exists and are frank enough not to characterize it as simply a residue of the capitalist system. The important question of concern to this analysis, however, is why such manifestations of nationalism still occur in a Marxist society which has worked so zealously for their demise. Do they occur because the populace has been unwilling or unable to bury the animosities and differences of the past? That is, did ethnocentric attitudes among the various nationalities lead to the revival of nationalism in the late 1960's? To shed some light on this issue, it is necessary to examine the outlook of the populace during the 1960's.

Popular Attitudes and Nationalism

Many studies of society and politics assume an important relationship between the attitudes of the populace and certain sociopolitical characteristics of the society. For example, in a study of political culture in five nations, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba posit a correlation between individual attitudes and the democratic capabilities of the state.[8] In the same fashion, most studies of nationalism assume a fundamental relationship between the atti-

[6] *Borba* (Belgrade), June 28, 1972.

[7] In an article on the nationalities question in the Yugoslav journal *Gledista*, the Yugoslav scholar and party ideologist Stipe Suvar writes in his opening sentence: "There is no doubt that in Yugoslavia in 1971, the main theme in political life is the nationalities question." See his "Marginal Notes on the Nationalities Question," *Gledista* (Belgrade), No. 5-6, 1971, p. 47. This and three other articles by Yugoslav scholars in the same issue of *Gledista* have been translated and are reprinted in a special issue of the *International Journal of Politics*. See "The Nationalities Question in Yugoslavia," *International Journal of Politics* (White Plains, N.Y.), Vol. II, Spring 1972.

[8] *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963.

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Table 1: Interethnic Relations in Yugoslavia, 1964

(percentage of respondents believing relations good or satisfactory)

By Nationality	%	By Republic or Province	%
Magyars	93.2	Macedonia	88.8
Macedonians	88.6	Bosnia-Herzegovina	86.7
Moslems	86.7	Vojvodina	82.8
Albanians	80.5	Croatia	82.6
Croats	79.1	Montenegro	78.1
Montenegrins	78.9	Kosovo	78.0
Slovenes	78.9	Serbia (proper)	76.8
Serbs	77.7	Slovenia	75.3
Yugoslav Average	**81.0**	**Yugoslav Average**	**81.0**

SOURCES: Data compiled from Sergije Pegan, "Opinions on Relations Between Nations in Yugoslavia," in Firdus Dzinic, Ed., *Yugoslav Public Opinion Concerning Current Political and Social Questions*, Belgrade, Institute of Social Sciences, 1964, translated by Joint Publications Research Service (Washington, DC), 1970; table adapted from R.V. Burks, *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, October 1971, p. 43.

tudes of the populace and the presence or absence of nationalism within the society. With this postulation in mind, let us see what Yugoslav attitude surveys tell us about national sentiments before the "revival of nationalism" in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Can we, for example, tie the reputed Croatian variant of "separatism" to ethnocentric attitudes among members of this particular national group? Similarly, do we find any hint of "unitarist" inclinations among certain sectors of the Serbian nation?

Attitude surveys begun in the early 1960's by the Center for Public Opinion Research (Centar za Istrazivanje Javnog Mnenja) in Belgrade permit us to view relevant attitudes prior to the resurgence of nationalism.[9] Since one would logically expect nationalistic or ethnocentric attitudes to precede the rise of a national movement, it should be instructive to find out whether or not the attitudes of the various national groups during the middle 1960's might have served as an omen of the escalation of national conflict to follow.

In 1964, the Center ran a survey asking respondents whether they thought relations among the nationalities were good, satisfactory, or bad, and 81 percent of the 2,700 individuals interviewed considered national relations to be "good" or "satisfactory" (see the Yugoslav average in Table 1). On the basis of this wide-sweeping overview of the Yugoslav populace, there would seem to have been little basis for predicting the subsequent national crisis.

When one proceeds to break down the sample by nationality and by republic or province (as in Table 1), the picture still seems to be the same. For example, the responses of the Serbs and Croats gave little hint of the impending "separatist" or "unitarist" movements. Among members of Croat nationality, 79.1 percent considered national relations to be either "good" or "satisfactory." With respect to those of Serbian nationality, 77.7 percent viewed national relations in the same favorable fashion. Even though the Serbs did not evaluate national relations as positively as some other groups (*e.g.*, the Magyars and Macedonians), their responses could in no way be regarded as grounds for pessimism about the future of national relations. Overall, then, few analysts would have forecast the impending revival of nationalism on the basis of this survey.

But perhaps these data were not really indicative of national feelings in the country. Perhaps it was easier and more expedient for an individual to say that relations were good while he in fact remained ethnocentric in outlook and behavior.

Data gathered during 1966 in another study of ethnic relations confronted the issue of national rela-

Table 2: Ethnic Distance in Yugoslavia, 1966

(percentage of respondents manifesting very slight or negligible ethnic distance[a])

By Nationality	%	By Republic or Province	%
Magyars	95.0	Vojvodina	93.5
Albanians	94.6	Bosnia-Herzegovina	85.2
Moslems	89.4	Croatia	83.1
Croats	85.3	Macedonia	81.2
Serbs	81.7	Serbia (proper)	78.9
Montenegrins	78.6	Kosovo	77.0
Macedonians	78.3	Montenegro	75.4
Slovenes	55.2	Slovenia	55.6
Yugoslav Average	**80.4**	**Yugoslav Average**	**80.4**

[a] These two categories comprise all respondents who answered 34 of the total 42 questions (seven nationalities x six relationships) positively.

SOURCES: Data compiled from Dragomir Pantic, *Ethnic Distance in Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, Institute of Social Sciences, 1967, translated by Joint Publications Research Service, 1970, pp. 12, 15-16; table adapted from Burks, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[9] The Center for Public Opinion Research of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade is staffed by highly trained scholars well-versed in the latest methods and techniques of survey analysis. Over the 1960's and early 1970's, their surveys and reported research have been of a uniformly high quality.

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Two Yugoslav peasants, one a Serb and the other a Moslem, engaged in friendly conversation near the town of Mostar, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

—Photo by H. W. Sylvester for Rapho Guillumette.

tions more directly.[10] This countrywide survey of 2,600 persons focused on the types of social relationship (*e.g.*, marriage, friendship, etc.) that the respondents would be willing to accept with members of other nationalities, as a measure of "ethnic distance."[11]

Of the overall Yugoslav sample, nearly 60 percent exhibited no ethnic distance whatsoever—in short, they were willing to accept members of all the other designated nationalities in each of the six specified relationships (*e.g.*, marriage, friendship, etc.). Furthermore, 80.4 percent of the total respondents indicated "very slight" or "negligible" ethnic distance (see Table 2). While the Slovenes stand out as the least tolerant of the eight specified groups, the Serbs and Croats evince neglible ethnic distance. The overall pattern indicates surprisingly high levels of ethnic tolerance among the various groups and, once again, carries little portent of the nationalist revival that was to ensue.

Generally speaking, then, the attitude surveys of the middle 1960's painted a picture that boded well for the future of nationality relations in Yugoslavia. The attitudinal preconditions for greater cooperation and understanding seemed to be established, and sufficient evidence existed to merit discussion of the evolution of a genuine community of Yugoslav peoples.

There seemed to be even greater reason for talking in optimistic terms in light of signs of an apparent disengagement from the more parochial and particularistic attachments of traditional Yugoslav life. It has been suggested by one eminent theorist of nationalism, Karl Deutsch, that the forces of contemporary socioeconomic and demographic change tend to diminish the importance of ethnicity and nationality in interpersonal and intergroup relations.[12] That is, there is reason to believe that the former attachments to region, dialect, customs, and so forth are likely to diminish in modernizing societies, as higher-order, more impersonal attachments develop simultaneously. Such a trend did appear to be occurring in Yugoslavia, according to research conducted by this author.[13]

Using countrywide survey data gathered from 1,186 individuals in 1967—again by the Center for Public Opinion Research in Belgrade [14]—the author investigated the major components of Deutsch's theory in order to determine the nature of individual

[10] For the full report of these data, see Dragomir Pantic, *Ethnic Distance in Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, Institute of Social Sciences, 1967, translated by the Joint Publications Research Service, 1970.

[11] The measurement of "ethnic distance" followed the approach of the American sociologist E. S. Bogardus, who developed the so-called "Bogardus scale of social distance" to explore ethnic and racial attitudes in America. In this case, the scale of ethnic distance was constructed from six questions asked of all respondents. These were: (1) Are you (*e.g.*, a Slovene respondent) in favor of his (*e.g.*, a Macedonian) permanent residence in your republic? (2) Are you in favor of his employment in the organization where you are employed? (3) Would you accept him as a friend? (4) Would you agree to marry him or her? (5) Would you accept him as your manager at the place where you work? (6) Would you be in favor of his holding a leading office in your republic? The six questions were posed in regard to the following eight groups (excluding the respondent's own group): Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Hungarians, and Moslems.

[12] Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication.* For an incisive critique of Deutsch's major contributions, see Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), April 1972, pp. 321-28.

[13] Gary K. Bertsch, "A Cross-National Analysis of the Community-Building Process in Yugoslavia," *Comparative Political Studies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Vol. 4, January 1972, pp. 438-59.

[14] The data were collected by the Center for Professor M. George Zaninovich, Department of Political Science, University of Oregon. They were used for his study of "Value Change in Yugoslav Society."

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change and, more generally, to shed some light on the community-building process. Three basic indices —social mobilization, modernism, and cultural universalism—were developed from the survey data.[15] These three indices were then assessed as a possible "causal chain." That is, an effort was made to determine to what extent the degree of social mobilization and modernism affected the attitudes related to cultural particularism. On the basis of existing theory and research, one would expect individuals with higher levels of social mobilization and more modern values to exhibit more universalistic values; hence, one might hypothesize that mobilization and modernization within the Yugoslav populace would engender a society less attached to the particularistic sentiments historically important within the Yugoslav setting.

When examining the relationships among the three attributes of the 1,186 Yugoslavs, one finds Deutsch's postulation to hold true (see Figure 1). Positive correlations among the three attributes are indeed observable for every national and ethnic group within the Yugoslav context. In other words, the higher the level of social mobilization, the higher the level of modernism; the higher the level of modernism, the greater the advance toward cultural universalism and away from cultural particularism; and the higher the level of social mobilization, the greater the advance toward cultural universalism and away from cultural particularism. However, if one looks at the relationships among the subsamples of the four largest nations in the country, one discovers interesting differences across the groups. While an attempt to explore the causes and consequences of such differences lies outside the bounds of this article, it should be noted that the rate and scope of attitudinal change do appear to vary considerably from nationality to nationality.[16]

This study appears to suggest that popular attitudes would have grown even less particularistic in the future and would therefore have tended to become increasingly conducive, over time, to the evolution of a Yugoslav community—that is, if uni-

[15] The first index was arrived at by constructing a breakdown of respondents in terms of the frequency of their exposure to communication stimuli. The second was established by setting up a Guttman scale based on the answers of respondents to questions designed to evaluate their possession of modern, as opposed to traditional, values. The third was created by constructing another Guttman scale, this one derived from answers to questions intended to reveal how much importance respondents attached to five possible kinds of particularistic identification within the Yugoslav context.

[16] For a consideration of the differences across the four nationalities, see Bertsch, *loc. cit.*, pp. 448-55.

Figure 1: Degrees of Correlation Beween Social Mobilization, Modernism, and Cultural Universalism in Yugoslavia, 1967

(in gamma coefficients[a])

	(A) Social Mobilization → (B) Modernism	(B) Modernism → (C) Cultural Universalism	(A) Social Mobilization → (C) Cultural Universalism
All respondents	.40	.41	.27
Slovene	.31	.20[b]	.12[b]
Croat	.50	.40	.29
Serb	.30	.41	.25
Macedonian	.51	.45	.46

[a] A gamma coefficient describes the extent of correlation between two sets of data—in this case, any two of the three indices (*i.e.*, A-B, B-C, and A-C). If the two sets of data correlated perfectly, the gamma coefficient would be + or −1.00. All gamma coefficients reported here are positive and significant at the .05 "level of confidence" (*i.e.*, the coefficients shown could have occurred less than one time in twenty as the result of chance) unless otherwise noted.

[b] This gamma coefficient is not significant at the .05 "level of confidence."

SOURCE: For discussion of the derivation of the data in this figure, see the author's "A Cross-National Analysis of the Community-Building Process in Yugoslavia," *Comparative Political Studies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Vol. 4, January 1972, pp. 438-59.

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versalistic values are indeed prerequisites for the understanding and cooperation upon which political communities are founded. Moreover, it seems to indicate that the mobilization and modernism normally brought about by industrialization and socio-economic development would aid in the community-building process. All this presupposes, however, that societal values do make a difference—that they do affect patterns of conflict and cooperation within a multinational state.

In light of the contradiction that appeared to characterize the Yugoslav scene during the late 1960's—that is, less particularistic popular attitudes and growing national crisis—that assumption must be called into question. To put things another way, if the popular attitudes of the mid-1960's reflected a substantial degree of interethnic understanding and tolerance and if projections into the future suggested that even higher levels of tolerance (universalism) would develop in the years to come, how does one explain the revival of nationalism and the subsequent national crisis that reached the boiling point in 1971?

Problems, Fears, and Frustrations

In approaching this complex issue, it is necessary to consider whether the revival of nationalism and the resultant tensions among nationalities stemmed directly from the attitudes of the society at large. Specifically, were the Yugoslav groups unable to overcome their past differences and historical animosities, and did this fact, in and of itself, produce the tensions of 1971? This writer's analysis of the attitudinal data gathered during the 1960's and previously described convinces him that the resurgence of nationalism did not emanate from the Yugoslav populace in general. Popular attitudes at the outset of the nationalist revival were of neither the character nor the intensity to have generated the subsequent unrest. Rather, the escalation of nationalism seems to have been due primarily to an elitist movement. This movement was composed of segments of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the intelligentsia, though it derived its justification from, and later capitalized upon, deep-seated frustrations within the Yugoslav populace. Not surprisingly, therefore, the attitude surveys concerning national relations during the mid-1960's provided little warning of the events that were to come.

In the author's estimation, then, the rise in nationalist sentiments within the general populace in the late 1960's was more of a consequence than a cause. Specifically, the escalation appeared to result from the following set of circumstances: Because of unresolved economic, political, and cultural problems in Yugoslavia, there was fairly widespread frustration throughout the population. Although initially latent, this frustration was seized upon by a number of political and cultural leaders and defined in national terms. Soon, expressions of national sentiment dominated the republic-based media—in particular, the Serbian and Croatian media. After the elites opened this release-mechanism for the venting of individual and mass frustration, some sectors of the populace began to "rationalize" their frustrations in a similar manner.

To an increasing degree, nationalist symbols and sentiments became vehicles used by various leaders and intellectuals in some of the constituent republics to account for the difficulties incurred in the Yugoslav developmental process—and perhaps, at times, to rationalize their own shortcomings. In the case of Croatia, for example, highly-placed leaders such as Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar played upon the underlying fears and insecurities of the Croatian populace (sometimes inadvertently and at other times intentionally) by explaining Croatia's developmental problems in national terms. Even more significant, perhaps, were the overtly nationalist analyses and appeals of Croatian scholars like Sime Djodan and Marko Veselica. They accounted for Croatia's troubles by attributing them to the republic's allegedly unfavorable and exploited position in the Yugoslav federation. A segment of elites in other republics employed similar analyses and appeals. Such activity evoked particularist sentiments among the public and eventually produced the setting in which a crisis in national relations developed.

The ease with which popular frustrations were converted into nationalism, of course, forces one to take another and more critical look at the national attitudes of the mid-1960's. It would not seem unreasonable to argue that the increasingly less particularistic attitudes revealed by the surveys at that time were only verbal opinions—that underlying animosities had never completely broken down and dissolved. In other words, while popular attitudes seemed to be growing more and more favorable to the establishment of a true Yugoslav community, the basic value structures of the populace

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still contained a considerable degree of ethnocentrism. Then when certain elites began to play upon various national themes in what increasingly became a crisis-type situation, latent nationalist sentiments within the population again surfaced.

To understand this whole development, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the basic problems confronting the Yugoslav federation. Indeed, these problems are subject to an interpretation that can be easily tied to the question of nationality. What were these problems, how might they lead to frustrations, and how might these frustrations be rationalized in national terms?

One major problem area confronting Yugoslavia involves the difficulties and shortcomings of the Yugoslav economic model. A republic-based economic system, with all the fears and insecurities attendant upon it, has been a source of frustration and conflict fundamentally linked to the national question. The key point of controversy concerns the relative contribution that each of the national republics and provinces should make to the overall development of the federation. As one might expect, the more developed northern republics (Croatia and Slovenia) feel that they are carrying more than their fair share of the burden in the federation's attempt to develop the more southern regions. Consequently, socioeconomic shortcomings in the more developed republics are often attributed to these republics' "exploited" position.[17] The overall problem, however, is a multifaceted one and includes such additional but related issues as foreign-currency exchange, credit policy, and investment.

A second problem area has to do with the amount of political power and influence that the national units ought to enjoy within the Yugoslav federation. The basic controversy is whether there should be a party monopoly with power concentrated in the federal center or, on the other hand, greater political decentralization within a genuine system of self-management. Thus far, Yugoslavia has found this question insoluble. While preaching decentralization and openly acknowledging the benefits and superiority of the dispersion of power within a self-management system, the party has been unwilling to relinquish ultimate authority and to allow the development of a true federation. What has resulted is a high level of uncertainties, fears, and frustrations regarding the distribution of power within the Yugoslav political system.

A myriad of other issues are tied to this general political problem. They include such sensitive matters as the location of the federal capital in Serbia and the overrepresentation of Serbians in the federal bureaucracy that that location engenders. Also involved is the question of the succession—specifically, how the Collective State Presidency will perform upon the passing of Tito.

These and other issues of a political sort have given rise to frustrations among both elites and masses. Even a cursory reading of the newspapers and journals from the republics and provinces during the late 1960's and early 1970's makes the fact abundantly clear.[18] In one way or another, every national group finds some "injustice" with which to be concerned. While the Croats dislike the capital's placement in Belgrade, the Serbs tire of constant complaining on the part of the Croats. Sooner or later, the perceptions of political "injustice" take on a nationalistic tone.

The final problem area concerns the cultural and social status of various groups and individuals. Although the Yugoslav government has attempted to guarantee the equality and rights of the various national and minority groups through practical institutionalization far exceeding that of most other multinational states, certain insecurities still persist. For instance, the less populous nationalities and ethnic groups fear the power capabilities of the larger. The larger, on the other hand, are uneasy about the ultimate effects of higher rates of population growth among the smaller. On a less generalized level, the Croats perceive the assimilatory potential of the Serbian language and culture and undertake measures to preserve their own distinctiveness;[19] the Albanians of Kosovo chafe at their

[17] Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the exploited position of the developed republics, in particular Croatia, was the now imprisoned Sime Djodan. For his analysis of the nature of the economic problem—including the position of Croatia—see "The Evolution of the Economic System of Yugoslavia and the Economic Position of Croatia," *Hrvatski knjizevni zbornik* (Zagreb), Fall 1971, translated and reprinted in *Journal of Croatian Studies* (New York), Vol. 13, 1972, pp. 3-102.

[18] For an incisive analysis of insecurities, frustrations, and resultant nationalism connected with such issues, see Branko Horvat, "Nationalism and Nationality," *Gledista*, No. 5-6, 1971, reprinted in the *International Journal of Politics*, Spring 1972, pp. 19-46.

[19] In March 1967, for example, the Croatian literary and cultural society Matica Hrvatska published a manifesto demanding a constitutional change to insure better protection for the literary languages of Yugoslavia—in particular, the Croatian language. Among other things, the manifesto requested that the practice of speaking of "Serbo-Croatian" be ended and that Serbian and Croatian be considered separate languages. For a discussion of the manifesto, see Fritz Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community of Nations*, The Hague, Mouton, 1968, pp. 326-29.

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provincial status, at the relative backwardness of their social conditions, and at the comparative weakness of their sense of cultural identity. One could go on citing such specific examples almost *ad infinitum.*

Relative Deprivation

During the initial years of postwar development, the ideological outlook of the new Marxist government created high expectations among both leaders and followers about the state's ability to deal with these three problem areas. Economic development and material abundance were to be accomplished both efficiently and rapidly. (The impressive gains that the country subsequently registered during the 1950's and 1960's raised expectations in this regard even higher.) Political relationships and former power inequalities were to be resolved through the self-management system and through regional decentralization. Finally, a community of peoples with equal rights and status was to be established. At least in terms of intentions, the new Communist government was strongly resolved to end the national and social injustices of old.

As a result of the successes of the revolutionary movement during its early years and of the legitimacy and popularity that the Titoist government acquired after its experimentation with decentralized socialism, the Yugoslav populace as a whole appeared to have internalized or "taken to heart" a good part of the official perspective. Through the early 1960's, national attachments were said—and seemed—to have softened in accordance with ideological prescriptions. However, when difficulties in the three problem areas continued to persist, frustrations resulted, and these tended to make the individual citizen susceptible to nationalist forces that impelled him back toward his more traditional and particularistic attachments—*i.e.,* his nation, his religion, and his cultural heritage. Stipe Suvar, a high-ranking member of the Croatian League of Communists, a sociology professor at Zagreb University, and an outspoken critic of nationalism, describes the situation in this fashion:

After having been drunk on ideology, which was destroying everything that was old and which promised the rapid creation of happiness on earth, [then] *after having become disappointed by the results of such a radical ideology, people have started sobering up and trying to return to the old, lost values: the religious and ethnic communities.*[20]

He goes on to argue that when individuals lose their perspective on progress and become frustrated by their social problems, they seek refuge in their ethnic group—a state of affairs marked by ethnocentrism and hatred directed toward other nationalities.

Why did such frustrations develop, and why did they have the effect of driving individuals back to their religious and ethnic communities? In the author's opinion, the basic factor leading to high levels of individual and mass frustration in Yugoslavia lay in the discrepancy between what Yugoslav individuals and groups thought they deserved and what they felt capable of attaining within the context of the Yugoslav federation. Put another way, frustration resulted from the discrepancy between, first, expectations related to key values and, secondly, capabilities for fulfilling these expectations.

While the ideological program of the Titoist government promised economic growth, political equilibrium, and cultural and social equality—and in so doing inevitably heightened the anticipations of the populace—persistent and recurrent problems on the economic scene, in the self-management system, and in the social and cultural realms underscored the gap between theory and reality. Therefore, the individual was increasingly inclined to view the values that he deemed important (*i.e.,* economic security, political power, and social justice) as largely unattainable. In short, while his expectations were high and generally rising because of the ideological pronouncements of the state, he perceived decreasing capabilities to realize such values as many problems lingered on and looked more and more as if they might prove insoluble. Had anticipations not mounted so high, the levels of societal discontent might never have escalated. As W. G. Runciman puts it, "if people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have, or even be grateful simply to be able to hold on to it." [21]

The general mood expressed in the Yugoslav media throughout 1970 and 1971 suggested that there were few who felt grateful. On the contrary,

[20] Suvar, *loc. cit.*, p. 58.

[21] *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, p. 9.

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there were many who had been led to expect far more than they were realistically going to receive. Upon perceiving the discrepancy between what they expected and what they were likely to receive, they felt deprived. This feeling of relative deprivation [22] resulted in frustration and, in the words of Branko Horvat, nationalism became the rationalization of frustration.[23] At that point, the latent nationalist sentiments hidden beneath the seemingly less particularistic attitudes evinced in surveys during the mid-1960's came back into play. Once again, nationalism energed as a dominant theme in Yugoslav politics.

In order to explicate more fully the applicability of the concept of relative deprivation to the Yugoslav nationalities, it might be instructive to explore in some depth two of the variants of nationalism purported to exist in the Yugoslav context. The Croatian example can be treated as typical of the "separatist" variant, and the Serbian example, of the "unitarist" variant.

The Croatian Example

To many other national groups in Eastern Europe —and even some in Yugoslavia for that matter—the improvement in the Croats' situation during the post-World War II years would be not merely gratifying but above and beyond what might be deemed acceptable. However, to the average Croat, whose judgments were colored by the promises of certain leaders, by what he had seen abroad, and by his assessment of Croatia's inherent capabiilties, the improvement was quite meager and often unacceptable. This perception became a source of frustration and discontent. In other words, while he entertained high expectations about what Croats deserved, his evaluation of Croat capabilities *within the Yugoslav federation* was low. The inevitable consequence was the development of individual and group frustrations, frustrations which national leaders such as Tripalo and Dabcevic-Kucar reflected and which led to the crisis in national relations.

Figure 2: Relative Deprivation—Croats



The sociopsychological dynamics of the state of affairs in Croatia during the postwar era can usefully be depicted in diagram form. Figure 2 represents an attempt to do so.[24] In constructing the vertical axis, the author concentrated on those values most relevant to members of the Croat nationality and to the Yugoslav populace in general. These values fall into the three problem areas discussed above;[25] therefore, the "collective value position" abstracts those economic, political, and status conditions which both elites and masses within the broader society deem important and strive to realize.[26]

Similarly, the term "value expectations" refers to the level of the average economic, political, and status values to which Croats *believe they are*

[22] A great deal has been written about the concept of relative deprivation, although it has never been applied—at least to this writer's knowledge—to national relations in East Central Europe. For some basic sources, see Runciman, *op. cit.*; Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970; and Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns*, New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1965. Cantril's empirical study of aspirations and frustrations in 13 countries, including Yugoslavia, sets out a useful methodology for further studies using the relative-deprivation approach.

[23] One of Yugoslavia's foremost economists, Horvat has made this statement on a number of occasions. See, for example, "Nationalism and Nationality," *loc. cit.*, and his speech at the symposium on "Culture and the New Constitution," as published in *Knjizevne novine* (Belgrade), May 8, 1971.

[24] It should be emphasized that while this diagram is a graphical presentation designed for heuristic and explanatory purposes, the figure has empirical roots in the previously-cited research of the author and of Cantril on Yugoslav value systems. In other words, it is a simplified representation of the expectations of Croats, their perceptions of their capabilities for achieving their values, and how both have changed over time.

[25] What values are most relevant to humans has been a subject of considerable discussion. Although some classifications are more detailed than others, Runciman and Gurr identify three basic sets: economic, political and status-related. See Runciman, *op. cit.*, Chap. 3; Gurr, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26. These value sets correspond to the three problem areas identified above, and they also conform to Cantril's empirical findings concerning the three most important aspirations that the Yugoslav people had for their nation. See Cantril, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[26] It is worth noting that Suvar identifies what are generally the same key sets of values among the Yugoslav populace: ". . . the first is linked to the natural striving of every nation or ethnic community whatever for self-determination and a struggle for an equal place in the contemporary world . . . the second is linked to the economic and cultural perspectives of the societies that are relevant not only for the national and ethnic communities as such but for people . . . and finally, the third is connected with the institutional network of relations among the nationalities." Suvar, *loc. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

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justifiably entitled. This level has varied over time and has reflected the general rise in Croat aspirations.[27] The designation itself means the sense that Croatians have of what is rightfully owed them as a collective national group. This judgment results from a variety of factors—including what rights they perceive history has bestowed on them, what their status is in comparison with that of other nationalities in the federation, and what their leaders have promised. In sum, the "value expectations" level constitutes a composite indicator of what Croatians feel is their due within the Yugoslav federation.

That brings us, finally, to "value capabilities." This term means the extent to which members of the Croat nation believe themselves able to achieve their economic, political, and status values. The "value capabilities" level, similar to the "value expectations" level, affords a composite picture of what Croatians perceive to be the possibilities for the attainment of their values within the Yugoslav federation.

As noted in the diagram, the decentralization policy and related developments of the 1960's engendered a rather marked rise in expectations among Croats, a rise which tended to coincide with an increase in the capabilities that they perceived. The growth in both increased progressively until the level of perceived capabilities dropped abruptly with the departure from power in 1971 of the Tripalo-Dabcevic-Kucar leadership.

Suvar observes that certain Croat nationalists view their economic, political, and status values as extremely important to the Croat nation but feel that the presently-constituted federation impedes attainment of these values. The nationalists, he writes, contend that

> . . . *the Croatian nation is* economically exploited *in the new Yugoslavia even more than it was in old Yugoslavia, and up until now pronounced Serbian pressure on Croatian* culture *has been manifest; there is Serbian penetration into Croatian ethnic territory and* political domination *of Serbs not only in Yugoslavia as a whole but also in the Republic of Croatia; because of the repression of its* national being *and the difficult* economic position *into which it has been brought, the Croatian people today is displaced and multiplies slowly.*[28]

Such feelings among Croat "nationalists," as well as the less articulate frustration evidenced by other members of the Croat nation, can be interpreted as the product of a sense of relative deprivation. This condition seemed to be brought on by the following circumstances: Ideological pronouncements and normal national aspirations caused Croat expectations to mount steadily over the postwar years, but the situation with respect to perceived capabilities was more problematical (see Figure 2). The policy of "Yugoslavism" induced a general decrease in what the Croats perceived as their capabilities through the early 1960's. After reaching a low in that period, however, the level of perceived capabilities turned upward as a result of Croat awareness of the potential effects of movement toward regional decentralization and of the economic reforms of 1965. They continued to rise and reached their apex at the time of the enactment of the far-reaching constitutional amendments already described in the summer of 1971. Had the discrepancy between expectations and capabilities gone on narrowing, nationalist sentiment among the Croats might have tended to moderate, and desires to establish a sovereign Croatia might have been put aside. But the reshuffling of the Croatian party in 1971 brought with it a sharp and sudden downswing in perceived capabilities. The result of this suddenly expanded gap was the open expression of hostility by many Croatian leaders, members of the intelligentsia, and even rank-and-file citizens.[29]

No better articulation of the kind of attitudes that ultimately became widespread in Croatia can be cited than the work of the Croatian economist Sime Djodan. In a number of his articles and writings, Djodan outlined the benefits which he believed the Croats justifiably deserved and then lamented that the federation had created obstacles to the achievement of such rewards. He contrasted the Croatian economic situation with that of Norway and other small European countries and maintained that Croa-

[27] Although many Croats have been skeptical over the years about the degree to which they could fulfill their values within the Yugoslav federation, their expectations with respect to the values to which they feel justifiably entitled have generally risen and have risen quite rapidly since the early 1960's.

[28] Suvar, *loc. cit.*, p. 50. Emphasis added.

[29] It was at this time that mass demonstrations took place in Zagreb. Shortly thereafter, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia commenced a reorganization of the party leadership in other republics—a move that seemed designed, among other things, to reduce the frustration and sense of relative deprivation among the Croats and the feeling of an anti-Croat campaign. Subsequent developments suggest that the policy did have practical effects.

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The League of Communists of Croatia meets in early 1972 to consider the causes of and remedies for the outbreak of nationalism in that republic. In the left foreground is Milka Planinc, who became President of the LCC in January 1972.

—Photo by Tanjug, as reproduced in *Review* (Belgrade), March-April 1972, p. 12.

tian development should and would compare favorably with that of these more developed countries if it were not for Croatia's "exploited" position within the federal republic. He also emphasized:

In the opinion of the Swedish economist Gunnar Mydral, smaller countries like Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have achieved optimal economic power, and if they were lumped into some great agglomeration, they would lose more than benefit.[30]

However, Djodan did go on to contend that if the new constitutional amendments designed to enhance the powers of the republics and provinces actually altered the "exploitative" nature of the federation, Croatia's future would be brighter:

If the financial power of our republic is brought up to the level of her productive strength, and if the announced changes are carried out in a really consequential and consistent manner, very beautiful vistas will open up for the further normal development of Croatia in many areas. . . . But in order for Croatia to develop normally, it is necessary that very radical changes be carried out in the economic system of the SFRY [Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia]. [31]

[30] Djodan, *loc. cit.*, p. 77.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

Repeatedly, Djodan's analysis expressed high expectations regarding the possibilities for Croatian development and, at the same time, low evaluations of the potential for achieving that end within the present federation. The federation, he claimed time after time, "blocked the development of Croatia." [32] And while the bulk of Djodan's work had to do with *economic* values, the writings and public utterances of others contained similar perceptions of deprivation with respect to *political* and *status* values.

It should be firmly stressed, of course, that Djodan was in no sense a spokesman for the collective will of the Croat people; nevertheless, he did reflect some of the sentiments prevalent among important sectors of the nation. Although less strident and less ideologically offensive, the public comments of the replaced Croatian party leaders mirrored similar if not identical points of view.

The crucial point for this discussion is that the views expressed publicly by the Croatian party leaders, certain sectors of the intelligentsia, and various social and cultural elites had begun to stir the national pride of the Croatian population. What had commenced as elite dissatisfaction with the federal arrangement and with perceived shortcomings of the SFRY had taken on a mass character.

This sequence of events explains why the attitude surveys cited earlier afforded little indication of the national movement that was to ensue. National feelings lay beneath the surface and did not reemerge until portions of the leadership seized upon deep-seated economic, political, and status frustrations and started to account for them in national terms. Since the elite interpretations of the situation seemed plausible, increasing numbers of people began to accept and use the national-based explanations as release mechanisms to vent their own frustrations. Rather than blaming their economic difficulties on themselves, they found it more acceptable to blame these difficulties on the "centralists" in Belgrade. The numerous manifestations of strong nationalist feelings in Croatia following the change in the regional leadership near the end of 1971 suggest that the national pronouncements and speeches of specific Croatian leaders evoked sufficient mass response to render the base of the national movement quite broad indeed.

It would be highly erroneous, of course, to assume that only members of the Croat nation have experienced frustrations. On the contrary, the shortcom-

[32] *Ibid.*

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ings and difficulties that have characterized life in Yugoslavia have given rise to frustrations among all national groups, frustrations which have in turn stimulated national sentiments of one sort or another.[33]

The Serbian Case

In this regard, it should be noted that certain elements of the Serbian nation have also perceived obstacles to the fulfillment of the values that they consider important and whose attainment they feel is their just due. For example, despite hopes and expectations in some quarters for the creation of a "Greater Serbian" state, the prospects for the realization of such an entity within the present Yugoslav federation have been minimal. The perceived discrepancy between these expectations and the capabilities for achieving them aroused a feeling of being wronged, and this sense of injustice produced frustrations which spawned the "unitarist" brand of nationalism.

The distinction here between "unitarism" and the earlier-mentioned "separatism" underlines the fact that nationalism can assume a variety of forms in multi-ethnic states. While it amounts to an oversimplification to say that Croatian frustrations tend to generate "separatist" feelings and Serbian frustrations tend to provide "unitarist" sentiments, such a proposition has some empirical basis and explanatory merit. The remedy favored by members of a nationality in order to alleviate their frustrations depends at least in part on the historical and environmental context in which they operate. Because Croatian "nationalists" are highly aware of Serbian domination during the interwar period and of present Serbian power, they by and large advocate separatism. On the other hand, their Serbian counterparts, conscious of Serbia's historical role in the Yugoslav state and convinced that increased authority for the federal government—dominated, of course, by the Serbian power center in Belgrade—could serve Serbian values more readily, normally lean toward a "unitaristic" (*i.e.*, unitary and centralist) approach.

The roots of "unitarism" in Serbia, like those of "separatism" in Croatia, appear to lie in the conditions of relative deprivation. In tracing the character of expectations among members of the Serbian nationality since World War II, one finds that they were always high but have generally climbed over the years (see Figure 3). Among the reasons for these mounting expectations have been Serbia's tradition as an independent state, its position of dominance in interwar Yugoslavia, the numerical strength of the Serbian nationality, and so on. Serbian perceptions of the possibilities for fulfilling key values within the Yugoslav federation, however, have been somewhat more problematic and have tended to vary with changes in Yugoslav nationalities policy. Generally speaking, the "Yugoslavism" (or centralist) approach of the early postwar years led to a rise in the capabilities that Serbs perceived for achieving their national values, but a decline set in during the 1960's as this policy came under growing criticism and was finally discredited. Perceived capabilities reached a postwar low with the adoption of the constitutional amendments of 1971, which greatly reduced the authority of the federal center in Belgrade. With the recentralization and reassertion of party control that ensued after the nationalist outbreak of 1971, however, those capabilities have evidenced a marked upswing. At the same time, the discrepancy between expectations and capabilities is still quite large and can therefore be expected to continue to spawn feelings of deprivation and, hence, mass and individual frustration.

Suvar has articulated the nature of the frustrations manifested by many Serbs in this fashion:

The Serbian people is injured and abused in the new Yugoslavia although it contributed most to its [the state's] creation and is the most important force for its preservation; sins which are either mutual or the fruit of a conspiracy of members of other nationalities are blamed on the Serbian people; Croatian nationalism is engaged in a striking assault, and among the Croatian nation subversive and ruffian forces are again on the scene, threatening even the exist-

Figure 3: Relative Deprivation—Serbs



[33] This is not to say, however, that the level of frustation and national sentiments has been the same for all national and minority groups

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ence of Yugoslavia and the Serbian people, which has outgrown nationalism and is characterized by general internationalism.[34]

In short, while the Serbian people evinced high and generally rising expectations with respect to the values that they could achieve within the new Yugoslavia, they discerned difficulties and obstacles in the way of attaining their expectations, and they attributed these difficulties and obstacles to the "subversive assaults" of other groups. This interpretation, in turn, constituted the basis for a "unitarist" movement which opposed a decentralized, fragmented state.

"Unitarism," however, proved to be no "sacred cow." When the central party leadership removed the Croatian nationalists from power in 1971 and restructured the Croatian party leadership, the "unitarists" temporarily saw themselves as the victors, but shortly thereafter the party declared that the "unitarists" were equally as dangerous as the "separatists."

The new Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Serbian Central Committee has observed: "One of the difficulties in the struggle against Greater Serbian nationalism has been the fact that in Serbia unitarism has never been considered as nationalism." [35] Now that it is, the assault on nationalism of all shades and hues continues.

[34] Suvar, *loc. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
[35] *Borba*, July 12, 1972.

ALTHOUGH THE Croatian and Serbian cases have been singled out for close attention in order to develop the argument of this essay, it should be underscored that the socio-psychological dynamics of perceived deprivation leading to frustration and ultimately resulting in a propensity toward nationalism are common to all groups within Yugoslavia. One ought to bear in mind, however, that it may only be natural for the nations and ethnic groups of Yugoslavia to see their positions as potentially threatened within the multinational union, for the experiences of a number of other ethnic groups in various multinational states suggest that fears of assimilation and attendant processes are not always unfounded. Under such circumstances, feelings of insecurity mount, and nationalist activity escalates as a defense of the group's threatened interests.

Experience indicates that the policy of "Yugoslavism," or centralism, did little to attenuate this kind of insecurity. At the same time, the contrasting alternative of a fragmented confederation defined along national lines—together with unpopular policies promulgated by the center—worked in such a way as to threaten the future of a united Yugoslavia. But these two extremes are not the sole options available. Currently, Yugoslav leaders are exploring a variety of alternatives, and they have actually begun to experiment with some of them. The ultimate test of the leaders' wisdom will be the effect of their new approach on the feelings of deprivation among the different sectors of the populace.

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Migration and Social Change

By George W. Hoffman

The introduction of a socialist model of development in Yugoslavia after World War II triggered an intense and rapid socioeconomic transformation of that multinational state. A salient feature of this metamorphosis has been the dynamic and complex migrations of large numbers of Yugoslav citizens both within the country and beyond its borders. The emphasis placed by the government on the rapid creation of an industrial society and economy served as a "pull factor," a magnet, which drew surplus agrarian labor reserves away from the limited supplies of arable land (on which farming was becoming increasingly unprofitable). Once activated, the desire of the excess agrarian population to improve its fortunes in city jobs became an autonomous push factor which exerted its own pressures on employment, housing, and other aspects of the emerging urban-industrial society. At the outset, the influx of manpower from labor-surplus rural locales facilitated the process of rapid industrialization and development of administrative, cultural and service facilities.[1] However, the unabated pressure of rural-urban migrations has come to complicate Yugoslavia's social and economic advance, particularly since the economic reforms of 1965, which by stressing industrial efficiency had the effect of reducing urban employment opportunities. As a consequence, an increasing number of Yugoslavs—a considerable portion of them skilled—have turned to temporary employment in foreign countries.

The impact of massive migrational movements upon the structure of Yugoslav society and, in particular, upon the urbanization of the country makes this phenomenon of great interest to all those studying the social transformation and modernization of developing societies. At the same time, one must also recognize that longstanding regional differences in cultural history and in social structures and values have placed a distinctive imprint on this process as it unfolded in multinational Yugoslavia. The present study will attempt to analyze the factors underlying the postwar migrations, to delineate their social consequences, and to trace in the broadest terms their future impact on the stability of Yugoslav society. It draws on the work of Yugoslav and Western scholars alike and also on early returns from the 1971 census, which—though still not completely analyzed—per-

Mr. Hoffman, Professor of Geography at the University of Texas at Austin, is author of Regional Development Strategy in Southeast Europe, *1972, and co-author, with Fred Warner Neal, of* Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia, *1962.* *Draft versions of the present paper were read in January 1973 at the Institute of British Geographers and at a special meeting on Yugoslavia arranged by the British Association of Soviet and East European Studies—presentations made possible by travel grants from the National Science Foundation and the University of Texas at Austin.*

[1] An early analysis of the role of surplus rural manpower in the economic development of Southeast Europe was provided by Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan in *Agricultural Surplus Population in Eastern and Southeastern Europe,* London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943, and in his "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe," *The Economic Journal* (London), June-September 1943, pp. 202-11. See also George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism,* New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962; George W. Hoffman, *Regional Development Strategy in Southeast Europe,* New York, Praeger, 1972, pp. 76-84; and Rudolph Bicanic's posthumously published *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973. The reader is also directed to Bicanic's fascinating but unpublished study of the prewar Yugoslav countryside, *Kako zivi narod. Zivot u passivnim krajevima* (How People Live. Life in the Passive Regions), Zagreb, 1936 (a 1941 translation by Stephen Clissold, London, is available only in mimeographed form).

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mit certain deductions concerning the long-term nature of social transformation in Yugoslavia.[2]

To place the discussion in clearer perspective, it may be useful to provide some summary statistics indicative of Yugoslavia's transformation from a predominantly agrarian society to a mixed one. From 1953 to 1970, the share of agricultural, food and tobacco production in Yugoslavia's gross social product declined from 49 percent to 24.6 percent, whereas industrial production has increased from 20.8 percent to 39.4 percent of the total over the same period.[3]

In social terms, the transformation has been equally dramatic. While *total* population increased by only 30 percent between 1948 (the date of the first postwar census) and 1971, the *nonagricultural* population more than doubled; agricultural population, on the other hand, declined by some 20 percent, and its share in the total dropped from 67.2 percent to 41.2 percent over that period.[4] Although the economically active population increased by 5.5 percent annually in the period 1961-71, agricultural employment decreased by 18 percent (with a slightly larger decrease among women).[5] In addition, in roughly the same period (1960-70) the number of members of agricultural households in nonfarm employment increased some 10 percent, reaching a total of more than 1.5 million persons in 1970. The combination of growing migration from the farms to the cities and increased nonagricultural employment of persons remaining in the countryside relieved pressures on the land and contributed to a rapid increase in per capita income of the rural population during the 1960's.[6]

In examining the shifts in employment brought about by internal migration, one discovers a sharp discontinuity in the year 1965, a shift clearly indicative of the impact of the economic reforms. Whereas nonfarm jobs absorbed some 140,000 new workers annually during 1948-64, only 29,000 such jobs opened up annually in the years 1966-70. Yet, some 115,000 youths, many of them rural, came of working age each year during the latter period. The options facing these young potential workers were unemployment, underemployment in agriculture (which still suffered from surplus manpower), or emigration. In fact, since only 13.6 percent of those seeking employment were able to find jobs within Yugoslavia between 1966 and 1970, the only alternative for the vast majority of Yugoslav job-seekers was emigration.[7] The openness of Yugoslavia's borders to the free flow of people and goods spurred recourse to this option.

The postwar internal migrations naturally had considerable impact on the urbanization process in Yugoslavia. Although the details of this process will be examined at greater length below, several salient figures should be presented here. Early returns from the 1971 census indicate that the "urban population" of Yugoslavia is somewhere in the range of 35 percent of the total as compared to 21.9 percent in 1953.[8] However, the process of "urbanization" has been more extensive than these simple statistics

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[2] Basic to the present analysis are compilations from various Yugoslav censuses and publications of such Yugoslav research centers as the Center for Demographic Studies at the Social Science Institute, Belgrade; the Economic Institute, Belgrade; and the Department of Migration Studies at the Institute of Geography, University of Zagreb, as well as studies of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, and the UN Social Development Division, Regional and Community Development Section, New York.

[3] All data used are taken from official Yugoslav sources: *e.g.*, relevant annual issues of *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije* (Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Savenzni Zavod za Statistiku; articles in *Yugoslav Survey* (Belgrade), and various census publications.

[4] The first postwar census—though limited—was taken in 1948 and indicated a population of 15,901,000 compared with 20,554,000 in 1971. In the absence of final data from the 1971 census, the author uses the figures presented by Kosta Mikhailovic in his "Socioeconomic Aspects of Interregional Migration in Yugoslavia," *International Social Development Review* (United Nations), No. 4, 1972, p. 30. Official census data show a 24.8-percent decrease in the share of agricultural population, with the greatest declines in Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and the Vojvodina.

[5] See fn. 3 above.

[6] The amount of arable land available to each agricultural worker increased to 2.2 hectares as migration reduced the number of inhabitants per 100 hectares from 104 in 1953 to only 73 in 1970.

[7] See Ivo Baucic, *Origin and Structure of Yugoslav Workers in the German Federal Republic,* in Radovi Instituta za Geografiju Sveucilista u Zagrebu, Vol. 9, Serija: Migracije Radnika, Book 1, Zagreb, 1970; *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problem of Returning Emigrant Workers,* European Demographic Monographs, II, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 3; and "The Social and Economic Effects of Labor Emigration from Yugoslavia," *Geografski glasnik* (Zagreb), 1971-72, pp. 25-59.

[8] Estimates of the share of urban population in the total range from 32 to 38 percent. In the absence of definitive data from the 1971 census, the author has chosen 35 percent as the most realistic figure for purposes of this study. Problems of defining "urban" in the Yugoslav context are discussed by Joel Halpern in his "Yugoslavia; Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State," in Wayne Vucinich, Ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment,* Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1969, pp. 323-29. For statistical purposes, settlements are deemed rural settlements, towns, or mixed settlements according to a system developed by Milos Macura, who classes populated points on the basis of size and proportion of nonagricultural population. The minimum size of a town is set at 2,000, although some settlements of smaller size in the mountainous areas of northwest Slovenia may well be "urban."

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indicate. As implied above, more than 58 percent of the population in 1971 was "nonagricultural." The difference, 23 percent (or 58 minus 35), represents a large body of people who live in "rural" areas but do not participate in agriculture, many of them commuting to work in the cities and towns. These so-called "peasant/workers," have formed an important part of Yugoslavia's commuting labor force. The 1961 census listed 3,529,000 workers and employees (over 35 percent of total workers and employees) as "working outside the settlement where they lived." The proportion of such workers varied from republic to republic, ranging from 30 percent of workers and employees in Kosovo and Montenegro to 39 percent in Slovenia.[9]

The increase in urban population and in the number of rural residents engaged in nonagricultural work are only two facets of the broader deagrarianization and urbanization of Yugoslav society. "Urbanization" in this context involves something more than a mere expansion of existing cities and creation of new towns; it encompasses the creation of a whole "urban way of life," one which even spills over into the countryside and erases differences between rural and urban areas. This physical and functional transformation of Yugoslavia is visible in the development of a modern road network and of a dense pattern of settlement, and in the provision to the countryside of modern utilities, consumer goods, and other amenities usually associated with city life. (It should also be noted that there has been a reciprocal "ruralization" of many urban areas as a result of heavy and rapid migration to the cities from the countryside, but more on this later.)

The Stages of Migration

Yugoslavia's postwar migrations occurred in three stages, all of them reflecting the pressures of agrarian overpopulation and two of them responding to social and economic forces unleashed by the socialist program of industrialization. The first involved migration from marginal rural areas to more promising rural settings and occurred in the early postwar years in response to new opportunities opened by the dislocations of war and by the consolidation of Communist power. The second stage, which also began in the immediate postwar years and continues to the present, represented inter- and intraregional migration from the countryside to urban settlements in response to new employment opportunities in industry, administration, and the service sector. The most recent migratory stage has been the temporary (or in some cases, not so temporary) emigration from Yugoslavia in response to declining employment opportunities in the country's urban industrial centers.

The first migratory movement involved the colonization of the Pannonian region (Slavonia and Vojvodina) of Yugoslavia, a process which must be viewed in its own special historical, political and social context. The lands settled comprised those formerly held by Germans (expelled as a result of World War II), lands formerly farmed by seasonal workers, and medium-and large-sized estates nationalized and turned into state farms by the Communist government. The immigrants were mainly people from poor mountainous areas with a high natural population growth (particularly in Bosnia's northern border-



A harvest is wrested from a patch of arable soil in the Bosnian highlands, a traditional source of Yugoslav population migrations.

—Photo by Mladen Grevic in *Review* (Belgrade), July-August 1967, p. 31.

[9] Dusan Breznik, Ed., *Migracije stanovnistva Jugoslavije* (Population Migration in Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, Centar za Demografska Istrazivanja, 1971, p. 365.

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lands), and included some who had formerly been employed as seasonal workers in the same areas they now colonized. This shift of some 350,000 people into new natural and cultural environments caused its own serious problems of economic and social adaptation, but inasmuch as this was basically a migration from agriculture to agriculture, these issues will not be examined here.[10]

The second and more significant migratory flow in postwar Yugoslavia has been the inter- and intra-regional movement from agriculture to industry.[11] There have been great regional differences in this process and in the associated patterns of urbanization—variations which have reflected the differing levels of regional economic development as well as cultural and historical factors.

As noted earlier, Yugoslavia entered the postwar period with a sizable surplus agricultural population.[12] This population was drawn to the cities and towns by various "pull factors," the most notable of which was the Communist government's commitment to a Soviet-type model of industrialization. In order to provide an adequate supply of labor for new industries, the regime took steps to draw upon the abundant supply of agricultural labor. Government restrictions and taxation on private landholdings, many of them of uneconomical size, exerted pressure on the rural population, causing many of them to seek employment in new jobs opening up in industry and in the administrative and service sectors. Besides finding higher and steadier income in the cities, rural dwellers were attracted to the better educational opportunities and other advantages offered by "urban life." An increasing flow of migrants began to move from low-employment, low-income areas with high rates of population growth to the cities and towns. Once started, this migration became an irresistible force with a momentum of its own, requiring further industrialization and urbanization.

This second stage of population movement swelled the industrial labor force and thereby spurred production growth. However, the whole society began to pay the costs of excess industrial employment. By the mid-1960's the Yugoslav leaders found it necessary to introduce wide-ranging economic reforms based on application of the market mechanism and designed to increase the efficiency of industrial operations. In place of the centrally planned and administered "command economy," there was to be decentralization. Productivity and profitability were introduced as performance criteria for managers, and special attention was given to the introduction of advanced technology rather than to the construction of new plants.

This radical policy shift also involved a break with the postwar principle that surplus agricultural labor had "a right to employment" in industry, administration or social services. The upshot was that the intake of new workers dramatically declined, while some existing workers were even dismissed or prematurely pensioned off. In spite of declining urban employment opportunities, however, the flow of population from rural to urban areas continued unabated. As a consequence, combined unemployment in the socialist and private sectors rose sharply, reaching 7 percent in 1966 and almost 9 percent by 1971. While this rise was fueled in part by the early postwar bulge in births, the main causal factor was the reduced ability of the urban-industrial economy to absorb surplus rural manpower.

It was the rise in unemployment within Yugoslavia that led to the third major stage of postwar Yugoslav migrational movements—a complex phase in which

[10] This process is discussed in D. Kostic, "Agrarian Reform and Changes in the Life of Postwar Settlers in Vojvodina," *Stanovnistvo* (Belgrade), No. 5, 1967; Vladimir Djuric, "Changes in the Structure of the Population in the Vojvodina," *Zbornik radova* (University of Belgrade, Institute of Geography), pp. 3-13 (in Serbo-Croatian with French summary); Milenko S. Filipovic, *Proucavanje naseljavanja Vojvodina* (Study of the Settlement of the Vojvodina), Novi Sad, Matica Srpska, 1958; and Mihailovic, "Socioeconomic Aspects . . .," *loc. cit.*, pp. 28-30. For an extremely interesting presentation in historical geography, see Josip Roglic, "Die Gebirge als die Wiege des Geschichtlichen Geschehens in Südosteuropa" (Mountains as the Cradle of Historical Existence in Southeast Europe), *Colloquium Geographicum, Argumenta Geographica,* Festzeitschrift Carl Troll, Vol. 12, Bonn, Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1970, pp. 225-39.

[11] Among the most perceptive works by geographers, ethnographers and sociologists on population movements in Yugoslavia are: Dusan Breznik, *op. cit.* (fn. 9); Vladimir Djuric, "Contemporary Migrations of Population in Yugoslavia," *Przeglad geograficzny* (Warsaw), No. 35, 1964, pp. 670-89; Ivan Ginic, *Dinamika i struktura gradskog stanovnistva Jugoslavije* (Dynamics and Structures of the Urban Population of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, Centar za Demografska Istrazivanja, 1967, and "Dynamics of the Yugoslav Urban Population According to the First Results of the 1971 Population Census," *Stanovnistvo,* January-June 1971, pp. 25-39; Petar Markovic and Darinka Kostic, "Structural Changes in the Yugoslav Countryside in the Postwar Period, 1945-1962," *Sociologija* (Belgrade), Vol. 6, 1964, pp. 170-95; and Josip Roglic, "Some Characteristics of the Yugoslav Population Movement," *Matica iseljenicki kalendar* (Zagreb), 1966. See also three contributions in *Berichte zur Regionalforschung "WGI"* (Munich), No. 9, 1972, edited by J. Maier: Hermann Gross and W. Guppel on structural changes in Yugoslav agrarian population; Franze Ronneberger and Heinz Kontezki on agricultural cooperatives; and Karl Ruppert on deagrarianization.

[12] Rosenstein-Rodan, *Agricultural Surplus . . .*, and Rudolf Bicanic, *Agrarna prenapucenost* (Agrarian Overpopulation), Zagreb, 1940.

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a wave of emigration abroad in search of employment or personal betterment developed alongside the continuing domestic rural-urban migration. We shall return to the subject of emigration and its social impact later.

Patterns of Migration

Turning briefly to an examination of the patterns of interregional migration in postwar Yugoslavia, one discovers that decisions to migrate and the direction of movements of population have been influenced by a variety of factors—historical, cultural and economic.

Although the massive interregional migrations since World War II have encompassed literally every region of the country, a significant portion of the movement has followed established historical routes. The late Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijic identified three such migratory currents: 1) *the Dinaric stream,* originating in the mountains of Herzegovina; 2) *the Kosovo stream,* originating in the mountains of Kapaonik and Mount Saca; and 3) *the Vardar stream,* originating in South Morava and Upper Vardar. From these mountainous areas of the south and west excess population has historically migrated to the valleys and plains of the north and east—particularly to the Sumadija of Inner Serbia and into the Pannonian Basin, especially Vojvodina.[13]

Ethnicity has also had its effect on the patterns of migration. As a general rule, those ethnic groups having a distinctive language and culture of their own and a strong sense of group identity have been less disposed to migrate outside their native regions, and at the same time the regions inhabited by them have been less attractive to potential migrants from other regions of the country. Thus, Slovenia, Kosovo (with its predominant Albanian population), and regions settled by Hungarians (mostly in Vojvodina) received relatively few immigrants from other parts of the country—at least before 1965. Conversely, in spite of strong population pressures, there was very little movement out of Kosovo, at least until quite recently, because of the unique linguistic and religious characteristics of the region's Albanian majority (Slovenia and Vojvodina, with their own distinct languages, represented a particular obstacle to any such migration). Migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina—major origins of such movements—has generally been toward Serbia, Vojvodina, Croatia, and also toward the Central Bosnian industrial region along the Sarajevo-Zenica axis, again reflecting ethnic affinities. Until recently, Inner Serbia received large numbers of Serbian-speaking immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and parts of Croatia. In more recent years, Serbian-speaking migrants have also entered Inner Serbia from Kosovo under political pressure from the dominant Albanian population in the latter region (Albanians comprised 73 percent of Kosovo's population according to the 1971 census). Ethnic differences continue to play a role among Yugoslavs working abroad. Those from ethnically distinct regions such as Kosovo tend to keep closer together while abroad, to return sooner to their native regions, and to pass on jobs abroad to relatives.

Serbia's position through most of the postwar period as Yugoslavia's only area of net in-migration from other regions reflects not only historical and ethnic factors but also an important economic factor—the heavy investment of the federal government in the industrial development of advantageously located regional centers in this republic during the 1950's and early 1960's. This investment priority shifted during the 1960's, and for the decade as a whole per capita investment and income in the



The old and the new mix in Titograd, the rapidly growing capital of the Montenegrin Republic.

—Photo by Sonja Bullaty/Angelo Lomeo for Rapho Guillumette.

[13] See Cvijic's *La Péninsule Balkanique* (The Balkan Peninsula), Paris, Armand Colin, 1918. Josip Roglic has described the Dinaric mountains as a folk fortress, serving as a refuge in times of stress and as the source of migrants in more peaceful times (see "On the Geographical Position and Economic Development of Yugoslavia", *Geografski glasnik*, Vols. 11-12, 1950, pp. 11-26).

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republic were below the national averages. As a result, the flow of rural-urban migration shifted toward the two most advanced republics—Slovenia and Croatia—in part, to fill the gap caused by the emigration abroad of some 300,000 persons from these republics in the late 1960's. Recent travelers to Yugoslavia can attest to the large number of laborers from Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia working in Slovenia and Croatia on apartment and road-building projects. The less-developed regions suffered particularly under the 1965 reforms (especially in 1966-69) as the switch in economic decision-making toward cost consciousness rather than expansion of production at any cost impeded efforts to create employment for their surplus rural populations. At first migrants from these areas sought jobs in developed regions, but later the flow swung abroad.

Dynamics of Urbanization

As noted above, massive population movements and rapid urbanization were two intimately linked aspects of the dramatic socioeconomic transformation of postwar Yugoslavia. Under the impetus of the government's industrialization policies and largely fueled by immigrants from overpopulated rural areas, the growth of urban population accelerated sharply after World War II.[14] From 1921 to 1953, the share of urban population in the total population grew by only 5 percentage points, accounting for 21.9 percent of the total population in the latter year. Between 1953 and 1961, the urban population jumped to 28.3 percent, and by 1971 it accounted for 35 percent of total population. According to the 1961 census, the proportion of urban residents born outside the city in which they were then living was 58.7 percent, and this proportion was even slightly higher (58.9 percent) in the 1971 census. Of the 4,099,000 urban "immigrants" reported in 1971, more than half (2,146,000) came from rural communities, and another 421,000 from mixed communities. Furthermore, the extent of rural-urban migration is understated in such data inasmuch as the census counts as "immigrants" only those whose most recent move was from the country to the city, excluding many who moved from other urban areas but originally came from rural settings. Judging from the 1961 data, some of Yugoslavia's larger cities had an even lower percentage of native sons than the national average (41.3 percent). Only 30 percent of Belgrade residents in 1961 had been born in the city; the figures for Zagreb and Titograd were 36 and 38 percent, respectively.[15]

Two basic forms of development can be observed in Yugoslavia's urbanization: (1) migration directly from rural villages into towns, and more specifically into new residential areas which either had been planned or had spontaneously developed around old urban nuclei; and (2) the slow transformation of farming villages into urbanized settlements which in time developed into urbanized zones and regions. A considerable portion of Yugoslavia's postwar urbanization has been concentrated in the country's larger cities—from 1961 to 1971, the number of cities with more than 20,000 population grew from 59 to 80, and their share in total urban population rose from 18.7 to 26 percent. The growth in the network of small and medium-sized cities was slower, with important consequences for the overall transformation of society. Judging by the proportion of population still living in rural areas or in settlements with a population under 2,000 (59 percent in 1961, 1971 data not being available) and by the number of cities with a population over 100,000 (only nine as of 1971), Yugoslavia must be considered underurbanized. Thus the major postwar transformation of Yugoslav society occurred without the concurrent development of an integrated and adequate system of cities and towns.

The result has been an interpenetration of urban and rural social patterns, as suggested earlier. Dennison I. Rusinow has raised the question of "whether a combination of rapid urbanization (in

[14] From the rich and diversified Yugoslav literature on urban studies, the following are most useful: Dolfe Vogelnik, *Urbanizacija kao odraz privrednog razvoja FNRJ* (Urbanization in Yugoslavia as an Expression of Its Economic Development), Belgrade, Ekonomska Biblioteka 13, 1961; Igor Vriser, "The Urbanization of Yugoslavia," *Geografisk tijdschrift* (Denmark), September 1971, pp. 491-95; "Postwar Urban Geography in Yugoslavia," *Jugoslovanski simpozij o urbani geografiji* (Yugoslav Symposium on Urban Geography), Ljubljana, Oct. 5-7, 1970, pp. 13-23; "The Pattern of Central Places in Yugoslavia," *Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie* (Rotterdam), September-October 1971, pp. 290-300; and *Vplivna obmocja Jugoslovanshih mest in drugih sredisc* (Areas of Influence of Yugoslav Towns and Other Centers), Ljubljana, Filozofska Fakulteta Univerza v Ljubljani, 1972; and Stanko Zuljic, "The Degree of Urbanization in Yugoslavia as an Important Characteristic and a Factor of Development," *Geografski glasnik*, No. 32, 1970, pp. 101-22, and "The Metropolitan Regions and Their Significance for Further Urbanization in Yugoslavia," *Jugoslovanski simpozij . . .*, pp. 27-38.

[15] Findings of the 1971 census in this regard are not yet available.

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YUGOSLAVIA:

Administrative Divisions

Urbanization Pattern



SOURCE: Adapted from Stanko Zuljić, "The Degree of Urbanization in Yugoslavia as an Important Characteristic and a Factor of Development," *Geografski glasnik* (Zagreb), No. 32, 1971, p. 120, by Jean T. Hannaford, Department of Geography, The University of Texas at Austin.

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the narrow sense of the growth of towns) with increased rapid deagrarianization is more likely to lead to the urbanization of rural areas (in the wider sense of the diffusion of the 'urban way of life') or to the 'peasantization' of the city . . ." His answer is that this is likely to depend on "historically derived attitudes and other psychological factors.[16] In any case, it is clear that urbanization is a long-term sociological process involving not only the slow adoption of the "urban way of life" by newcomers to the towns, but also the urbanization of villages and the ruralization of towns.

Obviously, the pace and extent of these transformations are affected by the size of the towns and by the proportion of urban workers who actually reside in the towns. Due to the serious housing shortages which developed in the cities and towns, industries often encouraged workers from rural areas to remain in their agricultural households and utilize company-provided transportation to urban work sites—a practice that is quite common in developing countries. In Yugoslavia, such "peasant-workers" are estimated to constitute as much as 30 to 40 percent of the total nonagricultural work force.[17] This contributes to the difficulty of drawing an exact line between rural and urban in this country. There are many small and medium-sized towns in the Pannonian Basin whose population is not predominantly engaged in agriculture. Yet many larger towns incorporate small villages, often preserving the latter's essentially rural character. Moreover, the largely unskilled rural labor which moved into the cities (either due to expansion of industrial employment or as replacements for emigrating skilled labor) adjusted only slowly to the requirements of modern urban industrial society.

Regional Variations

Patterns of urbanization have varied markedly from region to region, reflecting different historical experiences, cultural heterogeneity, great spatial differences, the federalized and decentralized administrative structure, and varying rates of economic development. The consequence of this variation has been a *polycentric* type of urbanization, which has proved insufficient to cope with the pressures of "deagrarianization."

Regional variations in urbanization can be expressed in terms of the share of urban population in the total population of the individual regions as of 1971. Macedonia, with 37 percent of its population living in its cities as of that date, is the most urbanized region. In second position was Vojvodina (31.3 percent), while Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro ranked lowest, with a 15-percent concentration of urban population.[18] When one examines the rate of growth of total urban population by region, the same general pattern emerges, with the exception of Montenegro, which—starting from a very low number of urban inhabitants—registered the fastest growth (241.4 percent) in urban population of any region between 1953 and 1971 (see Table 1).

One factor in these variations is the differing historical patterns of urban formation in Yugoslavia's individual regions. Jack Fisher has noted that the North (Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina), whose cities developed during the Hapsburg and Venetian domination of those regions, is generally more diversified and urban, with a "rank-size" distribution, *i.e.*, a great variety of different-size cities, whereas the cities of the South tend to be more "primate," *i.e.*, less developed, as manifested in a larger percentage of cities of less than 60,000 population and a dearth of middle-size cities (or those with populations of 60,000 to 150,000).[19]

Emphasis on the traditional historical divisions of the country and on decentralization further contributed to a polycentric development of urban places. Yugoslavia lacks a single metropolis, a true "national capital," which might serve as a major nucleus of urban growth. On the other hand, decisions concerning the establishment of regional administrative centers under the federal structure

[16] "Some Aspects of Migration and Urbanization in Yugoslavia," American Universities Field Staff, *Field Staff Report Southeast Europe Series*, Vol. 19, No. 2, DIR 2-72, p. 1. Joel Halpern has also written extensively on this topic—see his "Peasant Culture and Urbanization in Yugoslavia," *Human Organization* (Washington, DC), No. 24, 1965, pp. 162-74, and *A Serbian Village in Historical Perspective*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.

[17] See Kosta Mihailovic, *Regional Development—Experience and Prospects in Eastern Europe*, Paris, Mouton, 1972, pp. 82-84, and "Socioeconomic Aspects . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 33; also Vladimir Klemencic, "Social and Geographic Problems of the Worker-Peasant with Particular Attention to the Situation in Yugoslavia," in *Zum Standort der Sozialgeographie* (Social Geography on Its Home Grounds), Munich Studies on Social and Economic Geography, Vol. 4.

[18] Zagorka Anicic, "Population Changes in Yugoslavia," *Yugoslav Survey* (Belgrade), August 1971, p. 8.

[19] *Yugoslavia—Multinational State*, San Francisco, Chandler, 1966, p. 48. For example, he noted how the controlled and massive migration toward Skopje was tantamount to "planned restriction on the growth of middle-sized urban centers" in Macedonia.

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Table 1: Yugoslav Urban Population: 1953-71

	Urban Population			Rate of Growth		
	1953	1961	1971	1953-61	1961-71	1953-71
Bosnia-Herzegovina	466,901	640,081	933,006	137.1	145.8	199.8
Croatia	1,007,936	1,282,490	1,705,555	127.2	133.0	169.2
Macedonia	367,110	490,159	759,696	133.5	155.0	206.9
Montenegro	64,900	101,517	156,698	156.4	154.4	241.4
Serbia:	1,722,049	2,293,724	3,098,207	133.2	135.1	179.9
Serbia (proper)	976,478	1,382,683	1,928,538	141.6	139.5	197.5
Kosovo	138,790	192,430	308,365	138.6	160.2	222.2
Vojvodina	606,781	718,611	861,304	118.4	119.9	141.9
Slovenia	363,155	458,109	592,106	126.1	129.2	163.0
YUGOSLAVIA	**3,992,051**	**5,266,080**	**7,245,268**	**131.9**	**137.6**	**181.5**

SOURCE: Ivanka Ginic, "Dynamics of the Yugoslav Urban Population According to the First Results of the 1971 Population Census," *Stanovnistvo* (Belgrade), January-June 1971, p. 28.

adopted in Yugoslavia have contributed to the rapid growth of certain cities. Thus, the postwar selection of Titograd, Pristina, Skopje and Novi Sad as capitals of republics or autonomous provinces unquestionably accelerated their growth. Between 1948 and 1971, the population of Titograd increased fivefold (from 10,330 to 54,509); Skopje increased from 87,654 to 312,091; and Pristina grew from 19,631 to 69,424. The growth of Novi Sad was slower but still substantial (from 69,431 to 141,712).[20] However, the lack of a developed system of lesser-sized cities in the regions surrounding these new centers tended to prevent an even more rapid urbanization and transformation of life in those regions.[21]

Basically, however, industrialization has been the biggest factor responsible for the increasing flow of rural manpower into urban areas. Not only did this lead to the expansion of existing urban centers, but it also led to the establishment of new towns, *e.g.*, Novi Beograd, Velenje, and Novi Travnik. The process whereby industrial development and urbanization interact to promote economic growth and social transformation is a complex matter. To be most effective in their role as true poles of growth, towns and cities must spread the socioeconomic impulses they receive throughout the surrounding region. As Kosta Mihailovic has observed, the economic activity of a town taken as a whole must have sufficient strength to ensure "spread effects" over the entire structure to respond to the feedback effects.[22] The size and location of towns and regional centers and enterprises—as privileged development points from which spread effects must originate—determine the impact of such policies on the region.

Some indication of the varying way in which economic and spatial factors affected the process of urbanization and socioeconomic transformation in Yugoslavia can be seen from the cases of Slovenia and Montenegro. Slovenia, to start with, had a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises and entered the postwar period with a decentralized system of urban settlements of varying size. Many of these enterprises and towns have acted as development poles for their immediate environs, and today more than 90 percent of all settlements with a population over 2,000 are classified as urban. Yet the decentralized character of urban development in the republic has its drawbacks. There does not exist a single large enterprise which might serve as a development pole of sufficient strength to leave its mark on the structure of the republic as a whole.

[20] See the census data for 1971; also *Yugoslav Survey*, August 1971, p. 7.

[21] Jack Fisher, *op. cit.*, and Vriser, "The Pattern of Central Places in Yugoslavia," *loc. cit.*

[22] "The Dynamics of Structural Changes as Context for the Growth Pole Theory, with Special Reference to Yugoslavia," draft paper, Belgrade, February 1972. Mihailovic has indicated that this paper will be published in various forms in Yugoslavia, in the USSR, and with the UN. It should be noted here that Yugoslav regional development was not based on "growth pole theory," but instead reflected decisions made during the period of centralization in the multinational country.

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Only Ljubljana and Maribor have a population over 50,000; there are one town each in the 30,000-50,000 and 20,000-30,000 range, and five in the range of 10,000-20,000. A full 61 percent of the population resides in places with a population of less than 2,000. The result of this pattern of urbanization is that in 1969 some 38 percent of the work force was commuting an average distance of 20 kilometers daily—often by car or bicycle.

The situation in Montenegro, while different, proved to be hardly more conducive to the development of an adequate network of cities and towns. A large proportion (70 percent) of postwar investment in the republic was concentrated in three large enterprises of basic industry located in two cities. Without going into detail, it can be stated that these cities had relatively weak spread effects in furthering the socioeconomic transformation of the republic and the integration of its regions.[23]

Most industrial expansion occurred in developed parts of the country, in and around existing towns. This precipitated a relatively quick growth of urban population and a spontaneous and uncontrolled expansion of towns (either by absorption of surrounding rural settlements or by creation of new residential areas). Serious housing shortages, insufficient utilities, and failure to renew older urban neighborhoods resulted.

Contributing to this somewhat chaotic development was a boom in private single-family housing construction in the 1960's. In 1964, private construction accounted for 57.6 percent of all residential building, and the figure reached 77.4 percent in 1969. More recent reports indicate a still further rise in the proportion of private residential buildings, with public housing construction actually ceasing in some cities in 1970 and 1971. Earnings of Yugoslavs working abroad have contributed to the boom in private home building, with some undesirable results. The construction of homes in the temporary emigrants' original home locality, often on unsuitable and dispersed locations with insufficient or no basic health and utility installations, has not appreciably benefited the economy and has in fact often worked counter to current economic needs and long-term social plans.

Emigration—A Safety Valve?

Having examined the patterns of interregional migration and its impact on urbanization processes in Yugoslavia, let us now turn to the third major postwar migratory movement—the emigration of Yugoslav labor to Western Europe and beyond in search of jobs or a better livelihood. Prior to the economic reforms, only 7,000 Yugoslavs were formally registered with employment services as being employed abroad, although estimates compiled by the Federal Republic of Germany for 1964 indicated that some 115,000 (including 53,000 in the FRG

A young Macedonian woman, typical of many who have left house and farm to work in industry.

—Photo by Blagoje Drnkov in Review (Belgrade), June 1971, p. 16.

[23] For a more detailed discussion of the problems of location decisions in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, see F. E. Ian Hamilton, "The Spatial Development of Industry in East Europe: The Principles and Their Impact," *Economic Planning* (Canada), March 1970, pp. 3-6, and "Location Factors in the Yugoslav Iron and Steel Industry," *Economic Geography* (Worcester, Mass.), No. 40, January 1964, pp. 46-64. See also Dennison I. Rusinow, "Slovenia: Modernization without Urbanization?" American Universities Field Staff, *Southeast Europe Series*, Vol. 20, No. 1, DIR 1-73, and the present author's *Regional Development Strategy in Southeast Europe, op. cit.*, pp. 186-89.

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Table 2: Employment of Yugoslavs at Home and Abroad, 1971

	Total Population (1,000's)	(%)	Employed in Yugoslavia (1,000's)	(%)	Rate of Employment (%)	Yugoslav Workers Employed Abroad in 1971: 1971 Census (1,000's)	(%)	Independent Estimate [a] (1,000's)	(%)	Census Total (% pop.)	Est. Total	Census Total (% dom. emp.)	Est. Total
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,743	18.3	518	13.4	12.9	137	20.4	195	22.7	3.7	5.2	26.4	37.6
Croatia	4,423	21.6	966	25.1	21.2	225	33.4	330	38.4	5.2	7.5	23.3	34.2
Macedonia	1,647	8.0	259	6.7	15.5	54	8.1	57	6.6	3.4	3.5	20.8	22.0
Montenegro	530	2.6	78	2.0	13.8	8	1.2	8	0.9	3.7	5.2	10.2	10.2
Serbia:													
Serbia Proper	5,242	25.4	976	25.2	18.3	115	17.1	120	14.0	2.2	2.3	11.8	12.3
Kosovo	1,245	6.1	100	2.6	7.9	24	3.6	25	2.9	1.9	2.0	24.0	25.0
Vojvodina	1,950	9.5	406	10.8	20.6	61	9.0	65	7.5	3.2	3.3	15.0	16.0
Slovenia	1,725	8.4	547	14.2	30.9	48	7.2	60	7.0	2.9	3.5	8.8	11.0
YUGOSLAVIA	**20,505**	**100.0**	**3,850**	**100.0**	**18.2**	**672**	**100.0**	**860**	**100.0**	**3.3**	**4.2**	**17.5**	**22.3**

[a] These estimates of Yugoslavs employed abroad in 1971 were derived by Ivo Baucic in the referenced source.

SOURCE: Adapted from Ivo Baucic, *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problems of Returning Emigrant Workers*, European Demographic Monographs II, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 13.

itself) were working abroad in European countries.[24] After the economic reform, emigration accelerated rapidly, and by the March 1971 census there were reportedly some 671,908 Yugoslavs temporarily living and working abroad—amounting to some 3.3 percent of the total population and 15.2 percent of the total registered nonagricultural labor force.[25] One should probably add to this figure another 190,000 who have moved overseas and presumably cannot be considered "temporary workers abroad," bringing the total number of emigrants to some 860,000 (see Table 2). This indicated an emigration rate of 4.2 percent, the highest in Europe except for Portugal.[26] (Reports in 1972 and 1973 suggest that the number of Yugoslavs working abroad may now run as high as one million.[27] In a recent study the Yugoslav economist Kosta Mihailovic observed that the average number of Yugoslav workers finding employment abroad after 1965 has approximated the annual increments to domestic employment before 1964. This was an indication to him that the pressures of rural overpopulation had not diminished but had turned from Yugoslavia's cities to foreign countries for release.[28]

The picture that emerges from the 1971 census, however, suggests that the process was more complex than a mere diversion of rural-urban migration to foreign countries. While many of the emigrants were underskilled workers from traditional rural areas of high population growth and relative poverty, a majority (over 57 percent) were qualified and skilled workers, many of whom had already been employed in Yugoslavia before departing. A full 22.3 percent of the emigrants had completed technical school, high school or university training. These skilled workers amounted to about 8 percent of the

[24] See Ivo Baucic, *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problem of Returning Emigrant Workers*, European Demographic Monographs, Vol. 2, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 3; and "The Social and Economic Effects of Labor Emigration from Yugoslavia," *Geografski glasnik*, Vols. 33-34, 1971-72, pp. 25-59.

[25] See Miloje Nikolic, "Some Basic Features of Yugoslav External Migrants," *Yugoslav Survey* (Belgrade), February 1972, p. 4.

[26] Baucic, *The Effects of Emigration* . . ., p. 3.

[27] See, for example, "The One in 20 Who Prefers it Abroad," *The Economist* (London), Sept. 5, 1970; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), Aug. 16, 1972, which speaks of some 600,000 Yugoslavs in West Germany out of one million in West Europe; and Radio Free Europe Research, "Problems of Manpower Export in Yugoslavia," *Yugoslavia: Economy*, Jan. 22, 1973, which quotes Ivo Jerkic, Chairman of the Federal Committee for External Migration, as stating in September 1972 that there were "about one million Yugoslav citizens working in the West: 800,000 in West European states and 200,000 in overseas countries."

[28] "Socioeconomic Aspects . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 37; see also United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Ad Hoc* Committee of Experts, "Socioeconomic Implications of Agrarian Overpopulation," June-July 1970, E/CN.9/AC, 11/L.7, June 1970.

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country's total force of employed skilled labor (including both domestic and foreign employment). Moreover, half or perhaps even more of those working abroad came from the more developed republics and regions—Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina (see Table 2 for 1971 data and more recent estimates of the rate of emigration by region). In the case of Croatia, the data suggest that more than 20 percent of the republic's total nonagricultural labor force may be employed abroad. Thus, the number of persons emigrating abroad from a given region to find employment has tended to be higher the higher the level of the region's economic development, rather than lower as conventional wisdom might predict.[29] The distribution of emigration by regions is presented in the accompanying figure.

The 1971 census also reveals the surprising fact that the flow of emigration first originated in urban areas, among skilled workers of middle age (30-45), and only later spread to less skilled and younger people from mixed settlements and rural communities. For example, in the period 1965-69, somewhat more than half of the emigrants to West Germany came from urban areas of Yugoslavia. As of 1970, some 84 percent of the workers temporarily employed abroad were between the ages of 18 and 39 (one-third of the total below 25). The average age of the emigrants was 30.8 years; 71 percent were married; and 68.6 percent were male.[30]

Recent motivational studies conducted among Yugoslav emigrant workers in West Germany help to broaden our understanding of these unexpected statistical data. In one sample survey, nearly three-fourths of those questioned gave as their motivation for coming to work in West Germany the desire to find housing or employment or to secure higher pay. Fully 77 percent had been employed before emigrating, and roughly half were currently working in job categories similar to those in which they had worked in Yugoslavia. The survey concluded that the wish to increase income, rather than escape from unemployment, had been a major motivating force for a substantial portion of the emigrants. For example, the average personal income of workers from Croatia was 2.64 times as great as they had earned at home, which indicated that the individual, by working four and one-half months abroad, can earn roughly the same monetary income as he would if employed for twelve months in Croatia. Obviously, in terms of real income the differential is much less, but as the poll indicated, this reality plays a minor role in the perceptions of the emigrant workers.[31]

The employment of a sizable number of Yugoslavs outside the country does have some distinct short-term advantages for the society as well as for the individual emigrants. It has unquestionably served as a safety valve for potential social unrest during a period of increased domestic unemployment. Moreover, the 20 percent of their earnings which Yugoslav workers abroad remit or bring back home represents a not insignificant sum—amounting to $90 million in 1966, $441 million in 1970, and over $800 million in 1972. These funds tend to be invested in housing, taxis, restaurants and farm tractors, all of which presumably improve the life style of the individuals involved.[32]

However, in the long run, the negative side of the ledger may prove to be more significant both for the

[29] Nikolic, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-8.

[30] Ivo Baucic, *Origin and Structure of Yugoslav Workers in the German Federal Republic, op. cit.*

[31] *Ibid.* Volume 10 in this series discusses "The Return and Reemployment of External Migrants from the Socialist Republic of Croatia"; for a summary in English, see Mustafa Begtic, "Yugoslav Nationals Temporarily Working Abroad," *Yugoslav Survey,* February 1972, pp. 17-30. The author confirmed these findings in an informal polling of 74 Yugoslav emigrant workers in February 1972 at the Munich Hauptbahnhof, a major center for arrivals of such workers.

[32] See Ivo Baucic, "Some Economic Characteristics of the Yugoslav Foreign Migration of Workers," a paper presented at an international meeting on "Conditions for the Development of Countries in the Mediterranean Area," held at Cagliari-Nuoro (Sardinia, Italy) on Jan. 19-21, 1973.

Table 3: Population Growth by Region

(natural increase per 1,000)

	1950-54 [a]	1960-64 [a]	1971
Bosnia-Herzegovina	24.3	22.6	15.1
Croatia	11.5	7.5	4.4
Macedonia	23.9	19.7	15.6
Montenegro	22.1	19.6	13.2
Serbia:			
Serbia (proper)	14.8	7.9	6.2
Kosovo	25.5	28.6	29.1
Vojvodina	10.9	6.6	3.0
Slovenia	11.9	8.3	6.3
YUGOSLAVIA	**16.4**	**12.7**	**9.5**

[a] Rates shown for 1950-54 and for 1960-64 are averages of annual rates in those periods.

SOURCE: *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1972* (Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia, 1972), Belgrade, 1972, p. 343.

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individuals and for the country as a whole. Even the investments made at home by the emigrant workers are not necessarily geared to meet the needs of the domestic economy. Thus, as Ivo Baucic has observed, of the areas of investment chosen, all but housing are already in oversupply. Moreover, "inadequate and often-changing tax policies and political positions toward private enterprises" tend to discourage long-term investment of skills and resources by returning workers in such essential occupations as the servicing and repair of automobiles, electric household appliances, and television sets.[33] Moreover, the temporary or permanent loss of qualified workers impedes the country's economic development. A further threat lies in the ever-present danger of a foreign recession, which could lead to a mass return of workers from abroad, aggravating the already serious unemployment at home.

The emigrant-worker phenomenon is also socially disruptive. A high proportion (71 percent of those "temporarily abroad" in 1971) of the workers are married,[34] and the separation of husbands and fathers from their wives and children in Yugoslavia places serious social and psychological pressures on families, and particularly on youth. Demographically, moreover, the emigration of workers has contributed to a reduction in the rate of natural increase of the population. As demonstrated in Table 3, this decrease has been most pronounced in the advanced regions—Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina (which have also been major sources of emigration)—whereas, by contrast, in the less-developed region of Kosovo, the rate of population increase has actually risen. In the ethnically diverse Yugoslav society, this combination of a high rate of population increase in the underdeveloped regions and decelerating population growth in the more advanced sections of the country has serious political as well as demographic repercussions and has contributed to the long-smoldering national question.

Yugoslavia's Dilemma

Let us now recapitulate our findings concerning the impact of postwar migrations on Yugoslav society as a basis for examining where the country can or might go from here. Like many developing nations seeking to transform themselves from agrarian into modern, industrialized societies, Yugoslavia has found itself unable to provide sufficient jobs, housing, transportation, services and utilities for the excess rural population flooding into the cities at least in part in response to those very development policies. The nation's cities grew with little regard for medium or even short-term economic and social objectives or, for that matter, for environmental impact (witness the continued proximity of an iron-and-steel works to the center of Skopje when the city was rebuilt following the 1963 earthquake).[35] At the same time rural migratory pressures continued to accumulate as a result of the lure of the cities and the relative neglect of agriculture and other aspects of rural life. Whole villages were abandoned, and valuable land went untilled as the most youthful and productive among the rural population concluded there was little future in agriculture and joined the trek to the cities.

Yugoslavia's migratory movements have been excessive and generally uncontrolled, giving rise to a social and political instability which will continue unless the process is somehow brought under effective control. Yet to do so—as we shall see below—may involve a rethinking of the dominant postwar developmental priorities, or at least a moderation of the pace at which the society moves toward the goals of industrialization and urbanization. All studies agree that deagrarianization and urbanization can be expected to continue. Some 41 percent of the active population is still in agriculture, and as matters stand, this represents a formidable reserve of underutilized manpower and hence of potential rural-urban migrants. Forecasts for 1975 see the urban population increasing to 36 percent of the total, and it is estimated that the proportion will rise to 42 percent by 1986.[36] In such circumstances, the country's large cities will show further increases in population, but the present pattern of numerous small and medium-sized towns and a sizable non-urban but nonagricultural population will likely persist—and perhaps should be encouraged (as we shall see below).

The question uppermost in the minds of the nation's planners, economists and politicians is how

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] See fn. 30.

[35] For discussion of urban problems, see Vladimir-Braco Music, "The Response of Yugoslav Urban Planning to Development of the Country," a paper presented at the Joint Institute on Comparative Urban and Grants Economics, University of Windsor, Canada, November 1972.

[36] Igor Vriser, "The Urbanization of Yugoslavia," mimeographed paper, Ljubljana, 1971, p. 14.

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ORIGINS OF YUGOSLAV WORKERS ABROAD

(As percent of total population by commune, according to 1971 Census)



SOURCE: Adapted from Ivo Baućić, *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problems of Returning Emigrant Workers*, European Demographic Monographs II, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 46.

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A group of Yugoslav workers in Switzerland get together for lunch in the factory cafeteria.

—Photo by *Politika*, as reproduced in *Review* (Belgrade), March 1969, p. 35.

to slow the steady stream of rural migrants, how best to accommodate this surplus population—in rural, urban, and/or foreign jobs and domiciles. A recent joint party-state resolution indicated a desire to effect "a gradual reduction in the departure of workers for employment abroad" and to create conditions for the return of experts and skilled workers in particular."[37] President Tito has spoken of the "hostile ideological influences" to which workers may be subjected abroad and of the loss of 300,000 potential conscripts for the armed forces —"three full armies"—represented by Yugoslav young men working abroad.[38] Only time will tell whether projected efforts to lure skilled labor back to Yugoslavia by providing better employment and remuneration conditions will prove successful. (That many emigrant workers actively wish to return has been evidenced by the fact that, of 170,000 Croatians employed abroad who spent the 1971 New Year's holiday at home, 126,000 expressed their hope to return to Yugoslavia after three-year work stints abroad.[39]

A recent study by a group of Belgrade demographers and economists indicated recognition of the need to take integrated actions to cope with the many consequences of excessive migration—depressed agricultural production, deficient urban planning, insufficient services and housing, etc.[40] One basis for such a comprehensive plan of social and economic development has emerged in the document "Fundamentals of a Policy of Urbanization and Spatial Planning, Theses" (*Temeliji politike urbanizacije in prostorske ureditve, Teze*), prepared by the Commission for Urban Planning at the Yugoslav Federal Parliament and published for public discussion.[41] Inasmuch as any such planning must be articulated on a regionally differentiated basis, it is heartening to note recent republic legislation on regional planning.[42] To be effective, such basic laws will need to be buttressed with adequate mechanisms for implementation of planned urban and spatial development.

Any solution to the complex problems posed by migration, urbanization and emigration in Yugoslavia will require major decisions concerning the type of socioeconomic development to be pursued. At present there is a debate in Yugoslavia—noted by the late Rudolf Bicanic, and by Branko Horvat, Kosta Mihailovíc, and other Yugoslavian specialists —over whether to continue the polarized pattern of socioeconomic development (with advanced and underdeveloped regions) or to give higher priority to the less developed regions in an attempt to close the gap.[43] The underdeveloped regions have, for the most part, arrived at the stage of economic take-off. If a decision were made to foster continued and accelerating economic growth in these regions, cities here might be able to attract a significant portion of local rural population which has tended to migrate to the cities of other, more developed regions. To achieve this, existing economic activities in the less-developed regions would have to be expanded—with a diversification of industries and dispersal of plants among small and medium-sized towns in such a

[37] Radio Free Europe Research, "Yugoslavia Curbs Labor Exports to Western Countries," *Yugoslavia: Economy*, Feb. 7, 1973.

[38] "Tito Voices Concern Over Influences on Young Workers Abroad," *The New York Times*, Dec. 9, 1972.

[39] Baucic, "Some Economic Characteristics . . ., *op. cit.*

[40] Breznik, *Migracije stanovnistva Jugoslavia, op. cit.*

[41] An English translation was published in Belgrade by Knjiznica Zvezne Skupstine, 1969.

[42] Slovenia has taken the initiative here, in part as a result of the very basic contributions of the American-Yugoslav Project in Regional and Urban Planning located originally at the Center for Urban Studies of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. See the Project's *International Collaboration in Planning Research: Summary Report of the Ljubljana Region. Demonstration Study*, April 1972; also Jack C. Fisher, "The Emergence of Regional Spatial Planning in Yugoslavia: The Slovenian Experience," in George W. Hoffman, Ed., *Eastern Europe: Essays in Geographical Problems*, London and New York, Methuen and Praeger, 1971, pp. 301-53 (with comments by Ivan Crkvencic and Joseph Velikonja and a summary of remarks, pp. 354-63).

[43] For a summary of the various viewpoints, see Hoffman, *Regional Development . . .*, pp. 209-14.

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way as to meet local as well as regional needs. In light of the possible adverse effect on economies of scale, this process would have to be carefully integrated on a regional, if not national, basis. Increased attention would have to be paid to development of existing, and creation of new, regional centers, both as key points in the network of central places for location of economic and noneconomic functions and as growth poles for tributary regions. Development of the needed administrative and service infrastructure would provide further employment opportunities. In addition, increased attention to consumer goods industries, tourism, and the private service sector might further help not only to increase opportunities for employment of surplus rural manpower but also to provide possible outlets for the talents and savings of Yugoslav workers now abroad.

While such steps would undoubtedly help to increase the ability of Yugoslavia's urban system to absorb more immigrants from the countryside (as well as to decrease emigration and further encourage the return of foreign workers), it seems likely that still other measures would be needed to cope with the problem of rural overpopulation. If the rural "push factor" is to be checked by means other than legal restrictions on changes of residence, revitalization of the countryside—through the reduction of existing differences between urban and rural areas with respect to income, social services, education, transportation, and the availability of consumer goods and services—would appear to be required.

One possible means of revitalizing the countryside, suggested recently by various Yugoslav planners, economists, and demographers, is to stimulate private agriculture—at present occupying about 80 percent of agricultural land—by raising the maximum permissible landholding and instituting other incentive measures. In return, these private farmers would be encouraged to produce labor-intensive items such as tobacco, fruits, and vegetables, which are in short supply in Yugoslavia.[44] Already private producers can purchase all kinds of agricultural equipment and receive loans at advantageous rates. Hence the restrictions on landholdings seem to satisfy ideological and psychological needs rather than rational economic purposes. In addition to eliminating this obstacle to profitable farming, the government might encourage private farming by reducing taxes on private agricultural production. Rural employment might also be increased by returning abandoned arable land to production, although caution would be required inasmuch as a considerable portion of this land is marginal and cannot be put into profitable production.

Finally, beyond improving the objective appeal of rural life, the government would have to reckon with deeply entrenched attitudes which view life in the city as preferable to life in the countryside. Joel Halpern has observed how the textbooks used in Yugoslav elementary schools reflect urban rather than rural values.[45] Presentation of a more balanced view of the relative advantages of rural and urban life in these formative years might alleviate some of the pressures of rural-urban migration in the future.

A major shift in the orientation of social development away from the former heavy commitment to an urban-industrial society toward a more balanced pattern of growth in which agrarian life plays an important part is obviously a long-term process fraught with serious economic and ideological questions. However, some such change may be required if the disrupting migratory tides are to be stemmed within a noncoercive framework. Any solution to this major dilemma will require a number of simultaneous, well-planned steps in all spheres of the social and economic life of the country. While integrated nationally, they will have to be differentiated regionally to reflect adequately the diversity of the multinational Yugoslav society.

[44] Discussions along these lines were prevalent among Yugoslav economists and politicians during 1969-71, but have not been evident since the internal upheavals of 1971-72.

[45] *Modernization* . . ., pp. 338-42; see also his study "Farming as a Way of Life: Yugoslav Peasant Attitutes," in Jerzy F. Karcz, Ed., *Soviet and East European Agriculture*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967 (with comments by the late Rudolf Bicanic, pp. 356-81, 382-84).

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Soviet Policy in East Asia

By Thomas W. Robinson

The Sino-Soviet border clashes of early 1969 signaled the beginning of a series of changes in major power relationships that, with surprising rapidity, have transformed the very essence of contemporary world politics. Having left the era of static East-West confrontation, we now find ourselves in an era of movement and dynamism. The People's Republic of China has emerged as a near superpower in the military sense. Japan has almost supplanted the Soviet Union as the world's second-ranking economic power. The United States has pulled its military forces out of the conflict in Southeast Asia. And a rapprochement of sorts has come about between the two erstwhile archenemies, the US and China.

East Asia has thus become the geographic center of world politics, in the sense that only in that region do the territorial, economic, and environmental interests of the major powers intersect directly. While developments in Europe and the Middle East possess great potential for causing rapid change in the contours of world politics, it is only in East Asia that all the great powers can exert pressure upon one another with ease. The Soviet Union is in a different situation from the others, however, in that it is the sole member of the group that not only is an economic and a military superpower but whose vital interests in East Asia are intimately linked with events in other regional "hotspots." It is thus essential to understand the motives, current directions, and anticipated changes in Soviet policy toward and in the East Asian regional power nexus.

There are at least three ways in which Soviet East Asian regional policy can be analyzed. One is to split the region into its political components and treat Soviet policy as if it were the simple product of the USSR's policy toward the individual nations in the area. The second way, simpler and in some ways more satisfying, is to approach the topic historically. In this approach, regional foreign policy is usually looked at on the basis of the activities of the state's foreign office—in other words, on the basis of diplomatic history. Finally, there is the topical approach: *i.e.*, treating Soviet policy as the product of Soviet attitudes and actions in such spheres as regional trade and aid, military strategy, and balance of power activities.

Each approach has its own merits and shortcomings. The state-to-state-relations approach offers the specificity, factualness, and neatness that comes from bringing together factors of historical development and national interests, but it risks missing the "big picture" that tends to emerge more clearly when regional policy is considered as a whole. The historical approach affords the same set of advantages but has the defect of making it impossible to inspect separable aspects of foreign policy in any but chronological context. The latter shortcoming is remedied by the topical approach, which however carries with it the presumption that a given policy is more rational, as well as less susceptible to contingent or exogenous factors, than may actually be the case.

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No fully satisfactory solution to these dilemmas is discernible, for there apparently does not yet exist a single, best means of explicating and analyzing a nation's regional foreign policy.[1] This inquiry will therefore essay a watery compromise between all three approaches, generally following the topical approach but adding large infusions of the historical and state-to-state modes of analysis.

In the present case, the way is made a bit easier by the fact that East Asia is not only a well-defined geographic (if politically and economically variegated) entity but a region made up of a relatively small number of states.[2] Moreover, until quite recently, the Soviet Union's policy in and toward East Asia was somewhat less complex than its policies toward other regions, complicated as the latter were by the Kremlin's preoccupation with problems of administration in Eastern Europe, by security questions in Western Europe and the Middle East, and by the global competition with the United States. Finally, the very fact that the Soviet leaders view the pursuit and protection of their Asian interests through Marxist-Leninist eyeglasses, coupled with the presence in the region of two other Communist-led states, has tended to give a somewhat simpler cast to Soviet policy than would probably have been the case if, say, China were ruled by a non-Communist government. To be sure, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split greatly complicated the Soviet leaders' task in East Asia, and in addition the economic resurgence of postwar Japan has posed major uncertainties for the future evolution of Asian politics in general. But during most of the postwar period, Soviet policy toward the five political entities in the region was relatively clear, simple, and direct.

Regional Interests: Historical

In seeking to delineate Soviet East Asian policy and its probable future development, it is first of all essential to define the range of Soviet interests in the region—ideological, security-related, economic, and so on—and how they have varied over the last two decades. Thinking in national-interest terms usually involves the assumption that a state's national interests, or at least the major elements thereof, tend to be invariable over time. But this is not true of all Soviet interests in East Asia. There are at least two kinds of interests that the Soviet Union can be perceived to have pursued in the region during recent times. The first might be termed "historic" interests, relatively invariable over time and therefore quite similar to Russian policy goals enunciated, say, during the Tsarist era. At least three such interests can be listed. First, there has been a historic security interest springing out of a vague Russian fear of China, and of the large Chinese population, dating back to the era of the Mongolian "hordes" and Genghis Khan's invasion of the Russian steppe from the east. With the rise of Japanese power after about 1880, this security interest was intensified by a felt need to safeguard Soviet territory against potential (and, in some instances, actual) threats of invasion. A sense of an urgent security need continues to move Moscow today, though the external danger is again perceived to come more from a nuclear-armed China than from a Japan presently oriented toward expanding its economic rather than its military power.

Another "historical" interest follows from Russian and Soviet involvement at the European and global levels. Over the long run, there has been an evident interest on Moscow's part in maintaining a quiescent Asia in the face of more important security concerns elsewhere. While some observers have noted a rhythmic long-term alternation of Russian interest and involvement between the Asian and the European (and, more recently, the global-strategic) arenas,[3] more often than not Soviet leaders have manifested an interest in avoiding conflicts in Asia in order to face the USSR's competitors in Europe, the Middle East, and North America. To be sure, the present situation might seem to argue for a reversal of these priorities, given Moscow's apparent primary concern with the "problem" of China. Nevertheless, over the long historical pull, Moscow has regarded Asian affairs as substantially secondary, and the

[1] For a recent series of efforts at approaching foreign policy in a variety of manners, see Wolfram Hanrieder, Ed., *Comparative Foreign Policy*, New York, McKay, 1971.

[2] As defined for the purposes of this study, East Asia embraces the two Koreas, Mongolia, China (including—geographically, if not politically—Taiwan), Japan, and the Soviet Union itself. The Philippines is, by and large, excluded, although geographically it can be considered as much a part of Eastern as of Southeastern Asia. Powers geographically external to the area but politically influential within it—*i.e.*, the United States and (to some extent) Great Britain—are also not included, although obviously Soviet East Asian policy cannot be discussed without considering, for example, US policy in Asia.

[3] *E.g.*, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914*, New York, Praeger, 1952, and Michael T. Florinski, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*, New York, Macmillan, 1955, Volume 2, Chaps. 25, 26 and 42.

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present emphasis on them may well be a temporary aberration. This historical allocation of priorities derives, in large part, from the very geographic and physical setting in which Russia finds herself. Because of the heavy concentration of population and industry in the European sector of the country, the high cost of transportation (even now) from European Russia to the Far East, and the forbidding nature of the Siberian terrain and weather, Russian interest in East Asia has necessarily been limited, at least until fairly recent years. By comparison, the Soviet Union has much quicker and easier access to Europe, the Middle East, and even the Western Hemisphere.

Regional Interests: Variable

The second set of Soviet interests in East Asia might be termed "variable," since, in contrast to the relatively stable historical interests just outlined, they are more susceptible to change over time. One way to determine the specific character of these interests is to survey the whole range of Soviet Asian interests at ten-year intervals, excluding only those in the historical category, and see which interests appear to change from one survey-point to the next, and to what degree.

Let us begin, then, by looking at what appeared to be Moscow's main nonhistorical interests in East Asia in 1950. First, the Soviet leaders evinced a negative interest in preventing the United States from using Japanese resources against the USSR and in forestalling American domination of the region as a whole. This interest led Moscow to conclude close military alliances with the two other Communist states in the region, China and North Korea, and also to support North Korea's invasion of the South with a view to filling the power vacuum that seemed likely to result from indications of American disinterest in the area.

The Soviet Union also manifested a revolutionary interest in East Asia in 1950, expressed essentially in a policy of encouraging, and to some degree supporting, "anti-imperialist" and anti-colonial revolutions and trying to bring former colonial as well as other noncolonial Asian states into the world socialist alliance under Soviet leadership. Thus, Moscow attempted, with some success, to dictate the policies of local Communist groups (*e.g.*, the Japanese Communist Party) and to influence the programs of revolutionary movements throughout East, Southeast, and South Asia.

There was little in the way of a Soviet economic interest in East Asia in 1950, since most of the area's resources were denied to Moscow. The exception was China itself, where the Soviet Union found it desirable for political reasons to extend economic aid to the new regime in Peking, and where the setting-up of joint Sino-Soviet stock com-

Signing of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic on Feb. 14, 1950, by Soviet Foreign Minister A. Ya. Vishinsky. Among those looking on (starting at second from left) are N.A. Bulganin, Chou En-lai, A.I. Mikoyan, N.S. Khrushchev, K.Ye. Voroshilov, V.M. Molotov, Josef Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and (second from right) G.M. Malenkov.

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panies was thought, for a time, to provide a means of enlisting Chinese resources to aid in rebuilding the postwar Soviet economy. But Chinese sensitivities and the USSR's commitment to supply military hardware to its Korean War allies short-circuited this and other attempts to pursue potentially profitable economic opportunities in the region.

BY 1960, TEN YEARS LATER, the interests of the USSR in East Asia had altered appreciably. In the realm of security, while Soviet interests continued to revolve around Japan and China and changing US involvement in the area, the Soviet leaders had become increasingly anxious to prevent the United States from using Japan and its now rapidly expanding industrial power against the USSR and to keep Japan out of active and independent involvement in the region.

At the same time, Moscow's interests vis-à-vis China began changing drastically because of the emerging ideological split with Peking. The Soviet leadership now wished to retard Chinese economic growth and to prevent the extension of Peking's political-ideological credo to other parts of Asia, especially to the other three major Communist-ruled states. This is not to say that the Soviet Union wished to break its military ties with China. A common defense against the "imperialist" camp was still in both powers' mutual interest, and the Sino-Soviet alliance assured, at least for the time being, that China would not be tempted to work toward a rapprochement with its greater enemy, the United States, or attempt to restore ties with Japan. In the Soviet view, the latter possibilities appeared likely to remain remote so long as Washington continued to adhere to its policy of containment and isolation vis-à-vis Peking and Japanese policy in this regard continued to be effectively determined in the US capital. A corollary was that Moscow had no vital interest in preserving Taiwan's independence from the PRC.

Another significant change was that by 1960 Moscow's interest in promoting revolutionary prospects in Asia, particularly in East Asia, had all but disappeared. For a variety of reasons, mostly associated with the differential character of Moscow's relations with Washington (slowly improving) and with Peking (rapidly worsening), the Soviet leaders saw greater advantage in developing good relations with the governments of newly-independent Asian states than in trying to bring about their overthrow by aiding local "liberation" movements.[4] Rather than insisting upon the universal applicability of the Soviet revolutionary model, as they had in 1950 and as Mao Tse-tung was now doing for the Chinese doctrine of revolution, the Russians fell back upon a policy of pointing to the presumed superiorities of Soviet society in the hope that the demonstration effect would influence public opinion and give rise to revolution by imitation.[5] By and large, the Soviet Union has since continued to evince little interest in promoting revolutionary movements in East Asia, although Moscow, to be sure, has not ceased efforts to influence the internal politics of several non-Communist Asian states by swaying the policies of local Communist parties (for example, in Japan) and has let itself be dragged by its Asian allies into situations that it would probably have rather avoided (*e.g.*, the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo and the North Vietnamese rekindling of the Vietnamese civil war).

In terms of Soviet economic interests in East Asia, 1960 represented something of a nadir. The Soviet Union withdrew economic aid and technicians from China in that year, and Sino-Soviet trade began its plunge to the near-zero mark. Soviet trade with Japan remained at a low level as Japan consciously sought to integrate itself with the Western economic system. For obvious political reasons, there never was any Soviet trade with Taiwan or South Korea, nor was the USSR interested in trading with the Philippines, which Moscow viewed as an appendage of American neocolonialism. That left only North Korea, where Soviet trade interests were essentially determined by emerging political competition with China for Pyongyang's favor. This is not to say that the Soviet Union in 1960 was without any economic aspirations in Asia, particularly vis-à-vis Japan, but prevailing political conditions made it impossible to realize them to any significant degree.

BY 1970, BOTH SOVIET overall policy and the entire international environment had altered so substantially as to entail a much more pronounced change

[4] On this change, see W. Raymond Duncan, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, Waltham, Mass., Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970; G. F. Hudson *et al.*, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, New York, Praeger, 1961; Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi*, New York, Pegasus, 1967; and Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest*, New York, Macmillan, 1970.

[5] See Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Challenge of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Morton Kaplan, Ed., *The Revolution in World Politics*, New York, Wiley, 1962, pp. 209-32.

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

THE USSR AND EAST ASIA

SOURCES: *The Times Atlas of the World* 2nd rev. ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1971, plate 16; and *Atlas SSSR* (USSR Atlas), 2nd ed., Moscow, Glavnoe Upravlenie Geodezii i Kartografii, 1969, pp. 102-103.

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in Soviet interests in East Asia. In the security sphere, despite what Moscow had thought to be major gains at China's expense as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Union found that it could well be faced with a hostile coalition of nearly all the powers of consequence in East Asia. With China and the US already moving toward a rapprochement (partly as a result of Soviet military threats against China following the Sino-Soviet border incidents of 1969), Moscow realized that if the rapprochement were to go beyond the mere settlement of outstanding differences, it might possibly lead to the emergence of a Washington-centered proto-coalition composed of the United States, China, and Japan, with Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines continuing to depend upon Washington for their security.[6] Henceforth, Soviet policy in the Far East revolved around the objective of forestalling the actual creation of such a group (or any anti-Soviet subcombination such as the US and China, the US and Japan, or Japan and China), or of breaking it up were it to materialize.

The linchpin of Soviet interests in the region, as in the two prior decades, continued to be China. If China continued to be hostile, the only course open to Moscow would be to maneuver to keep her away from the Americans and/or the Japanese, and to assure that Japan, as she moved away from the United States, did not combine with China against the USSR. Therefore the Soviet Union adopted a policy toward China which combined cautious restraint with measures to strengthen Soviet military defenses against presumed Chinese territorial ambitions in Siberia and Mongolia, and initiated a policy of negotiated concessions toward Japan. If China remained unfriendly while Japan maintained close ties with Washington, Moscow would have to concentrate its efforts on preventing the formation of a grand anti-Soviet coalition. If, on the other hand, China were to become more conciliatory (say, in the post-Mao period), then the Soviet Union could afford to treat Japan less solicitously, as East Asian international politics would probably tend to freeze once more into its Moscow-Peking *vs.* Tokyo-Washington configuration of the 1950's.[7] This, however, did not appear to be a likely development, given the existing level of Sino-Soviet enmity. In any event, Moscow appeared in 1970 to retain only a minimal degree of control over future developments in East Asia.

Under these uncertain circumstances, the Soviet Union since 1970 has evidenced a renewed interest in not becoming involved militarily in East Asia, principally out of fear that, with China now possessing a nuclear capability, any recurrence of fighting on the Sino-Soviet frontier might escalate to the nuclear level, but also because of continued or increasing Soviet involvement in other areas—especially South Asia and the Middle East—and in global-strategic competition with the United States. To be sure, the 1972 strategic arms limitation agreement and President Nixon's Moscow visit, the start of discussions concerning European security and settlement of the German problem, and the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt have all lessened the probability of Soviet involvement in war in areas outside East Asia, while on the contrary the massive Soviet deployment of forces to the China border during 1969-72 has heightened the possibilities of misperception, confrontation, and conflict in Asia between the USSR and China. Nonetheless, in the judgment of this writer, the global range of Soviet interests and involvement, the apparently genuine defensive nature of the Soviet anti-Chinese buildup, and—perhaps most importantly—the military countermeasures which the Chinese themselves began taking in 1972 to bolster their security position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union [8] all argue for a Soviet

[6] "Washington-centered" in the sense that only the United States had treaties of alliance with all these states except the PRC. Hence, alliance commitments within the emerging anti-Soviet system were still determined largely by American attitudes and actions. This became even more true once Peking and Washington effectuated their rapprochement during 1971-72. The term "proto-coalition" is used here to mean a preliminary working arrangement which has some of the features of an unwritten agreement and which can be viewed by third parties as leading at some future time to a more explicit cooperative arrangement, written or unwritten.

[7] Since a partial rapprochement with post-Mao China was the best Moscow could hope for, Soviet policy toward Peking and Tokyo was shaped accordingly. With China, the USSR would attempt to improve state relations while at the same time building up its military defenses against a recurrence of incidents of the 1969 Ussuri style and trying to deter other Asian states from aligning themselves with Peking against Moscow (hence the Soviet proposals for a "collective security" arrangement in Asia). Vis-à-vis Japan, Soviet policy was directed toward averting Sino-Japanese cooperation in the short run, hopefully without having to make excessive concessions to Tokyo (such as the return of the northern islands).

[8] Although China, given the problems left by the Cultural Revolution, was in no position in 1969 to counter the massive Soviet military buildup on China's northern borders, she did begin slowly shifting units to the north and continued to produce and deploy nuclear weapons. The big shifts, however, came in 1971 and 1972. In 1971, China's inability to intervene militarily in the Bangladesh conflict meant, paradoxically, a lessening of her military requirements on her southwestern frontier, and in 1972 the Nixon visit to Peking resulted in *(continued on page 38)*

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interest in preserving peace in Asia. The very fluidity of the international situation in Asia since the Nixon trip to Peking has no doubt tended to accentuate this interest. More specifically, the opening-up of new opportunities for Soviet initiatives as a consequence of the end of large-scale fighting in Vietnam and incipient US military withdrawal from the Asian area, as well as Japan's new quest for an independent place in the Asian sun and the potential dangers associated with possible Japanese rearmament, would seem likely to convince Soviet policy-makers of their interest in avoiding conflict in Asia.

Domestic Factors in Foreign Policy

Such appear to be the "interests," both historical and variable, which shape Soviet policy in East Asia. But they are not the only determinants; of perhaps equal importance, though more difficult to gauge, are domestic factors. Some of these factors are not entirely separable from Soviet foreign policy interests. Thus, as indicated earlier, Russia's security interest in East Asia derives in part from a historic fear of China and her burgeoning population that has become ingrained in the psyche of every Russian citizen, as has also the memory of Russia's defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1904-05.[9] These persistent and widespread attitudes among the Soviet population can be looked upon as one of the domestic determinants of Soviet policy toward China and Japan even today.[10]

There are other determinants of a purely internal nature. For instance, the Soviet leaders' awareness of the need to have a relatively free hand to deal with the USSR's many domestic problems is certainly one of the factors impelling them to favor quietude in East Asia. Another reason for a cautious Soviet policy toward China is the fact that the Sino-Soviet boundary artificially separates Soviet national minority peoples from their linguistic and cultural brethren across the border. Given the rise of local nationalism among some of the peoples of Soviet Central Asia, concern over possible Chinese efforts to exploit nationalist sentiments in the Soviet border regions has undoubtedly influenced Soviet Asian policy in recent years.

There is also the problem of Siberia's lack of self-sufficiency and its vulnerability to attack from the south, particularly where the trans-Siberian railroad runs close to the border. (The tundra line dividing habitable from nonhabitable areas generally lies just to the north of the railway and the population concentrations huddled along it.) Not being self-sufficient in food, Siberia must import grain and other products from Western Russia and Central Asia, and the rail links with these areas are therefore vital not only for military transport but also for food supply. Any military conflict that would result in the cutting of the trans-Siberian railway would effectively isolate Siberia and place it at the mercy of an invader. The implications of this situation for Sino-Soviet relations in an era of possible confrontation between the two powers are obvious and go far to explain both the enormous Soviet military reinforcement of the Far Eastern regions since the border conflict of 1969 and Moscow's current predilection toward a cautious Asian policy.

A final internal factor influencing the Soviet posture vis-à-vis China is Moscow's concern over the potential effect on domestic political stability of Chinese criticisms of the character and policies of the Soviet party leadership. While the excesses of the Cultural Revolution served temporarily to short-circuit Chinese propaganda attacks, the restoration of stable conditions in China, in juxtaposition to the apparent inability of the Soviet leadership to solve

an understanding to defuse military tensions in the Taiwan Straits, thus reducing Chinese military requirements on the Fukien sea frontier. These developments, coupled with the dramatic resolution of the Mao Tse-tung *vs.* Lin Piao leadership conflict in late 1971, meant that China could now afford to concentrate her resources against possible Soviet attack. In addition to troop shifts northward, the launching of a massive shelter-building program and the emplacement in 1972 of Chinese missiles capable of reaching Moscow underscored this trend. For details, see the annual volumes of *The Military Balance*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, for 1969-70 through 1973-74; and Harry Gelber, "Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy," *Adelphi Papers* (London), No. 99, July 1973.

[9] In the view of Ernest R. May, Russia had what he terms an "axiomatic interest" in preventing a repetition of her defeat at the hands of Japan, or in seeking revenge if possible, and this desire underlay Stalin's declaration that Soviet territorial gains at Japan's expense at the end of World War II were just retribution for the 1904 Japanese defeat of the Imperial Russian forces. See May's "The Nature of Foreign Policy: The Calculated versus the Axiomatic," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, Mass.), Fall 1962, pp. 653-67.

[10] A qualification should probably be made, however, with respect to the importance of the Russian popular fear of Chinese numbers. While it may be a subconscious element in the Russian popular psyche, it is doubtful that it exerts a major influence on Soviet day-to-day policy toward China. During a visit to Moscow in 1972, the author asked Soviet China specialists what role fear of the size of the Chinese population played in Soviet political and military calculations, and the answer was uniformly: nearly none.

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

An April 1972 training session in the Central Asian Border District of the Soviet Union.

—Photo by N. Zhiganov for TASS via Sovfoto.

recurrent economic and other problems at home,[11] has again heightened Moscow's sensitivity to the possible effects of Chinese criticism. Although there is as yet no evidence that mounting political dissidence in the USSR looks to China for inspiration, fear that it may be encouraged by the Chinese attacks makes it obviously necessary for Moscow to maintain a strong and uncompromising ideological front toward Peking. (It may also be true that, in reverse, the Chinese challenge has influenced Soviet internal policies. Recent reports of a general tightening of controls within the party and society at large, coupled with expressions of nostalgia for the "good old days" under Stalin's firm leadership,[12] suggest that the Politburo may be attempting to reinvigorate Soviet society from above, partly in order to prevent Chinese criticisms from reinforcing domestic political dissent.)

East Asia in Soviet Global Policy

In addition to Soviet regional interests and the domestic factors just outlined, another crucial determinant of Moscow's policies vis-à-vis the individual states of East Asia is the overall pattern of Soviet policy at the global-strategic level. Unlike China, the Soviet Union is able—indeed, forced—by virtue of its military power and geographic location to play a major role in several areas of the world. While China has no doubt become an increasingly serious problem for the Soviet leaders, they still have the freedom to involve themselves in European and Middle Eastern affairs and global-strategic rivalry with the United States without having to conduct their policy first and foremost so as to counter whatever the Chinese may be up to at the moment. By comparison, Chinese capabilities outside of East Asia have remained relatively inconsequential. Given this power relationship vis-à-vis China, Soviet global strategy since the end of World War II has posited the United States as the principal adversary, the US alone—at least until fairly recently—having the military capability to wreak vast and unpreventable destruction on Soviet territory. From the military standpoint, China until the mid-1960's figured hardly at all in Soviet defense considerations—except, perhaps, for having once been looked upon by Moscow as a fraternal Communist ally that the Soviet Union was committed by treaty to defend.

[11] These problems include shortages in domestic food production; inability to keep up with rising popular demand for consumer goods, resulting in declining levels of voluntary support for the regime; generational problems arising from the tendency among younger people to rebel against previously unquestioned principles of Soviet rule; and the contradictions between the aspirations for greater freedom generated by an economically modernizing society and the legacy of political repression stemming from traditional Communist modes of rule.

[12] For a report that some in Soviet society would like to see the reimposition of Stalinist-like rule, see *The New York Times*, March 5, 1973.

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The widening Sino-Soviet split and China's development of a steadily increasing nuclear capability after 1964 necessarily altered Soviet calculations. Henceforth, the Soviet Union faced the necessity of deterring two large and unfriendly states. Moreover, whereas the US military threat was exclusively nuclear, China confronted Soviet military planners with the problem of defending a 9,700-mile common border [13] against a very large and experienced Chinese land army as well as a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. When, in 1969, China preemptively attacked a Soviet border patrol,[14] the Soviet Union was forced to effect a drastic reorientation of its military priorities. Soviet forces now had to be divided, and the Far East became a "front" even more difficult to defend, in terms of logistics and manpower and material requirements, than the Soviet Union's European frontiers. Although the Soviet leaders by no means lost interest in pursuing their objectives in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, since the late 1960's East Asia—more particularly, the "China threat"—has claimed higher priority in Soviet thinking with respect to defense and foreign policy.

What Moscow has most to fear is a global combination of its two major adversaries, China and the US, and the fact that both are Asian powers is a major reason for the current level of Soviet interest in the Far East. Moreover, any change in relations between two of the three "superpowers" [15] necessarily means a change in relations among all three.[16] The sharpening of Sino-Soviet hostility after the border clashes of 1969 was the principal causative agent that led Peking to the conclusion that the greater immediate threat from the north made it advisable to compromise with the lesser (at least as perceived in Peking) American threat from the east and southeast. The result was the PRC's move toward reconciliation with a US government likewise disposed to resolve Sino-American differences.

The Soviet decision-makers could do nothing to stop the Sino-American rapprochement, but there were two things—aside from looking to their own military defenses [17]—that they could do to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. The first and perhaps more important of the two was to adopt a policy of patience and to appeal to the Chinese—while maintaining high levels of Soviet military strength and deterrence—for a reasonable settlement of outstanding disputes. Two corollaries of this policy suggest themselves. One was to seek, to the extent possible, to cultivate non-Maoist and post-Maoist Chinese political leaders, and Moscow appears to have done just that.[18] Another was to attempt to smooth over existing Sino-Soviet conflicts as far as possible in the interim before Mao dies, in order to set the stage for their eventual resolution after the Chinese party Chairman has left the scene, and to prevent Peking's present anti-Soviet course from becoming a permanent fixture of Chinese foreign policy. In actuality, Moscow entered into negotiations with Peking on border

[13] The Sino-Soviet border comprises three sectors: the Inner Asian sector (2,000 miles), the Mongolian sector (2,700 miles), and the Far Eastern sector (2,000 miles). The Sino-Mongolian boundary is included as part of the Sino-Soviet boundary not only because of the limited sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic but also because Soviet and Chinese military forces are ranged against each other across that border and because the Soviet Union is, for all intents and purposes, in charge of the defense of Mongolia.

[14] For a detailed study of that incident and of the Sino-Soviet border dispute in general, see the writer's "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wis.), Vol. 46, No. 4, December 1972, pp. 1175-202.

[15] The term "superpower," as used here, applies to any state that equals or exceeds a certain level of "power" on a series of generally-accepted scales. China is clearly more powerful than all other states save the US and USSR and in "the same league" with the latter two by the following measures: extent of territory; stock of deliverable nuclear weapons; and number of men under arms. She is among the top five nations in industrial production, gross national product, political stability, and degree of national integration, and is, of course, the world's most populous nation. Only in "modernity" and "accessibility to the external world" is she markedly deficient. These ten measures are justified and discussed in greater detail in the writer's "China in a Tri-polar World," unpublished paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, October 1972.

[16] This has been true in earlier periods as well as the most recent one. Since the very inception of the PRC, the triangular relationship among China, the USSR, and the US has constituted a major determinant of the foreign policies of each of the three states. When Soviet-American and Sino-American relations were bad in the early and mid-1950's, Sino-Soviet relations were good. When Soviet-American relations improved in the late 1950's and early 1960's, Sino-Soviet relations declined. When Sino-American relations warmed in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Soviet Union became suspicious of the tie, and Sino-Soviet relations worsened still further.

[17] Some details of the Soviet military buildup in the Far East are provided later. However, it should be noted here that the buildup actually began in 1964 after the breakdown of Sino-Soviet border negotiations and accelerated during the Cultural Revolution.

[18] Here, the names of three deposed Chinese military leaders—P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing, and Lin Piao—come foremost to mind. All either were accused of maintaining "illicit relations" with the Soviet Union (P'eng and Lin) or apparently advocated compromising with Moscow in the face of the presumed US threat in Vietnam (Lo). Whether the accusations against the three men were strictly true or not, the important thing is that the politico-military struggles involving them (as well, perhaps, as the purge of Kao Kang in 1954) apparently all revolved around disputes over how to deal with the Russians.

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Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin pays a surprise visit to Peking on September 11, 1969, to suggest negotiations on outstanding Sino-Soviet issues (including border disputes). He is greeted by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

—TASS via UPI.

issues (though evidently without any real hope of settlement as long as Mao remained), persuaded the Chinese to restore reciprocal diplomatic representation at the ambassadorial level, and encouraged agreement to increase the volume of Sino-Soviet trade. Not much could be done on the ideological front with Mao still at the helm; nevertheless, Moscow did propose (and Peking declined) to open discussions on ideological issues, and it occasionally moderated, if only slightly, the tone and volume of its anti-Chinese propaganda.[19]

The second tactic available to Moscow for heading off the threat of a Sino-American combine against the USSR was to take positive action to improve Soviet-American relations. While such developments as the US-Soviet agreements on Berlin and the German issue, the SALT I accord, the vast stepup of Soviet-American trade, enhanced scientific and cultural exchanges and cooperation, and the Nixon and Brezhnev exchange of visits may well have occurred without the impetus provided by Sino-American moves toward improved bilateral relations, there can be little doubt that these moves accelerated the process and, in part, fueled its continuation. For as the US and the PRC proceeded with step-by-step efforts to eliminate major sources of conflict between them, Moscow must have felt increasing pressure to "keep up" with the pace of these efforts. Without a commensurate set of Soviet-US agreements, a series of Sino-American accords—or even mutual decisions to put aside such previously divisive issues as Taiwan and Vietnam—would unquestionably have been viewed in Moscow as tantamount to the very Sino-American coalition that the Soviet rulers feared so much.

Soviet competition with the United States and China is closely linked to the relative power positions and geographic locations of the three superpowers. With the United States, the Soviets must compete globally and must above all be concerned about deterring US nuclear attack. On the other hand, the threat from China is regional, and Moscow is more concerned with defense against Chinese ground action, although the problem of Chinese nuclear strength grows with each passing year. Soviet decision-makers would no doubt like to have the freedom not to have to worry about East Asian, especially Chinese, problems. Soviet security would then improve, enabling the USSR to channel its energies into areas of the world affording more interesting possibilities for enhancing Soviet influence at the expense of its paramount rival, the US. Every increment of Soviet power invested in the management of Far Eastern international politics is lost to the pursuit of Soviet objectives, for example, in the Middle East, where there are major Soviet security interests, and Africa, where at least the potentialities for Soviet gains are great. In short, the Soviet Union finds it historically unnatural and politically inconvenient to be "pinned down" by the Chinese threat in Asia.

Japan and Korea

If that were not enough, the current situation confronting the Soviet Union in East Asia is complicated still further by the reemergence of Japan as a power of political as well as economic consequence in the region. Because of her growing power and her greater freedom to choose on whom to bestow her favor, Japan now occupies a pivotal position in the Asian power balance, and it is therefore natural that she should be courted by Moscow

[19] These abatements of Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda appeared in some cases to be related to anticipations of progress in the border talks or of important political developments in China. Several times following the resumption of border talks in October 1969, the Soviet Union ceased polemics, and in midsummer of 1971 there was a marked lessening of anti-Chinese diatribes that may have been linked with the events leading up to the ouster of Lin Piao.

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and Peking, as well as by Washington. What are Soviet policy goals vis-à-vis Japan? The most important of Moscow's aims is probably to keep Japan relatively disarmed, which means discouraging Tokyo from acquiring nuclear weapons. Soviet policy-makers, however, may well find themselves in a dilemma over this question. On the one hand, they need to convince Tokyo that Far Eastern security is stable and that Soviet policy in Asia is both disinterested and pro-Japanese. On the other hand, their every declaration spells worry over the China problem, and in addition they continue (at this writing) to withhold Soviet consent to return the four small islands off northern Hokkaido which the Japanese claim to have been illegally seized by the Soviet Union at the close of World War II, and whose retention in Soviet hands is seen in Tokyo as a potential threat to Japan itself.[20] Moreover, there are convincing reasons why Moscow will probably continue to have little positive influence on Japanese security arrangements. For one, the Japan-US security treaty will probably continue in force. For another, the historic anti-Russian and pro-Chinese attitudes of the Japanese are likely to persist. Finally, Moscow no longer exercises control over the Japanese Communist movement.[21]

Other probable Soviet objectives are to wean Japan away from her ties with the US and to prevent her from entering into too close a relationship with the Chinese. Here, the Soviet Union does possess some useful instruments of persuasion. It can, for instance, offer the Japanese a peace treaty that would include some concessions to Japan's claims to the northern islands. More important, Moscow can offer to cooperate economically with Japan by trading Soviet raw materials (especially oil) for Japanese industrial goods and investment in Siberian development. There are, however, some serious obstacles to Soviet success. Japanese political leaders, anxious to preserve an even balance between China and the USSR,[22] do not wish to anger Peking by assisting the Soviet Union to build up its power in the very regions where that power, enhanced by greater regional self-sufficiency and closer integration with the Soviet transportation net in the western part of the USSR, would most directly threaten Chinese territory. Hence the cautious slowness with which the Japanese have responded to Soviet proposals for cooperation in Siberian development.[23] This hesitancy may also reflect some lingering uncertainty in Tokyo as to whether Siberian development will prove to be in the long-term interest of Japan herself, not to mention the interests of China (or even the United States). If Japan aspires to regain the status of a world power in every sense of the term, her leaders may well have reservations about the wisdom of helping to strengthen the position of perhaps her greatest rival in Asia.

If Moscow policy-makers are frustrated with China and worried about Japan, they have no such worries about Korea. It is true, of course, that the degree of Soviet influence in Pyongyang has declined sharply since its high point at the beginning of the Korean

[20] The Soviet position has hitherto been that sovereignty over the islands was decided at the end of World War II and is non-negotiable. It is possible, however, that Moscow might move away from this position as the price for an agreement that would draw Japan into a close working relationship with the USSR and hence, hopefully, away from Peking. On the Japanese side, a *New York Times* report of March 8, 1973, indicated possible Japanese willingness to compromise on the northern islands issue in return for a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and an agreement to move ahead on the proposed joint development of Siberian oil resources. But Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's recent visit to Moscow for talks with the Soviet leaders resulted in no visible progress toward resolution of these issues.

[21] Historic relations between the Japanese and Soviet Communist Parties are covered in Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967. For more recent developments, see Karl Dixon, "The Growth of a 'Popular' Japanese Communist Party," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, B.C.), Fall 1972, pp. 387-402; and Rinjiro Harako, "Prospects for Relations with the USSR," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1972, p. 53.

[22] On the general subject of Japanese foreign policy attitudes, see Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969; also, the collection of articles entitled "Japan at the Crossroads," in *Survey*, Autumn 1972, pp. 30-159, and various issues of *Pacific Community* (Tokyo).

[23] Political pressure from Peking against the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese agreement has probably been partially responsible for Japan's go-slow attitude in negotiating with the Russians. However, there have also been economic obstacles to an accord, primarily involving the terms of joint cooperation in Siberian development projects. A major stumbling block is the question of ownership of oil-producing facilities to be financed and constructed by Japan, once they are in place. The Japanese want to retain at least part-ownership, whereas the Russians want a "turnover" arrangement whereby they would take title upon completion of construction. Present indications are that, despite the pressure from Peking and Japan's anxiety not to offend the Chinese, some Soviet-Japanese economic agreements will eventually be concluded if mutually satisfactory terms can be agreed upon. For details of Soviet-Japanese relations in recent years, especially as they bear on Siberian development, see Violet Conolly, "Soviet-Japanese Economic Cooperation in Siberia," *Pacific Community*, October 1970, pp. 55-65; David I. Hitchcock, Jr., "Joint Development of Siberia: Decision-making in Japanese-Soviet Relations," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), March 1971, pp. 279-300; T. C. Rhee, "Japan and the Soviet Union," *World Affairs* (Washington, DC), June 1970, pp. 240-57; Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan and the Continental Giants," *Current History* (Philadelphia), April 1971, pp. 193-99; and Kiichi Saeki, "Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1972, pp. 1-11.

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Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka (second from left) is welcomed to the Kremlin by Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, at the start of Japanese-Soviet negotiations on Oct. 8, 1973.

—Photo by V. Masaelin for TASS via Sovfoto.

War [24]—and Moscow has never packed any weight, either political or economic, in Seoul. Nevertheless, North Korea's independent posture within the group of Communist states gives Moscow some assurance that Chinese influence there will be kept within bounds, and at the same time the opening of negotiations between the North and South Korean regimes in 1972 may hearten the Russians as a sign of some flexibility in the South's ties with the United States. Moscow probably welcomes the Korean negotiations, too, as a factor tending to diminish tensions in Northeast Asia, to keep North Korea away from too close a relationship with Peking, and to insure against a recurrence of hostilities between North and South which might lead to a confrontation of the major powers. Short of a North Korea firmly in the Soviet camp, an independent regime in Pyongyang looking toward peaceful unification with the South probably represents the next best situation for Moscow. If nothing else, it removes the Korean issue from the list of potential tension spots with the United States and reduces the likelihood of any firm North Korean alignment with Peking that could prove dangerous in the context of a severe exacerbation of Sino-Soviet conflict.

[24] For recent surveys of Soviet-North Korean relations, see Morton Abramowitz, "Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers," *Adelphi Papers*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, No. 80, 1971; Chin O. Chung, *North Korea's Attitude in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1967*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1970; Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), January 1970, pp. 237-54; Yong-Soo Kim, "North Korea's Relationship to the USSR: A Political and Economic Problem," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR* (Munich), November 1971, pp. 34-38.

Moscow's Asian Security Scheme

While seeking to orchestrate its relations with individual East Asian states to its own advantage, the Soviet Union since 1969 has also made tentative efforts to promote the construction of a wider Asian system of "collective security," presumably calculated to bolster the USSR's strategic position in the area as a whole. Moscow has not been very forthcoming regarding the details of the arrangement it has in mind, and it is consequently difficult to evaluate the purposes and seriousness of the scheme. Moreover, since a generally unenthusiastic reception of the proposal by the Asian states has resulted in meager progress toward materialization, there is little empirical data to go by other than Soviet declarations.[25]

[25] For Brezhnev's original formulation of the proposal, see "Speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev" (to the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties), *Pravda* (Moscow), June 7, 1969, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio—henceforth cited as CDSP), July 2, 1969, p. 16.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Kho Dam, confer in Moscow on Feb. 23, 1972.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

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In a speech delivered in March 1972, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev declared that "collective security in Asia must . . . be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for the sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, noninterference in internal affairs, and the broad development of economic and other cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage." [26] This sounds very much like an enumeration of the principles of "peaceful coexistence" which form the basis of Soviet declaratory policy and which Moscow favors including in treaties of friendships with other states.[27] In fact, it seems likely that what the Soviet leaders envisage for Asia is not necessarily a single multilateral security pact, but perhaps a network of bilateral treaties between the USSR and individual Asian countries on the model of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship of August 1971. More recently, G. A. Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute in Moscow, indicated to the author that any new "collective security" arrangements in Asia would have to include China and Japan, and should take the place of existing military treaties and agreements in the area (*i.e.*, between the US and its Asian allies and between China and other Asian states). He further expressed the view that they might include provisions for arms limitation and perhaps even for nuclear-free zones, as well as for steps to expand trade and cultural relations.[28]

It would appear from the foregoing evidence that Moscow conceives of an Asian "collective security" system more in terms of a gradual process of working collectively (which can mean bilaterally or multilaterally) with Asian states to bring about conditions of enhanced all-round security in Asian international relations, rather than in terms of a clearly-defined, integrated system conforming to generally accepted Western concepts of collective security.[29] In any event, the Soviet scheme would seem to have three probable objectives:

1. To construct a Soviet-sponsored *cordon sanitaire* around China. Although Moscow has stated that China "could become a full member of this system," [30] what this really appears to mean is that once the rest of the system is already in being, Peking would be invited to join on terms set by the Soviet Union and its fellow partners. Meanwhile, it is very difficult to distinguish the Soviet scheme from an anti-Chinese alliance, and Peking has vehemently opposed it on that very ground. Certainly, there is no chance whatever that a Mao-led China would join.

2. To lay the groundwork for a Soviet presence in Asia filling the void, or near-void, left or assumed to be left by the decision of the US and Britain to greatly reduce their own military forces in the area.[31] Moscow, of course, vigorously opposes such exclusively non-Communist Asian groupings as the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and especially the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), all of which it would like to persuade the Asian states to scrap in favor of its own collective security scheme.[32]

3. To forestall the emergence of new alliances or groupings of Asian nations, Communist or non-Communist, that China, or even Japan, might seek to forge under its leadership. From the Soviet point of view, of course, nothing could be worse than the

[26] See "Speech by Comrade Brezhnev" (to the 15th USSR Congress of Trade Unions), *Pravda*, March 21, 1972, translated in *CDSP*, April 19, 1972, p. 8.

[27] A similar version was also embodied in points 1, 2, and 3 of the joint US-Soviet "Declaration of Principles" issued during the Nixon visit to Moscow. See *Pravda* and *The New York Times*, May 30, 1972. For the version that was included in the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of Aug. 9, 1971, see *Pravda* or *The New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1971.

[28] Conversation with G. A. Arbatov, New York, March 27, 1973. Similar indications can also be gleaned from various Soviet radio broadcasts in early 1973—*e.g.*, Radio Moscow, March 11, and Radio Peace and Progress, March 12, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Soviet Union* (FBIS-SU), March 11, 1973, p. C8, and March 12, 1973, pp. C1 and C3, respectively.

[29] Inis L. Claude, Jr., the principal authority on collective security, defines the concept as "the proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by *any* nation against *any* nation will be met by the combined force of *all* other nations" (emphasis added). See *Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, New York, Random House, 1956, p. 251. In this sense, collective security implies the conclusion of a treaty among a number of nations requiring all the signatories (except the aggressor) to go to the immediate defense of any signatory attacked by another signatory (but not by a state not party to the treaty). Theoretically, all aggression would be deterred by the prospect of a massive and automatic coalition against it.

[30] Radio Moscow, March 7, 1973, tr. in *FBIS-SU*, March 9, p. D10.

[31] See V. V. Matveev, "A Filled 'Vacuum,'" *Izvestia* (Moscow), May 29, 1969, partially translated in *CDSP*, June 18, 1969, p. 14. Significantly, Soviet authorities cited this article when asked about the purpose of Brezhnev's Asian security proposal. This suggests that British and American announcements of impending troop withdrawals from Southeast and Northeast Asia triggered the insertion of the Asian collective security line in Brezhnev's speech of June 7, 1969. It is doubtful, however, that Moscow had really thought out the full potentialities of the proposal at that time.

[32] Along this line, see V. Pavlovsky, "Asia: Regional Cooperation and Collective Security," *New Times* (Moscow), July 8, 1972, pp. 18-20; and D. Pavlovsky, "Problems of Regionalism in Asia," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1969, pp. 46-51.

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creation of a Chinese-sponsored Asian security system directed against Moscow.

Recent statements from Moscow suggest that the Soviet leaders, in trying to achieve these objectives, may seek to utilize the 1971 friendship treaty with India as a springboard for selling their security ideas to other Asian states.[33] It would seem to follow from this that they intend to try to win converts first among the Southeast Asian countries on the strength of the Indian example, and that they will only later extend their efforts to East and Northeast Asia. But even if Moscow were to succeed in persuading some Southeast Asian states to accept its security proposals, there is every reason to expect that China will continue her bitter opposition, and that Japan will remain aloof in order to preserve her new, friendly relationship with Peking. It should be noted here that Moscow does not seem to include Mongolia and North Korea in its proposed Asian security network, presumably because the USSR already has full-fledged defense treaties with them and hence their participation in any wider security system would only mean a dilution of Soviet influence. In fact, Moscow's desire to avoid any such dilution is probably a major reason why it shows no interest in a real regional collective security system in which each member state would have a veto over collective response to aggression by any other member. In short, what Moscow appears to be aiming at is not a system of collective security in the accepted sense of the term, but rather a system of collective defense largely under its control and directed against China.[34]

Soviet Military Policy

Moscow's initiative for a new Asian security structure brings into clearer focus overall Soviet military policy in East Asia. The central component of that policy is, of course, the defense of Siberia against possible Chinese attack. This concern not only has a major influence on Soviet military policy throughout the area but also affects Moscow's military policy in other regions. It seems clear, for instance, that

[33] The Radio Moscow broadcast cited above (fn. 30) stated that Soviet-Indian relations could become "the foundation of the whole system of international relations in Asia."

[34] For statements differentiating between collective security and collective defense, see Claude, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 *ff.*; and Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Defense *versus* Collective Security," in Arnold Wolfers, Ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, pp. 49-74.



A Chinese nuclear test filmed by the CPR, as viewed on Japanese television in early 1967.

—Wide World.

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the Soviet Union's willingness to sign the 1972 arms control treaties with the United States and to proceed with the SALT II negotiations, its agreement to settle the Berlin question and to move substantially ahead in its relations with West Germany, and its readiness to discuss reciprocal force reductions and general security matters in Europe have all been directly influenced by Soviet preoccupations with the perceived Chinese "threat." [35]

At present, the Soviet Union is reported to have the most powerful concentration of military force on the face of the earth deployed adjacent to China's northern borders—more than 45 infantry and armored divisions, backed by heavy logistical and air support and by units equipped with a wide variety of nuclear weapons. These forces face Chinese forces of roughly equal number but with significant relative deficiencies in equipment and weaponry.[36]

As long as the current state of tension in Sino-Soviet relations persists, it seems probable that the Soviet Union will do nothing in Asia as a whole that would adversely affect its military position vis-à-vis Peking. Thus, for instance, it is highly unlikely that Moscow would accede to any North Korean move to resume hostilities against the South (indeed, Moscow's encouragement of the joint decision by North and South Korea to attempt to resolve their differences peacefully may have augmented the points of conflict between Moscow and Peking). Similarly, Soviet military opposition to China is likely to moderate Moscow's opposition to the buildup of Japan's military forces. Peking, of course, is attempting to convince Tokyo that it favors such a buildup, perhaps in order to create the impression that China and Japan are moving into some common arrangement against Moscow (though this is certainly not Japan's intention, nor was it China's at least until 1972).[37] In another area, while Japan is hardly likely to resort to force against the USSR to regain the northern islands, the China problem perhaps makes the Soviet Union more amenable to compromise on this issue.

Militarily, of course, the Sino-American détente was highly disturbing to Moscow as one of its major effects was to greatly reduce tensions in the Taiwan Straits and Chinese concern over a possible Nationalist invasion from the sea, thus enabling Peking to move forces from the Fukien coastal regions to areas opposite the Soviet border. In a way, the end of large-scale American involvement in the Vietnam conflict and even the outcome of the Indo-Pakistan war over the independence of Bangladesh also contributed to a relative change in the Sino-Soviet military balance in China's favor. The former eliminated any potential American threat to China's territorial integrity from the south as well as the necessity to deploy air and ground forces in South China to defend North Vietnam against invasion. In the latter case, China's failure to go to the defense of her Pakistani ally paradoxically lessened the necessity to maintain forces threatening India for a contingency that would probably never again arise.[38]

Under these circumstances, it is probably safe to venture the general conclusion that the Soviet Union will not initiate military activity in East Asia—whether against China, toward whom the Soviet posture is, despite Chinese fears and accusations, essentially defensive; against Japan, who might be spurred by any threat of Soviet military action into an all-out rearmament that nobody wants; or in relation to Korea, where tensions have greatly lessened and where the United States would have to be faced directly in the event of a Soviet-supported North Korean threat to South Korean independence.

The situation would alter, of course, if one or more of several variables were to change. If the Soviet dispute with China were to be settled and Sino-Soviet tensions significantly reduced, if the scale and/or pace of Japanese rearmament were to be stepped up beyond presently contemplated levels, or if US force dispositions and policies in Asia were to change drastically, the Soviet Union

[35] This is not to say that the China factor was the sole or even the decisive motivating force behind the Soviet moves to reach an accommodation on the German and European security issues. However, it seems certain that Moscow's interest in resolving these issues was heightened by its concern over Soviet security vis-à-vis China.

[36] As of late 1972, the Soviet Union had deployed in the frontier areas about 44 divisions (including two in Mongolia), together with a large array of supporting artillery, air power, nuclear warhead storage sites, and missiles. These forces aggregate somewhere between 750,000 and 1,000,000 men, as compared to less than 450,000 men and 15 understrength divisions before 1969. China has about 55-60 divisions in the military regions adjacent to the Soviet border. But not all of these troops are detailed to border defense, and none are as heavily armed and well-equipped as the opposing Soviet forces. See *The Military Balance (1972-73)*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972, pp. 7 and 43; and *The New York Times*, March 4 and 28, 1973. The Chinese reportedly have not yet moved the massive numbers of troops and equipment from East and South China that they could, probably because of the unsettled state of the Chinese military leadership following the purge of former Defense Minister Lin Piao.

[37] See *The New York Times*, March 28, 1973, for reports of such Chinese pressure.

[38] See fn. 8.

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would be faced with a quite different balance-of-power situation. From the Soviet point of view, the present situation in East Asia has one thing to commend it—namely, that despite the growing problem of China the situation is still under Moscow's control, at least militarily. In other words, there is a measure of stability in the East Asian political and military situation that is not inimical to Moscow's interests. Thus, while the Soviet leaders may be willing to make some sacrifices to settle the conflict with China, they may be quite content to live with the present status quo if a settlement cannot be reached.

Unpredictable Contingencies

This leads us to consideration of a final question: *i.e.*, the problem of "break-points," or unpredictable contingencies, that may suddenly intervene to make any projection based on a given status quo short-lived. At least four such contingencies come to mind. The first, which is unpredictable in the sense that no one knows exactly when it will occur, or what the political consequences will be, is the death of Mao-Tse-tung. The Chinese policy of total opposition to the Soviet Union has, ever since its beginning in the mid-1950's, been Mao's own policy. That policy has encountered internal opposition at least twice, and perhaps thrice,[39] since 1956, and it is probable that after Mao's death at least some of his successors will argue for an end to the confrontation with Moscow. Although the very passage of time tends to cause a hardening of views on both sides and thus to lessen the chances (and possible scope) of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement after Mao, this writer sees little doubt that one of the issues on Peking's agenda in the post-Mao era will be whether or not to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

The extent to which Sino-Soviet relations and hence Far Eastern international politics as a whole would be altered by a Sino-Soviet agreement to remove certain questions from the list of outstanding differences between Moscow and Peking would, of course, depend on the relative importance of the issues resolved and the length to which the two capitals would be willing to go to settle other questions. Even so, almost any softening of Peking's present intransigent anti-Soviet line would likely signify a profound change in the international relations of the region. The policies of all Asian states including Japan, and of the United States as well, are now predicated on continuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. A scaling-down of that conflict would not necessarily mean that Japan, for example, would no longer be able to balance Moscow against Peking and would therefore be thrown back into the arms of the United States; much would depend on the character and extent of the amelioration in relations between the two Communist states. Still, a different basis upon which to ground the East Asian international political equilibrium would probably have to be found. That basis could well be both peaceful and multilateral if all parties acted with care. The danger would be, however, that rapprochement between Moscow and Peking would at least partially rekindle the Sino-Soviet ideological unity that split the world into two camps during the 1950's. Given the vastly increased power of a Soviet-Chinese combine in the 1970's, the consequences in terms of international politics would be that much more severe.

A second potential contingency that needs to be considered is a substantial change in the orientation of Japanese foreign policy. As in the case of Sino-Soviet relations after Mao, the probability of some modification in Japan's Asian policies is high. The questions are what sort of change it is likely to be, and how it may affect Soviet policy within the region. To gain some impression of what could lie ahead in this respect, it may be useful to extrapolate from present trends in Japan that are likely to affect Tokyo's external policies. There are four such trends: (1) toward increased independence from the United States; (2) toward greater attention to domestic social problems, which appears to be causing a leftward political trend;[40] (3) toward a buildup of military power capable of regional application, although

[39] See fn. 18. It is still not clear whether Lin Piao was personally opposed to Mao's anti-Soviet policy or whether the opposition came from some of Lin's high-level military subordinates whose views he felt he had partially to reflect. In any case, there is no primary evidence as yet that Lin was guilty of having contacts with the Russians (as Peking has charged), or that he advocated changing Peking's anti-Moscow stance and withdrawing the invitation to President Nixon to visit the Chinese capital.

[40] At the moment, the movement leftward stems from the efforts of the ruling Liberal-Democrats to restore their waning voter appeal by devoting a greater proportion of Japan's national resources to the solution of increasingly urgent urban and social problems. It should be noted that many polities faced with similar difficulties have often wound up opting either for a socialism of the left or for a nationalism of the right—both of which have tended to affect foreign policy. In *(continued on page 48)*

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the question of developing a nuclear capability will probably remain open; and (4) toward enhanced economic strength, making Japan the rival of the Soviet Union and the United States, and certainly more powerful in the overall economic sense than China.

It would seem to follow from the first two and the last of these four trends that Japan will expand the scope and degree of her involvement in Asia, and from the first and the third that she will change the content and direction of her present foreign policy. One possible result is that Japan will continue to move still closer to China than it already has in the past 14 months. While Tokyo's present policy is still one of balancing between Peking and Moscow within the context of the security treaty with the United States, were the trends outlined above to lead to a Japanese decision to let the treaty lapse, Japan might even choose to enter into some sort of defense arrangement with China against what both Peking and Tokyo might consider a common Soviet threat from the north. (To be sure, however, a Sino-Soviet reconciliation that appeared to be firm and lasting would short-circuit such a development and probably throw Tokyo back into a close relationship with Washington. This possibility might, indeed, restrain Japan from being too hasty in abandoning its present tie with the United States.)

Faced with the possibility that Japan could further solidify its ties with China, even perhaps to the point of entering into a bilateral defense arrangement against the USSR, Moscow might try to "buy off" Tokyo by compromising on the northern islands issue and offering more favorable terms for Japanese participation in the Siberian development venture. Whether Tokyo would be tempted to accept such a deal in spite of its obvious anti-Chinese political implications is impossible to say, but Japan's ever-increasing need for large and diversified supplies of raw materials might force her to make an unpalatable choice between economics and politics.

Sino-Soviet War?

The last contingency, *i.e.*, Sino-Soviet war, is the one most talked about but, in the writer's opinion, one that is becoming increasingly unlikely. China is rightly fearful of the Soviet military might massed near her borders, and Moscow, whether rightly or wrongly, is also fearful of what it perceives as Peking's propensities toward military excesses and territorial revisionism. Admittedly, the military dispositions on both sides may seem to point to an increasing possibility of war, either intentional or accidental: the enormous forces facing each other and the fearsome nature of their weaponry, coupled with the degree of reciprocal misperceptions prevalent in both Moscow and Peking with regard to each other, inspire forebodings of the breakdown of a fragile peace and the outbreak of a tragic, unnecessary, and avoidable conflict. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the propaganda and the negotiating positions of the two sides and an inspection of the military balance itself lead to the conclusion that a conflict is becoming ever less likely.

When statements made purely for propaganda purposes are thrust aside, the intentions of both sides appear to be largely defensive. Even the military dispositions reflect this for the most part, although the Soviet troop deployments, necessarily so close to the border, are naturally perceived in Peking as an acute threat to Chinese territory. Most important of all, the military balance is gradually shifting toward rough equality as the Chinese provide themselves with advanced military hardware—ranging from radars and other early warning devices to nuclear weapons—in quantities more nearly adequate to deter Soviet attack. As long as Moscow is convinced that China possesses the capability to destroy one or more major Soviet population centers, no matter what Soviet preemptive or defensive measures are taken, the Soviet leaders will be deterred from any large-scale attack on Chinese territory or an attempt to "take out" Chinese nuclear installations. This, in fact, has already been the situation for the last several years, and with every passing month

Japan's case, opting for the former would likely produce a shift toward anti-US and probably anti-Russian and pro-Chinese policies. Opting for rightist nationalism, on the other hand, would likely mean not only anti-US and anti-Russian but also anti-Chinese foreign policies.

To this writer, the continuation of a leftward trend in Japanese politics seems probable, and this is true regardless of which party or parties—the Liberal-Democrats, a coalition of the Liberal-Democrats and some other non-Marxist party, or a Socialist-Communist alliance—hold power in Japan. There are a number of reasons for such a judgment. First, Japan faces many domestic problems that only a government-directed program of reforms (in contrast to a market-oriented *laissez-faire*ism) can alleviate. Second, if the now-ruling Liberal-Democrats implement the reforms, their political program *ipso facto* moves leftward. Third, the Liberal-Democrats may be forced to shift to the left if for no other reason than to reconstitute their electoral base in the cities and thus take away potential (and actual) support from their opponents. Fourth, if the Liberal-Democratic Party as a whole does not move leftward, it may well stand to lose an upcoming election to some coalition of opposition parties appealing to the voters on the basis of a claimed superior ability to solve Japan's social problems.

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the Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability increases. Thus, unless misperceptions come to dominate thinking on both sides or some accident triggers a major exchange of military blows, it is unlikely that war will occur.

Nonetheless, Sino-Soviet armed conflict cannot be ruled out absolutely. Were it to occur, even on a relatively small scale, the impact on East Asian international politics and the policies of affected nonwarring states, especially Japan and the United States, would be extreme. Much would depend, however, on the duration of the conflict, external assessments of its cause, the level of violence, and the kinds of weapons used.

Most scenarios assume a Soviet initiative, although the possibility of a forestalling Chinese attack cannot be excluded. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Soviet Union would be so foolish as to let itself be drawn into a long land war in Asia. The more probable Soviet choices might be a lightning thrust aimed at seizing strategic segments of Chinese territory—such as Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and parts of Heilungkiang—in order to create a buffer zone protecting Siberia; one or more punitive incursions across the frontier to destroy specific Chinese military units as an example and as a means of extracting political concessions from Peking; a quick nuclear strike either against Chinese nuclear installations or against specific industrial targets; or finally, military assistance (*e.g.,* supplies, armor, and air cover) to one or more of the Chinese military factions that might emerge in a post-Mao struggle for power. What the Chinese response would be to any of these is more difficult to predict, but if China found herself either losing badly or in desperate need of a concrete military success to "even the score," she might be tempted to launch a nuclear attack at Soviet military or civilian targets. As argued above, it is the likelihood of such a Chinese response that, more than anything else, deters the Soviet Union from initiating military action against China in the first place. If, however, Soviet military leaders were to perceive a very high probability of impending conflict, they might exert heavy pressure on the Politburo to sanction the launching of a preemptive nuclear strike; hence, the probability is high that if a Sino-Soviet war—however unlikely that may be—were to eventuate, it would be nuclear from the very outset.[41]

Any use of nuclear weapons by either or both antagonists would have two immediate effects. First, prevailing westerly winds would quickly spread poisonous fallout particles to Korea, Japan, and other neighboring East Asian countries, and eventually to US territory. There would thus be a strong compulsion on these countries to exert collective pressure on the belligerents for immediate cessation of nuclear hostilities, or—if only one side had resorted to nuclear warfare—to unite behind the state that did not. Second, if either belligerent were to gain a decisive advantage by a nuclear first-strike, this would massively threaten the balance of power in Asia and the world as a whole, probably causing the major nonbelligerent states to bring strong collective pressure to bear on the winning state to restore the *status quo ante*, or (because such a restoration would not be very likely) to form a firm alliance in defense of the defeated state—an alliance which could also encompass other geographic areas as well as matters other than defense. In either case, world politics and East Asian international relations would enter a new and more uncertain era as a consequence of the breaking of the nuclear barrier and the necessity of starting over again to forge a new Asian power balance on a more stable basis. Thus, if the USSR were to emerge the "winner" in such a conflict with China, it might find itself faced with a grand coalition of all the states vitally interested in Asia, with such countries as Japan and India possibly yielding to the compulsion to rearm, probably with nuclear weapons.

Outlook

To sum up, the past quarter-century has seen vast changes in Soviet policy in and toward East Asia as China and Japan have risen in power status, as US policy has altered, and as Soviet interests themselves have changed. In contrast to the situation in 1950, when the Soviet Union and China were partners in a common front against the United States and its Japanese ally, Moscow now feels the need to confront its Far Eastern neighbor with a formidable array of military force, fears a Sino-American-led proto-coalition against the USSR, worries about Sino-Japanese rapprochement, and ponders how to deal with regional Japanese (and, to some extent, Chinese) economic power. By 1973, Moscow's policy of

[41] For an extended discussion of these and other possibilities, see the author's *The Border Negotiations and the Future of Sino-Soviet-American Relations*, Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, August 1971. See also O. Ferdinand Miksche, "Sino-Soviet War 19xx?," in Raymond L. Garthoff, Ed., *Sino-Soviet Military Relations*, New York, Praeger, 1966, pp. 193-202.

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subordinating Asia to its primary European concerns —or, more recently, to global Soviet military and political competition with the United States—has been forcibly altered by the necessity to treat East Asia as an area of no less vital concern to the USSR than Europe or the Middle East. The central interests and objectives of the Soviet Union in the East Asian region are to defend Soviet territory against possible Chinese attack, to forestall the development of a Sino-American coalition, to break up the Japanese-American alliance, and to keep Japan both disarmed and away from close alignment with Peking.

Present Soviet military and political policies in East Asia are explicable in terms of these vital interests and objectives. In the realm of military or security policy, Moscow seeks to deter the Chinese from initiating military action to recover "lost" territory and at the same time deems it wise to refrain from anti-Chinese military moves that might trigger a major nuclear exchange; and it also seeks to prevent other states—specifically, North Korea—from precipitating a military conflict in which Soviet forces might become involved. In the political sphere (and in support of these security policies), Moscow seeks to forestall a further deterioration of the political situation by calling for a series of bilateral "friendship" treaties in the name of Asian collective security; by endeavoring to assuage Chinese hostility and thus set the stage for possible restoration of close Sino-Soviet ties after Mao passes; by tempting Japan, through economic inducements and hints at a compromise on the northern islands, not to move too close to China; and by coming to terms with the United States on security and other issues in order to keep pace with the rapprochement between Washington and Peking.

These policies would seem to carry a fairly high probability of success, barring the possible intervention of the imponderables we have pointed out above. While Sino-Soviet armed conflict appears increasingly unlikely, a leftward drift in Japanese domestic politics could lead to close Sino-Japanese ties that might have an anti-Soviet bias. On the other hand, a melioration of Sino-Soviet relations that might well follow upon Mao's eventual demise could lead to a new, if attenuated, bipolarity that does not now seem to be in Moscow's long-term interest.

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Marxism in Venezuela

By Benedict Cross

Over the forty-plus years since its founding, the Communist movement in Venezuela has pursued a checkered course that has failed—at least until very recently—to attract more than a miniscule following to its ranks. Yet a number of factors make the movement an interesting and important target for scrutiny. In the characterization of Venezuela's most famous Communist dissident, Teodoro Petkoff, the party organization has a "rare" profile that sets it apart from more conventional sterotypes.[1] It is one of the few Communist parties on the Latin American continent to have adopted armed struggle—"*lucha armada*"—as an active strategy during the first half of the 1960's, in the wake of Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba. Partly as a result of the latter, it has played an influential—if negative—role in modern Venezuelan history out of all proportion to its political strength. Internally, it has undergone numerous divisions in its history, including three major splits. Its continuous internal wrangling has reflected an absence of traditional Marxist-Leninist discipline and a very loose interpretation of "democratic centralism" on the part of factional groupings.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Venezuelan communism is the recent emergence of Petkoff's dissident group as a force to be reckoned with on the political scene. In an effort to undo—or at least to sidestep—the critical damage done to the popular image of the insurgent Left during the *lucha armada,* these Communist dissidents have formed a Marxist nationalist party which abjures all revolutionary models. It has struck a strongly anti-Stalinist stance, but at the same time it has shifted attention away from the politics of international communism to concentrate instead on purely national issues. Its obvious aim is to polarize the Venezuelan electorate, wooing elements of the military as well as the *marginados* (the poverty-stricken masses who, in Marxist terms, have been not so much "exploited" as left idle on the fringe of Venezuelan socioeconomic development). By the time the present article is in circulation, the strength of this new offspring of communism will have been tested in Venezuela's national elections of early December. While there is no expectation that it can seriously challenge the parties of the democratic Left that are the major contenders in the election, the indications are that it may manage to capture a larger vote than any Communist grouping has registered in the past.

In attempting to assess the impact of the Communist movement in Venezuela, it may be useful to review some of the highlights of the country's political, economic, and social evolution to the present day.

Benedict Cross is the pen name of an American observer of Communist affairs who has recently lived in Latin America for several years.

The Historical Background

In broad perspective, Venezuela presents the rather striking picture of a nation which has emerged from the "dark ages" of over a century of political tyranny, economic primitiveness and civil war to become—in a period of some 15 years since 1958—one of the few relatively stable democracies on the South American continent.

Historically, the course of Venezuela's political development was set in the era of Spanish colonial

[1] Teodoro Petkoff, "The Division of the Communist Party of Venezuela," *Libre 1* (a Spanish-language quarterly published in Paris), September-November 1972, pp. 19-36.

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dominance. Once the colonizers failed to find a city of gold—the fabled "El Dorado"—along the Orinoco River (the largest waterway in what is now Venezuela), the Spanish crown had little interest in the area and treated it as a second-class colonial outpost. As a result, it remained relatively isolated from European influence throughout the colonial period. In this vacuum, a number of small, independent power centers emerged, a pattern that continued to prevail after the Andean colonies—under the leadership of the venerated "Liberator" Simón Bolívar—won their independence from Spain (1821) and Venezuela was proclaimed a separate republic (1830). For the rest of the 19th century, the Venezuelan scene was characterized by an almost uninterrupted struggle for supremacy among independent *caudillos*—political dictators with their own armies and local seats of influence, who successively tried to dominate the country as a whole. While some dictators were more "benign" than others, their reigns were generally marked by authoritarian rule and widespread corruption.

Two consequences of this era were of particular importance in Venezuela's later social and political evolution. First, the *latifundista* system that is common in much of South America (under which the vast landholdings of a few rich owners are farmed by *campesinos*—peasants—on a tenant basis) did not become widespread in Venezuela because of continuing political instability. Partly as a result, the country did not develop a rigid social structure, and the population remained relatively free of class-consciousness—a fact reflected in contemporary social and political behavior. Secondly, in the wake of the most serious period of struggle, a liberal *caudillo* named Guzman Blanco broke the back of the Catholic Church in Venezuela, divesting it of its political power and properties, and exiling its archbishop; the Church has since remained a minor force socially and politically, although 90 percent of the population is nominally Catholic.

During the present century Venezuela's political development has fallen into four distinct periods: The years 1908 to 1935 saw the reign of the supreme *caudillo* of them all, Juan Vicente Gómez, known as the "tyrant of the Andes," who ruled the country with an absolute hand, picking henchmen to alternate with him in the presidential palace on the basis of indirect elections that were patently controlled from the top.

Gómez' death in December 1935 ushered in a dozen years of mixed political development: two initial successors—General Eleazar López Contreras, who ruled from 1936 through 1941, and General Isaías Medina Angarita, in power from 1941 to 1945—were still *bona fide* presidential dictators, but both started out their regimes by undertaking some limited liberalization of political life, allowing the recognition—for the first time in Venezuelan history—of legal opposition parties. Of the several principal parties which emerged, *Acción Democrática* (the Democratic Action Party) quickly established itself as the strongest force on the political Left under the leadership of Rómulo Betancourt. In a coup sparked by the issue of succession, the AD joined with a group of military officers to overthrow Medina in October 1945; Betancourt was declared Provisional President of the Republic, and for some three years his regime and a successor regime (elected by universal suffrage in 1947) made a determined effort to institute constitutional political democracy and to launch programs of economic development and agrarian and social reform.

This effort was abruptly aborted in November 1948, when a countercoup by a conservative military junta dominated by Colonel (later General) Marcos Pérez Jiménez plunged the country into another decade of strong-man rule. Pérez Jiménez, who formally assumed the presidency in the years 1952-58, proved to be one of the most corrupt military dictators in modern Latin American history.

A final and crucial coup, widely supported by the population (including many in the military), led to Pérez Jiménez' overthrow and exile in January 1958, paving the way for Venezuela's return to constitutional government. In the period since, three presidents have been elected to five-year terms in office: Rómulo Betancourt who served from 1959 through 1963; Raúl Leoni, also of the Democratic Action Party, from 1964 through 1968; and Rafael Caldera Rodríguez of the Social Christian Party (*Comité de Organización Politica y Electoral Independiente*—COPEI), from 1969 through the end of 1973. While these administrations have pursued different programs and policies, all have worked to strengthen popular allegiance to the democratic system.

Paralleling the pattern of political change, economic and social development has come late but dramatically to Venezuela. At the time of Gómez' death in 1935, the country was an isolated agrarian society; over two-thirds of the population were *campesinos*, and since there was very little industry of any kind, there was virtually no working class —in terms of a perceptible social force—in the

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urban population. The wartime and postwar periods have brought about great socioeconomic changes, owing—more than any other factor—to the development of rich petroleum deposits in the country. As a result of rapidly expanding extraction of its "black gold" (mainly by foreign companies), Venezuela has become one of the world's largest producers and exporters of oil and has come to boast one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. At the same time, the country's dependence on this source of wealth has served as a psychological deterrent to significant capital investment in industry and agriculture. There has been some growth of small industry and manufacturing, but stockraising and agriculture—potentially important sectors of the economy—have tended to lag. Continued economic diversification and growth have been among the major objectives of the regimes in power since 1958.

The course of the country's recent development has given rise to a number of difficult economic and social problems. The middle class in Venezuela—which is one of the largest on the continent—has generally prospered in the years since 1958, but poverty is still widespread among the masses. While even the poorest segment has a higher average income than in most countries of Latin America, the lower 50 percent of the population still receives less than 15 percent of the national income, and the lowest 20 percent less than 3 percent of the income. In the current hemispheric climate of nationalistic ferment, there has been increasing pressure in Venezuela for social reforms that would distribute the wealth more evenly. There has also been growing pressure for nationalization of the foreign-owned oil industry, creating complex and problematical decisions for whatever government comes to power following the December elections. Moreover, Venezuela faces critical problems of overpopulation and underemployment, to be discussed later in this paper.[2]

Several of the above aspects of Venezuela's evolution have directly affected the nature and course of the Communist movement, and a brief summary of these factors may provide a useful framework in which to discuss its haphazard history. First, the extended periods of dictatorship up to the turning point of 1958 meant that the Communist party organization (the *Partido Comunista de Venezuela*—PCV) operated underground or in exile through most of its early years. It thus had little chance to develop a political base among either the peasants or the workers and was forced to remain a small, embattled party. A more important limitation was the highly effective competition it faced on the democratic Left, particularly from *Acción Democrática*. As Robert Alexander has stated in a useful study of Venezuelan communism: "Throughout virtually its [the PVC's] entire existence, another party of the Left, AD, has appealed to exactly the same groups, has promised many of the same short-run achievements, and has had the advantage of seeming more likely to fulfill its promises within a relatively shorter time than the Communists."[3] In the 1960's, the COPEI emerged as another formidable competitor of the Communists, especially among university youth.

The years of dictatorship stifled political thought as well as political organization, with the result that most Venezuelan Communists were relatively ignorant in the area of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.[4] Moreover, the combination of late political development and the aforementioned absence of a rigid social structure led to a general lack of social and political discipline, producing, in the case of the Communists, a membership that did not easily bow to leadership dictates and that frequently became embroiled in infighting (one of the main subjects of controversy being how to deal with the AD).

This indiscipline also affected the Venezuelan Communists' foreign relations and contacts—in the first instance, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The PCV top leaders generally remained loyal to the Moscow line and obedient to CPSU dictates—with the notable exception of the period of party support for the *lucha armada*. (They were duly rewarded, it might be added, with a rather generous flow of support and subsidies from the Soviet comrades.) But the leadership was unable to instill the same fealty to

[2] For information on the Venezuelan economy, see economic bulletins published by the ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), United Nations, New York.

[3] Robert J. Alexander, *The Communist Party of Venezuela*, Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1969, p. 213. For much of this brief background, the author has drawn on Mr. Alexander's study and his ideas.

[4] Teodoro Petkoff has been quoted as remarking: "The kind of Marxist formed in the 1930's and 1940's in Latin America is a very simple person, theoretically speaking, because he ignores the phenomena that do not fit into his theoretical preconceptions." See Norman Gall's series of interviews with Petkoff entitled, *Teodoro Petkoff: The Crisis of the Professional Revolutionary*, New York, American Universities Field Studies, 1972, p. 6.

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Moscow in the Communist flock, resulting over time in a proliferation of ideological views and political loyalties, as we shall see.

Against this broad background, let us examine the emergence of the Communist movement as a radical minority that has been as much frustrated by as frustrating to the rest of Venezuelan society.

The Early Years

The PCV enjoys the distinction of being Venezuela's oldest political party. It was founded clandestinely in May 1931 under the tutelage of the CPSU, admitted to the Comintern in 1935, and—during the brief respite of political permissiveness under López Contreras—held its first Congress in 1937, though it was still not legally recognized. A new period of crackdown circumscribed political activity during the late 1930's, but the Communists nevertheless managed to establish significant strength in local unions, particularly among the oil workers.

After the advent to power of President Medina, the Communists were allowed to form a legal front in 1942 under the name *Unión Popular Venezolana* (Venezuelan Popular Union), which in turn endorsed the President's slate of candidates in the congressional elections of that year. The latter act of endorsement paved the way for the party's first split. A faction led by Juan Bautista Fuenmayor which favored support of the Medina regime was expelled from the *Unión Popular* in 1944, but it quickly regrouped and was permitted by Medina to claim the title *Partido Comunista de Venezuela* (PCV). The remainder renamed themselves *Partido Comunista Unitario* (Unified Communist Party—PCVU). Following the overthrow of Medina and the establishment of the first Betancourt regime, the two parties at first cooperated fitfully but then ran separate candidates in the 1947 national elections. Since the new suffrage laws extended the vote to illiterates, all parties adopted identifying colors for the elections; as a result, the PCV became known as the "Red Communists," and the PCVU—once again changing its name to the *Partido Revolucionario Proletario/Comunista* (Revolutionary Proletarian Party/Communist), or PRPC—became known as the "Black Communists." The larger Red faction favored partial cooperation with the new democratic regime and generally supported it, even though the AD managed in this period to maneuver the Communists out of their hold on the labor movement.

After the restoration of dictatorship in November 1948, the "Reds" joined the AD in underground opposition to the military junta, and by May 1950 they were once again outlawed as a party. The "Blacks," having (correctly) identified the AD as the major enemy of communism, worked to harass the government in 1947-48 and then opted for cooperation with the junta; subsequently used by the new regime to counter AD's underground activity in the labor movement, the "Blacks" were eventually absorbed into the regime's unions and finally dissolved as a party in July 1952, leaving the "Reds" as the surviving CP organization.

The period of clandestine opposition to the Pérez Jiménez regime was characterized by a combination of cooperation and competition among several political parties which had been forced underground, including—besides the AD and the PCV—the *Unión Republicana Democrática* (Democratic Republican Union—URD) and the aforementioned COPEI, both of which had been formed in 1946. The underground movements of these parties generally collaborated on anti-regime strategy, but each was staking out areas of future influence and power. Within the PCV there was at first deep division over the tactic of cooperation with the AD. Fuenmayor, who had generally supported Betancourt in the 1947-48 period, did an about-face to urge cooperation with the military against AD, and as a result was again expelled from the PCV in 1951. Toward the end of this period, three men became dominant in the PCV leadership: Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, brothers and senior party members from a wealthy Caracas family; and Jesús Faría, originally an illiterate petroleum worker, whose political astuteness brought about his rapid rise in Communist ranks

In December 1957 a number of leaders of the AD, URD, COPEI and the PCV (represented by Gustavo Machado) met outside the country to plot the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez and to plan on a subsequent government. Within a month, the coup was successfully carried out, and a Provisional Government under shared civilian/military leadership was set up. Interestingly—and perhaps prophetically—another month passed before the PCV's decision to cooperate in the "patriotic junta" was formally approved by the party Central Committee.

The year 1958 proved to be a fateful turning point for the PCV, as it was for Venezuela as a whole. In the wake of Pérez Jiménez' overthrow, the Communists—though still an incohesive minority—

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Jesús Faría, an early leader of the PCV and its present Secretary General.

—Photo from *Elite* (Caracas), April 12, 1970, p. 66.

hit what was probably the peak period of political respectability and popular support in their history. Sharing in the acclaim that was accorded all the political parties which had worked to oust the dictator, they managed to reestablish a sizable following in the labor movement (amounting to 15-20 percent by the end of the year [5]). They also emerged in a relatively strong position in the *barrios* of Caracas—the slum sections of the capital city—owing mainly to the organizational abilities of young activists who had been recruited to help fight Pérez Jiménez.[6] In this situation, the leadership of the now legalized PCV was hopeful that the party would play a part in the coalition government that was to be formed on the basis of national elections in December 1958.

Unhappily for the Communists, this was not to be. The uneasy civilian/military relationship during the period of the Provisional Government showed the AD leadership that its democratic ambitions were still subject to challenge. In particular, a rightist effort by a senior general to dissolve the PCV and AD parties in mid-1958 must have signalled Betancourt that he had a long way to go to establish his party's credentials with the skeptical military and the wealthy Venezuelan conservatives, and that any pact with the relatively powerless Communists would constitute a folly with enormous and perhaps fatal consequences for democracy in Venezuela.[7] Soon after, the three major parties—AD, URD, and COPEI—agreed to the so-called "Pact of Punto Fijo," which committed them to a coalition government, excluding the Communists, under whichever of their candidates won the December elections.

Communist reactions to this exclusion were at first mixed. For several months the leadership was irresolute and split on how best to deal with the situation; but a number of factors combined to impel the party gradually but inexorably toward a course of violence after the election and installation of the Betancourt government.

The Onset of Violence: 1959-61

The record of events suggests that the Communist Party was drawn into a course of open struggle against the government by degrees, less as the result of leadership policy decisions than as a consequence of a process of radicalization that developed across a broad spectrum of the Left in the wake of Castro's victory in Cuba in 1959. While the PCV leadership assumed a posture of intrepid opposition to Betancourt from the start, it did not adopt a clear-cut policy of armed struggle until well

[5] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[6] See Talton R. Ray, *The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969.

[7] See Philip B. Taylor, *The Venezuelan Golpe de Estado of 1958: The Fall of Marcos Pérez Jiménez*, Washington, DC, Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1968. For a detailed study of the military threat to Betancourt in 1958-59, see Winfield J. Burggraaff, *The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935-59*, Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1972.

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after civil strife had broken out—and even then vacillated in its line and its tactics.[8]

The radicalization of the Left first gathered momentum among the youth wings of the AD, the URD and the PCV. These groups had played a vital role in the urban resistance movement against Pérez Jiménez and felt somewhat alienated from the older political leaders, most of whom were returning from the relative comfort of exile. The youth organizations had strong ties to the universities, which had been the centers of radical thought and activity in the underground period, and they were highly impatient for dramatic social change following the backward years of the dictatorship. During 1959-60 their impatience combined with a fascination over the Castroite experience and a flowering of revolutionary romanticism to spark the emergence of a new party, causing major splits and realignments among the existing forces of the Left and paving the way for the eventual formation of a revolutionary front and guerrilla army.

The new party, *Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario* (the Left Revolutionary Movement—MIR) was formed in May 1960 primarily out of the left wings of the AD and URD parties. In a speech in Congress in late June, its chief founder, Domingo Alberto Rangel, a defector from AD, was frank to admit that MIR had been inspired by the events in Cuba. The formation of the party was a serious blow to the Betancourt government, since it won over from AD 15 parliamentary deputies and one Senator, as well as the vast majority of AD's youth wing and many of its leading intellectuals. At the same time, MIR confronted the Communists with the prospect of a rival which claimed to stand to the political left of the PCV. While the MIRistas declared themselves to be Marxist-Leninists, they had the advantage at the start of being unencumbered by ideological or organizational baggage or by ties to the international Communist movement. Most certainly, the romantic and radical challenge of MIR was one of the crucial factors that moved the PCV toward open adoption of the *lucha armada*.[9]

The first phase of the developing struggle against the regime can be dated from the spring of 1959 through 1961. During this period the rhetoric of the radical Left became increasingly harsh, but incidents of violence were sporadic up to the emergence of MIR.

In November and December 1960 MIR and the PCV collaborated for the first time in a series of demonstrations, with the leaders of both parties calling for general strikes and popular "rebellion." The government reacted by closing down the Communist newspaper, *Tribuna Popular,* raiding the headquarters of both parties, and suspending some of their activities.

According to available evidence, the year 1961 was marked by continuing disagreement within the PCV over the course it should take, with the leadership and its supporters facing increasing pressure from the younger ranks to abandon all pretense of constitutional behavior and openly proclaim war on the regime. (Three of the most outspoken proponents of struggle were Teodoro Petkoff, Douglas Bravo and Guillermo García Ponce, all of whom were to play key roles in the insurgent movement.) A PCV Congress in March and a party plenum in October both took an ambivalent stand that endorsed the *lucha armada* but held that the time was not yet ripe for an all-out struggle. Meantime the party began to organize cells for further street demonstrations, assigned funds for the development of guerrilla training camps in the countryside, and sent some of its young people to Cuba for training in urban and guerrilla warfare. Urban terrorism increased significantly in late 1961, though there is evidence that it was carried out by MIR and PCV extremists without party authorization.

Struggle and Political Strategy: 1962-63

The first important signs that the PCV leadership had yielded to the pressure for a sustained struggle against the government appeared in early 1962, and if violence ever had a real chance to destabilize the Betancourt regime, it was probably in this period. A succession of strikes and university disturbances marked the beginning of a systematic campaign of terror in the cities that was to continue throughout the rest of Betancourt's presidency. Meantime the MIR and the PCV got their first rural guerrilla groups into operation, respectively in January and April 1962. The radical Left also managed to infiltrate and develop some support within the armed forces, sparking two attempts at mutiny in the naval and

[8] For a useful study of this period, see *Castro-Communist Insurgency in Venezuela*, Washington, DC, US Department of Defense, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Project No. 4860, 1965.

[9] A second division within AD in 1961 resulted in its losing a majority in Congress, contributing further to the Communists' belief that popular opposition was mounting against the Betancourt government.

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marine corps in May and June 1962.[10] By May, Betancourt felt forced to take new countermeasures, suspending both the MIR and the CPV, seizing their records and properties, and prohibiting all their activities. Seemingly undaunted, MIR and the PCV moved in mid-1962 to organize a new revolutionary front, *Frente de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Front—FLN) and military arm, *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (Armed Forces of National Liberation—FALN), charged respectively with directing and carrying out the campaign of violence.

At a December Central Committee plenum, the PCV leadership for the first time formally announced a strategy of armed struggle, but it was still hedging its bet. The policies of the PCV and MIR were obviously influenced at this juncture by the onset of the presidential election year. On the one hand, the insurrectionists were determined that if they could not effect the overthrow of the Betancourt regime, they would at least do everything in their power to disrupt the electoral campaign, discredit the democratic process, and create an atmosphere in which a peaceful transfer of power to a successor regime would be difficult. At the same time, leaders in both parties—though legally suspended from political activity during the campaign—pursued a secondary strategy of attempting to form a coalition behind the URD candidate for president so as to defeat the AD.[11] The government countered this two-pronged effort by standing firm in the face of increasing terrorism (including a particularly shocking attack on a passenger train in September) and by jailing a number of MIR and PCV leaders and congressional deputies for their illegal activities in advance of the election.

The results of the election represented an overwhelming repudiation of the strategy of violence. Despite last-minute terrorist efforts to frighten the public away from the polls, over 90 percent of Venezuela's registered voters turned out to elect the AD candidate, Raúl Leoni, to the presidency by a plurality vote of 33 percent; the *campesinos*—particularly loyal to the AD because of the party's past efforts at agrarian reform—cast a majority for Leoni, while the urban workers distributed their support more evenly among the democratic parties.[12]

Guerrilla Warfare: 1964-66

Unfortunately, the lessons of the 1963 election were lost upon the insurgents. After a brief respite, the CPV, MIR and FLN/FALN resumed the campaign of violence, now shifting the main focus of their struggle from urban terrorism to rural guerrilla warfare.

It is one of the ironies of the PCV's history that the Communists waited until a party plenum of April 1964 to issue their first unequivocal commitment to the *lucha armada,* espousing classical guerrilla warfare as their key strategy (albeit "without neglecting the struggle in the cities").[13] This stance was struck after the insurrectionists had clearly failed to weaken—let alone bring down—the developing democratic system. Indeed, Venezuela's democratic institutions seemed in a better position than ever to resist challenges from either the radical Left or the conservative Right. In this situation, the insurgents' shift to guerrilla war marked the abandonment of hope for the immediate downfall of the government and an effort instead to build a base in the countryside for a prolonged struggle.

This course was to prove just as unprofitable, however, as the campaign of urban terrorism. For some two years, various guerrilla bands engaged in hit-and-run fighting in the countryside, seeking to win over as much *campesino* support as they could and terrorizing those in the rural population who resisted. Guerrilla activity reached a peak in the first half of 1965; but the clear futility and high cost of this effort had meantime produced growing opposition within the ranks of both the MIR and the CPV to a continuation of the struggle. Some of the leaders of MIR, including its founder, Domingo Alberto Rangel, were the first to dissociate themselves from the violence, splitting off from MIR to form a dissident party in 1964. "Soft-line" spokesmen of the PCV soon voiced similar sentiments,

[10] According to Teodoro Petkoff, who was then a member of the party's "military command," the party tried to start uprisings in the armed forces twice in 1962 but failed. In his view, the PCV-inspired revolts in May and June at Puerto Cabello and Carupano came too late and were a serious mistake. From that time on, the possibilty of a successful armed struggle with help from the military was out of the question. See Gall, *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

[11] In Petkoff's view, the foundering insurgency movement made another mistake by failing to abandon its terrorist campaign at least temporarily during the 1963 electoral campaign. He argues that instead of "walking with one foot in the armed struggle and one in the elections," the party should have thrown its full support behind the URD candidate, Jovito Villalba. See Gall, *ibid*, p. 12.

[12] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[13] See Carlos Lopez, "The Communist Party of Venezuela and the Present Situation," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), October 1964.

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calling for a diminution of the costly and wasteful guerrilla war and a new effort to pursue political as opposed to armed struggle. Infighting over this issue surfaced at a PCV plenum in April 1965 and continued to build up during the year, resulting in a waning of PCV authority over the insurgents and an estrangement of FALN leaders from the PCV. At the end of the year Douglas Bravo and other diehard insurgents undertook a revolt within the PCV, seeking to form a new Central Committee sympathetic to their cause. In reaction, the PCV leadership reformed ranks and in early 1966, without completely repudiating the armed struggle, called on the party to undertake a campaign of "democratic pacification." To the relief of Moscow and the despair of Havana, CPV chairman Jesús Faría thus set a course for the party's eventual return to legality.

Once the PCV leadership opted to reemphasize the political over the military struggle, the disengagement of the MIR and FLN/FALN forces from PCV policies was a foregone conclusion. In April 1966 the FALN/FLN chiefs reorganized their ranks without the approval of the PCV Politburo, which in retaliation suspended Bravo from the PCV leadership in May. On June 11, 1966, MIR and FALN leaders published a letter in Cuba's *Granma* newspaper and in the Caracas daily, *La Republica*, denouncing the Politburo's ouster of Bravo as a "revisionist" act, scoring their own dissidents, and reaffirming the policy of armed struggle. Soon afterward three PCV leaders who had once been among the most enthusiastic supporters of the *lucha armada*—Teodoro Petkoff, Pompeyo Márquez, and Freddy Muñoz—issued a rejoinder in the form of a statement supporting the end of guerrilla warfare.[14]

Antigovernment guerrillas Douglas Bravo, right, and Luben Petkoff (brother of Teodoro), left, pictured with Mexican journalist Mario Menendez in December 1966 in the mountains of Falcon State.

—UPI.

For the Communists, this act marked the unofficial termination of the era of armed struggle, though some loose ends remained to be tied. In March 1967 the PCV leadership, in denouncing the terrorist assassination of the Foreign Minister's brother in Caracas, publicly charged Cuba with interference in Venezuela's internal affairs.[15] Castro replied bitterly, accusing the PCV of selling out the guerrilla movement to regain its legitimacy. A month later the PCV Central Committee issued a formal statement of frank self-criticism, committed the party to return to a peaceful course, and expelled Bravo from the party altogether.[16] The second major split in the Communist Party was thus complete. Sporadic acts of rural and urban terrorism by the insurgent diehards were to continue for several years but without much discernible impact.

The Radical Left in Disarray

The Marxist Left that emerged from the *lucha armada* in 1966 was a very different phenomenon from what it had been in 1958, and it may be useful at this juncture to pause for an overview.

In 1958, there had been just one Marxist political party, the PCV. It could claim control of 15 or 20 percent of the labor movement; had strong support in the urban *barrios* as well as in the univerities and secondary schools; had indeed registered the second largest vote in Caracas in the December 1958 election, although it had won only 6.3 percent of the national vote; and—if of negligible importance outside the big cities—had at least earned national respectability as a result of its participation in the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez.

By 1966, there were at least three radical Leftist organizations—the PCV, MIR and FLN/FALN—already splintered and destined to split still further. Among them, they probably could not have claimed the support of 5 percent of the labor force, and they

[14] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[15] "The Reply of the Communist Party to Fidel Castro," *El Nacional* (Caracas), March 17, 1967.

[16] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

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had immeasurably damaged their image among the poor of both the cities and the countryside by their terrorism. While MIR and the PCV still had a strong base in the universities, the revolutionary romanticism sparked by Castro, Ché Guevara, Régis Debray, *et al.*, was fast fading as more young people lost their lives in the futile struggle. Although it has been claimed that FALN's strength, including guerrillas and logistics support groups, ran to over 2,000 men at the peak of its activity,[17] the insurgents probably could not have mustered the backing of 200 people throughout Venezuela by 1966-67. In this situation, the radicals' attitude—in stark contrast to the outward and hopeful posture of the Communists in the beginning of 1958—was one of looking inward at their own mistakes, contemplating their future, and weighing their survival.

One of the striking characteristics of the Marxist Left by 1966 was the multiplicity of individual and group views that existed with respect to the revolutionary effort. Through trial and error, the various participants in the *lucha armada* had experimented with urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare, with organizational and logistical methods of supporting these operations, with smuggled weapons and homemade explosives. At another level of experimentation, they had been feeling their way in relations with the Soviets, the Cubans, the Chinese, and fellow Latin American Leftists.[18] They had debated ideology and studied various revolutionary writers from Debray to Leon Uris (whose *Exodus* was said to have provided some ideas about commando action). The result was that many individuals or small groups emerged from their experience in one part of the movement with differing concepts of how to conduct the struggle. Within each of the three main Marxist organizations, there were divergent views on violent *vs.* political activity, urban *vs.* rural terrorism, protracted *vs.* tactical conflict. Since in the end all methods seemed to fail, these debates became increasingly esoteric and irrelevant. From 1967 onward, those who clung to the pursuit of armed struggle were to convey the impression of being variously medieval debaters, irreconcilables, desperate revolutionaries, or just plain criminals and robbers.

At the same time, the dissipation of revolutionary élan did not mean that those who were now ready to turn to a peaceful political path had completely abandoned their revolutionary ideals. Within the PCV, a number of militants and radicals assumed the attitude, as good Marxist-Leninists, that the party's adoption of a peaceful course was only a temporary tactic and that armed struggle could eventually be resumed. The dominant mood can perhaps best be described as a revolutionary mentality in the Maoist sense: the Venezuelan Left had been through its "long march," the only difference from the Chinese precedent being that it had failed—and failed miserably. Among the survivors, there was still a certain camaraderie rooted in the shared experiences of the past and a continuing sense of alienation from the democratic system (and particularly from the AD).

Perhaps most important, many Marxists had come to see the folly of trying to adapt the teachings of Mao or Fidel to Venezuela—first because the country was overwhelmingly urban and increasingly nationalistic by 1966, and second, because the very system of government which they despised held out the promise of access to the media, to the Congress and to the people, subject to the Left's pursuit of a peaceful course. At the height of the armed struggle, the radicals may have taken some pride in providing the surrogate battlefield for ideological debates between the Soviets, the Chinese and the Cubans. But by 1966-67, their "foreign connections" had become more of a burden than an asset.

The Impact of Pacification

For some time after its formal renunciation of violence, the PCV remained under official suspension from political activity. But with a tolerance that is characteristically Venezuelan—and in this case particularly admirable, considering the aggravation the country had suffered—the Leoni government decided to permit the Communists to participate in the national elections of 1968, not under the PCV banner but as a front called *Unión Para Avanzar* (Union for Advancement—UPA) which had a red rooster as its unmistakable Communist symbol. The UPA ran candidates for Congress throughout the country, though it did not name a presidential runner, giving its unsolicited support to the presidential candidate

[17] Teodoro Petkoff has claimed that the FALN at one time had five 100-man brigades, each supported by a logistics group of 300 to 400 men. See Gall, *loc. cit.*, p. 15.

[18] The present paper has not dealt with the fascinating international aspects of this period in the development of the Venezuelan Left, since they are peripheral to the issues being discussed. For an illuminating study of the Left's international connections, see D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.

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of the *Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo* (People's Electoral Movement—MEP), a new leftwing splinter of the AD party.

The elections of 1968 went off smoothly, with no interference from the terrorist remnants isolated in the Venezuelan hills. Rafael Caldera of the Social Christian Party managed to win a narrow victory over the AD candidate, Gonzalo Barrios, in a four-way contest for the presidency, although the AD recaptured the largest number of seats in the congressional races.[19] Although the UPA (PCV) campaigned energetically, it won only 2.8 percent of the popular vote and sent only five deputies and one senator to the new Congress. This minimal vote for the only Marxist party running in the election was clear testimony to the impact on the Left of nearly a decade of violence. In retrospect, it seemed hard to imagine that such a miniscule political force could have managed to cause the predecessor AD governments so much concern over the possibility of a popular uprising. Certainly, the election seemed to confirm a strong anti-Communist bias in the Venezuelan electorate at large.

Virtually the first official act of the new government, taken in March 1969, was the legalization of the Communist Party and the announcement of a policy of "pacification"—an essential ingredient of the COPEI promise of a *cambio* (change) from the years of violence under AD. Pacification was to become the hallmark of Caldera's administration—a government of *dialogo* with all political factions of the Right or Left, at home and abroad. On the domestic front, the regime set out to encourage former guerrillas either to leave the country (on occasion with government support) or to turn themselves in with some hope of amnesty; to expand contacts and improve relations with Leftist political groups, particularly the PCV; and to discourage publicity about any counterinsurgent activity still necessary, minimizing the role of the military and giving the police a more benign image. In the field of foreign affairs, Caldera moved toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries in Latin America, regardless of their forms of government, and toward the opening up of relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Among other effects, the policy of pacification permitted the reentry of numerous former insurgents (returning from prison, exile, or the hills) into active political life; gave official sanction to legitimate Leftist activities; and resulted in a marked expansion of Marxist propaganda, particularly in the urban centers. This very emphasis on openness and legitimacy was to contribute to the further, extensive fracturing of the Marxist movement—leading by



Gustavo Machado, one of the founders of the Venezuelan Communist Party, pictured in 1967.

—Cover photo from G. Machado, *Ante El Consejo de Guerra* (Before the Court Martial), Caracas, Veneprint S. A., 1968.

[19] The COPEI party—with close ties to the Chilean Christian Democratic Party of Eduardo Frei—had managed during the two successive AD administrations not only to show increasing strength as the chief opposition party to AD but to compete effectively with the Communists in the universities and secondary schools. In particular, the COPEI youth movement, which was imbued with a spirit of Christian social reform without being tied to the Catholic Church, had provided ideological competition for the Marxist Left. Many of the youth leaders became members of Caldera's cabinet.

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1970 to a third major division within the PCV and by 1971-72 to the "Balkanization" of the rest of the radical Left into some 15 to 20 esoteric splinter groups.

From Debate to Debacle

The Communist Party—which resumed the PCV label within weeks of its legalization—was the first to show signs of new dissension. For some time, reactions to the Soviet invasion of Czecholovakia in 1968 had been simmering within the party. Among others, Teodoro Petkoff had emerged as an articulate critic whose troublesome questions had led to his removal from the party Politburo in January 1969. During the spring and summer of that year these simmerings developed into a profound dispute over the issues of PCV relations with the Soviet Union, the role of the party, and the nature of internal party democracy. The stage for the dispute was set in April, when the PCV leadership—acceding to pressures from within party ranks—took the unusual step of sanctioning a free exchange of views in the now open party press as a prelude to a PCV Congress scheduled for December 1970; as one source has put it, "everything was subject to debate except . . . [matters] affecting the security of the party." [20] Over the next months distinct factions emerged among the leaders, and discussion became increasingly acrimonious.

The spark that ignited open dissension—simultaneously catapulting the PCV into the international spotlight—was the publication in the summer of 1969 of a book by Petkoff entitled *Checoeslovaquia: Socialismo Como Problema* (Czechoslovakia: Socialism as a Problem.).[21] This book was less a study of Czechoslovakia than it was a highly critical history of the Soviet party and state and a scathing critique of Stalinism in all its forms. Petkoff's thesis was that the Soviet perversion of socialism over many decades had led inexorably to the decision to snuff out the Dubcek effort to humanize socialism. Few contemporary Communists—certainly in Latin America—have written such a forceful attack on the CPSU (only the French critic Roger Garaudy comes to mind in comparison, aside from the Chinese).

Petkoff's opinions about Soviet communism led him to certain conclusions about Venezuelan communism which he now began to publicize more openly, both inside and outside the party. First, he preached the need for ending the PCV's dependence on the Soviet Union and developing a truly Venezuelan Communist Party. Second, he advocated much greater internal party democracy and repudiated "democratic centralism," the classic term for control from the center as practiced in Marxist-Leninist parties. Third, he maintained that the major thrust of the party should be directed against Venezuela's capitalists and wealthy elite, and only secondarily against the "imperialist" North Americans who had always been the main target of orthodox Communist propaganda.

Understandably, Petkoff's ideas created a stir among anti-Communist forces and something of a scandal for the Soviets, leading to an attempt by the PCV Politburo in the fall of 1969 to place restrictions on the ongoing debate and thus put a lid on the Pandora's box they had opened. Despite some opposition from regional organizations, Communist intellectuals and youth elements, the PCV Central Committee backed up the Politburo's efforts, issuing a formal resolution in February 1970 that expressed disagreement with Petkoff's views and established more stringent limits on discussion.[22] But Petkoff refused to be silenced, and the fundamental issues that he had raised simply would not go away. He and his growing band of supporters—including, at the top level of leadership, Freddy Muñoz and Germán Lairet—now came to be regarded as the left wing of the PCV.

In diametric opposition to Petkoff, the right wing of the party—led by Guillermo García Ponce and the now aging Eduardo Machado—held firmly to the view that the PCV could only overcome the disastrous years of insurgency by retrenching, stressing party discipline, seeking increased support and assistance from the Soviet comrades, striking an anti-imperialist line as a means of making political friends and alliances, and avoiding excessive criticism of the powerful Venezuelan elite.

In between Petkoff's left faction and the PCV right wing stood a "compromise" group headed by Pompeyo Márquez and Eloy Torres which saw the need to diminish dependence on foreign parties,

[20] Eleazar Díaz Rangel, *Como Se Dividió El PCV* (How the PCV Split), Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1971, p. 16. Diaz Rangel's book, although biased toward MAS, is considered by most observers to be a rather accurate story of the internal PCV debates in this period, and it is the primary source used by the present writer in this part of the essay.

[21] Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1969.

[22] Díaz Rangel, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24.

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

Pompeyo Márquez, now Secretary General of MAS, denounces the PCV Politburo on December 10, 1970, days before a new rupture in the party.

—Photo from Eleazar Díaz Rangel, *Como Se Dividió el PCV* (How the PCV Split), Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1971, p. 98.

particularly the Soviet, and to develop a more nationalistic image, but wanted to avoid a split in the party. Lastly, there was an element in the leadership, including PCV Secretary General Jesús Faría, that remained neutral in the debate for as long as it felt able to do so.

While the issues of the debate were real, personalities and age also played a role in the alignment of forces. Petkoff clearly had the support of young people (including most of the party's semi-autonomous youth organization, intellectuals and many non-party Marxists). His arguments were "new Left," nationalist, and persuasively more relevant to modern Venezuela than the stale PCV sloganry. His insistence on open debate of all issues appealed to the instinctive anarchism of student radicals and to the antibureaucratic bias of the urban youth and intellectuals. The old guard in control of the Politburo, on the other hand, saw in Petkoff the epitome of undisciplined left-wing radicalism that they felt would wither outside the PCV. They became increasingly interested in isolating his group from the remainder of the party, and probably would have moved sooner to oust him if they had not feared loss of influence over the Communist youth wing.

Dissension in the party reached a new crescendo in the fall of 1970 after Petkoff published a second controversial volume, *Socialismo para Venezuela?* (Socialism for Venezuela?), reiterating many of the views of his first book.[23] According to Díaz Rangel, a Petkoff supporter, a furious debate also developed over the issue of what message the PCV should send the CPSU to mark the 53rd aniversity of the October Revolution.[24]

At this critical juncture, the powers-that-be in Moscow chose to sanction (if not indeed to order) the publication in *Pravda* of an article on the PCV which the Old Guard read as a clear recommendation to move against Petkoff. The article, written by one A. Mosinev and published on October 20, was pegged to the upcoming PCV Congress still scheduled for early December, but devoted most of its discussion to the "group with anti-Leninist positions" in the PCV. Criticizing Petkoff by name, the article charged him, *inter alia*, with renouncing the Leninist organizational principle of democratic centralism, maliciously distorting the process of the building of communism in the USSR, falsifying Soviet documents, denying the historic mission of the working class, speaking against the standard Comintern line in support of anti-Fascist popular fronts, and specifically rejecting the PCV's need to establish a broad anti-imperialist popular front at the present stage of its development. The article ended with a direct call upon the PCV membership and the youth organization to defend party unity by giving "fitting rebuffs" to Petkoff's "anti-party design."

Aside from this "indirect directive" from Moscow, as the Old Guard saw it, some very practical considerations influenced the leadership's course. During regional preparations for the party Congress, it became clear that Petkoff's left wing and Márquez' central group outnumbered supporters of the right wing in several key Venezuelan states. The conservatives then applied increasing pressure within the Politburo to change the rules for representation at the Congress. In this situation Secretary General Jesús Faría was swayed from his position of neutrality toward a rightist stance: at a Politburo meeting on November 24, he advocated that Petkoff be

[23] Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1970.
[24] Díaz Rangel, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

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relieved of all leadership positions for a period of a year; that the party sections for Caracas and the adjoining Miranda State be revised by the Politburo (these were the largest and most important regional organizations, and in both the right was in a minority); that the party "debate" be cut off at once; and that the party Congress be postponed.[25] According to Díaz Rangel, Eduardo Machado insisted at this meeting that the *Pravda* article had been an order from Moscow either to punish or to expel Petkoff, and that the order should be obeyed.[26] Two weeks of fierce internal maneuvering for and against these proposals culminated in an open attack on the Petkoff and Márquez factions in the conservative-dominated PCV weekly, *Tribuna Popular,* on December 10 and a counterdenunciation of the Politburo by Márquez (who was still a member) in a press conference the same day. Four days later a truncated Central Committee met to announce that Petkoff, Márquez, and many of their followers—including some 20 members of the Central Committee itself—had left the party.

Thus, what had started out as a debate over the implications of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia mushroomed into the third and most serious division of the PCV in its history. Diversity had long existed within the PCV, and it might be argued that the division was unavoidable at this stage of the party's growth. Still, it is interesting that the final break was given a crucial boost from Moscow, whose spokesman in *Pravda* indeed seemed to summon a litany from a more monolithic era when he invoked the name of the Comintern to attack the PCV dissidents.[27] In Petkoff's words, the split-up of the PCV "became inevitable once the Soviet intervention, striking those sensitive chords reflecting the Stalinist condition, made any democratic solution impossible." [28] It is truistic to add that the Kremlin was motivated in the case of the PCV by the same concern that had led them to invade Czechoslovakia—their desire to keep intact the traditional authoritarian structure and role of the Marxist-Leninist party.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[27] Another aspect of alleged interference by the Soviets is worth recounting, though the charge was never proved. Diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the USSR—which had been broken off by Pérez Jiménez in 1952 because of Soviet aid to the PCV—were reestablished in 1970 as a result of the Caldera government's overtures. By coincidence, an advance party of Soviet diplomats reopened the Soviet Embassy in Caracas just weeks before the split in Communist ranks, and there were widespread rumors that these diplomats had played an important part in influencing the course of the PCV leadership that led to the split. It was clear, however, that Petkoff's supporters were actively floating the rumors, and no substantiation ever surfaced.

[28] Petkoff article in *Libre 1*, p. 35.

MAS and the Masses: 1971-73

Out of the division of the PCV and the chaos on the Marxist Left in general, there emerged in January 1971 a new political party, *Movimiento Al Socialismo* (Movement Toward Socialism—MAS).



Teodoro Petkoff, founder and chief theoretician of MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo—*Movement Toward Socialism).*

—Photo from Eleazar Díaz Rangel, *Como Se Dividió El PCV* (How the PCV Split), Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1971, p. 27.

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una minoria: los ricos
QUIENES VIVEN DE LO QUE POSEEN
DUEÑOS DE FABRICAS MATERIA PRIMA EQUIPO
estos son los explotadores !!!
y la mayoria: los pobres
QUE VIVEN DE SU TRABAJO
estos son los explotados!!

A sample of the MAS electoral tactic of seeking mass support by focusing political attacks on Venezuelan public figures rather than abstract class enemies. Those individuals pictured in the lefthand panels are accused of being an exploiting, rich minority who live off their holdings in plants, raw materials and equipment, in contrast to the poor majority in the right panels, who live off their own labor.

—Photos courtesy of the author.

Built around the core of dissidents who broke from the PCV, MAS was based on the ideas of Petkoff (who became its Propaganda Secretary) and the organizational abilities of Márquez (who became its Secretary General). MAS managed to take with it nearly 60 percent of the old PCV, including the key regional organizations, most of the youth movement, the lion's share of the Communist intellectuals, and over one-half of the PCV's miniscule labor movement. The orthodox Communists retained the party name, the newspaper, the six seats in Congress, and the continued financial support of the Soviet Union. Today MAS has some 4,500 to 5,000 members, while the PCV probably has about 3,000 to 4,000 members.[29] While exact figures are not available, the MAS youth organization is clearly much larger and stronger than the Communist youth wing. MAS' strength is still greatest among university youth and the middle-class professional groups in the large cities, though it has made a determined effort to widen its appeal.

The MAS strategy has been not to expand membership or to develop a party structure but to work for massive popular support in the December 1973 elections. Organizational work has been *ad hoc,* and "Leninist principles" have been thrown to the wind. The MASistas' approach to the elections has been tailored to what the leaders see as the Venezuelan condition in 1973. First, in order not to offend other Marxists or potential Leftist voters, and to set the stage for what they hope will be their future role as Venezuela's chief Marxist party, the MAS leaders have deliberately played down polemics vis-à-vis their former colleagues in the PCV and other parties of the Left. Secondly, they have avoided the use of the words "Communist" or "Leninist" since both have an antinationalist flavor in Venezuela, at least in part because of lingering reaction to the insurgence of the 1960's. MASistas have also avoided the word "party" and kept discussion of the "movement's" organizational structure to a minimum, since they have estimated—probably correctly—that the voters who are the target of their appeals, in particular the *marginados* in the *barrios,* have become cynical about the promises of Venezuela's political "parties." Thirdly, MAS has undertaken a propaganda campaign against Venezuelan capitalism—and specifically against individual rich Venezuelan families. Instead of attributing the ills of society to illusive "imperialists" (as the Moscow-line Communists have traditionally done in Latin America), MAS propaganda has identified and circulated pictures of individual Venezuelans who are accused of being the "guilty" parties "responsible" for the poverty and miserable conditions of the *barrio* people. This approach has no precedent in Vene-

[29] See US State Department publication, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1973.

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zuelan political campaigns, and MAS leaders believe it has been the single most effective tactic they have adopted. Fourthly, MAS, in making organization a secondary concern, has taken in many new non-Communist Marxists and Leftists who have further helped to blur the Communist origins and aura of the movement.

The MAS effort to win over the poor masses in the *barrios* as well as elements of the military has reportedly led it to attempt a rapprochement with some forces on the Right. The *marginados* have never warmed to the major democratic parties, tending rather to be attracted to the political extremes. In the 1968 elections they had lent significant support to a comeback effort directed on behalf of Pérez Jiménez, helping to elect him as a senator even though he remained in Spain and his election was subsequently declared illegal.[30] A new effort to make him a presidential candidate in the 1973 elections was declared unconstitutional by legislative action. The MAS leaders have made no secret of the fact that they coveted the vote among the poor that might otherwise have gone to the ex-dictator. It has been reported that they suggested an alliance of forces with his supporters to "reject representative democracy" as practiced by the mutual enemies of MAS and Pérez Jiménez—the AD and COPEI parties—but no formal alliance was ever announced.

With respect to platform, MAS has advocated a radical program of social reform and state control of industry, although it has left room for a private sector. In particular, it has called for the "socialization" of the foreign-owned petroleum companies, meaning "nationalization" by a "socialist government." The MASistas have argued that nationalization by an AD or COPEI government would simply mean the transfer of control from foreign to domestic "capitalists," which could even be worse for the country. (Private polls have shown for years that over 70 percent of the Venezuelan population favors nationalization of the oil companies.) At the same time, MAS has been careful to make clear that if it gained a controlling voice in the government, it would continue to sell most of Venezuela's petroleum to the US and to try to remain on good terms with—though not dependent on—"Tío Sam."

Finally, as their presidential candidate the MASistas selected an independent Marxist, José Vicente Rangel (no relation to Domingo Alberto Rangel), who is young, handsome, a stirring if not a brilliant speaker, and an *andino*—a native of the Andes, long the birthplace of Venezuelan leaders. Rangel has portrayed himself, with some justification, as a sincere idealist who has fought as an independent in Congress to stem police repression and corruption. He has a gentle and convincing manner that has enabled the MAS propagandists to portray him in posters in a pose reminiscent of a beloved doctor of the early 20th century, José Gregorio Hernández, who is Venezuela's only candidate for sainthood before the Vatican.

Election material of MAS seeks to cast its 1973 presidential candidate, José Vicente Rangel (seen in the poster to the left), in the image of Dr. José Gregorio Hernández (seen in the newsclip to the right), a venerated early 20th-century physician.

—Photos courtesy of the author.

[30] Pérez Jiménez won a total throughout Venezuela of some 400,000 votes, a large portion of which came from the *marginados* in Caracas.

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The energy that has gone into the MAS electoral effort has apparently borne some fruit. Nationwide polls in recent months have shown Rangel getting the support of 7 to 12 percent of all voters, and 14 percent of those in the age-bracket from 18 to 24 years. If support on this scale in fact materializes in the election, the vote for MAS—not counting what the PCV picks up—will represent a dramatic increase over the Marxist vote of less than 3 percent in 1968.

The Longer-Range MAS Line

Looking beyond the MASistas' tactics in the electoral campaign, it seems fair to assert that MAS represents a new type of Marxist political movement, but one that could flourish only under rather special circumstances. MAS leaders have explained that they have no "models": they disclaim any allegiance or similarity to the Cuban regime, they have no attachments to Maoism, and while they have toned down their criticism of the CPSU, they have not retreated from their rejection of the Soviet Communist view of the party and state. Petkoff views the MAS as part of an ongoing "revolutionary movement" which should not be limited in any way by rigid views of "classes" but should rather draw on all groups of society useful to it—including such disparate elements as the left-wing Christians, the *barrio* population, and supporters in the military establishment.

Moreover, while the MASistas' emphasis to date has been on electoral activity, Petkoff preaches that the revolutionaries should not limit themselves to any single form of struggle but must stand ready to exploit any condition that will further the cause of an eventual accession to power.[31] On the subject of armed struggle, he has written: ". . . the military and police power of the [current Venezuelan governmental] system appear to give no chance to armed struggle. I insist, however, that experience has demonstrated that politically correct and cleverly directed armed struggle could take advantage of the fissures in the system and by means of these take it over."[32]

[31] Petkoff, *Socialismo Para Venezuela?* The last chapter contains the best explanation of Petkoff's view of revolutionary movements. It is worth noting that Petkoff has been a key figure both in the PCV and in MAS for making and maintaining contacts with young military officers.

[32] Petkoff's article in *Libre 1*, p. 37.

Petkoff and the MAS movement could be—and indeed in some respects have been—compared to other Marxist leaders and parties of the "New Left" in various countries of the world, but space limits prohibit a discussion of particulars here. It is more important to note what is unique about MAS—an amalgam of factors rooted in the specific Venezuelan conditions of an open society, a large poor sector, and a core of revolutionary leaders who have experimented with a variety of forms of struggle in the recent past. Rightly or wrongly, Petkoff and his followers believe that the present state of the Venezuelan economy, society and political environment afford the revolutionary movement an opportunity to develop mass support. Also, they appear sufficiently imbued with the "revolutionary spirit" to adopt new tactics after the December elections; it seems clear that they would not hesitate to return to violence to expand their influence should that appear to be the most profitable course.

The PCV: Survival and Realignment

While MAS emerged from the confusion on the Left as the most popular and creative of the Marxist movements, the PCV managed to hold on as a political force, along with various other mini-parties of the far left.

In broadest terms, the survival of the PCV—as well as the growth of MAS—could be attributed to changes on the Latin American scene after the turn of the decade that encouraged more extremist political positions throughout the hemisphere. In particular, the election of Salvador Allende in Chile and the near victory of the populist former dictator Rojas Pinilla in neighboring Colombia pointed up to the leaders of Venezuela's major democratic parties, AD and COPEI, that they risked losing power to forces of the populist Left or Right if they failed to develop vigorous new programs of social reform and to assume a convincing nationalist posture, especially in their approach to the foreign petroleum companies. In this situation, the climate ripened for radical rhetoric, and the Communist Party managed to hang onto enough of a following to survive as a political force.

A more concrete factor in the PCV's recuperation from the 1970 split was the continued support it received from the Soviet Union. Soviet subsidies allowed the PCV to turn its weekly *Tribuna Popular*

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

*Two views of the electoral alliance between the PCV and the MEP (*Movimiento Electoral Popular—*People's Electoral Movement): the PCV money-raising poster to the left refers to the alliance as the "Popular Unity" (*Unidad Popular*), a phrase evoking Allende's Chile; the poster to the right attacks domestic issues: "This government has raised the cost of meat, eggs, etc. The solution is in the New Force (*Nueva Fuerza*). Vote the Red Rooster [symbol of the PCV]."*

—Photos courtesy of the author.

into a daily in 1972—making it the only political party that year to have a daily newspaper. (The MAS weekly *Bravo pueblo* became a daily named *Punto* in 1973.) Besides providing outright gifts of money, travel grants, etc., the Soviets lent encouragement and legitimacy to the PCV by continuing to recognize it as the established Communist party in Venezuela, thereby contributing to what small amount of political leverage it had with the governing party and helping its relations with various foreign Communist groups.

At the same time, the Soviet party and government were clearly intent on a low level of involvement in the political campaign in Venezuela. In fact, as the campaign progressed, the Soviets—who have always tended to be more concerned with "anti-imperialism" in Latin America than with social revolution—seemed less interested in how the PCV would fare in the elections than in whether the increasingly leftist-sounding COPEI could win a second electoral victory over AD.

In its search for new legitimacy, the PCV sought and won an alliance with the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), a social democratic offshoot of the AD, for the 1973 elections. The MEP-PCV coalition has campaigned under three names—the *Frente Nacionalista Popular* (National Popular Front), *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity), and the *Nueva Fuerza* (New Force). The Communists have preferred the first two names since they were suggestive of the Allende coalition in Chile, while the stronger and larger MEP has preferred the latter name for the cosmetic reason that it downplayed the Communist role in the coalition. The assets of this coalition, clearly inspired by the Chilean example, are not negligible. MEP is strong in the labor movement, which the Communists have not managed to penetrate since the early years of their activity[33] (when MEP split off from AD in 1967, it took a major part of the powerful AD labor movement with it). The PCV survived its troubles with its organization intact, and MEP has rather even representation throughout the country; these factors combined have provided the coalition with a better electoral machine than that of MAS. MEP, which has moved much to the left during the last few years, hopes to emerge from the elections as the most coherent, it not the largest,

[33] The Communist labor federation (CUTV) had a few affiliates in 1970, but its membership amounted to less than 5 percent of the organized labor force, and even this small group divided in the PCV-MAS split.

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force on the Left—so the PCV may gain a stronger hold on its political life through its ally (polls have indicated that the coalition could win between 5 and 10 percent of the vote in the December elections). At the same time, there have been some signs of instability in the coalition, and it would be unwise to venture any bets on its long-range survival.

What's Left of the Left

The remainder of the radical Left was in shambles by 1973. While the Marxists and Left radicals had better access to the masses through the media than ever before in their history, the main result seems to have been the continuous splintering of existing groups and a proliferation of new groups to the left of MAS and the PCV. A radical fringe has continued to reject political action and to press for terrorist activity and strikes, including a series of student revolts that have at times paralyzed the main high schools and universities. The MIR, once the spark of the insurgent movement, has suffered from several further splits, while the FLN/FALN has become all but inoperative.

MIR. In 1970 the insurgent arm of the MIR split into two groups, both of which are still illegal and have been whittled down to insignificant strength. One group, under the leadership of Carlos Betancourt, a former MIR guerrilla (no relation to Rómulo), took the name *Bandera Roja* (Red Flag) and managed to retain an operating base in the Eastern Venezuelan hills until the middle of 1973. His faithfuls attacked occasional military convoys, but their number was gradually reduced to less than 20 irreconcilables. In mid-1973 he and his chief lieutenant were arrested and more of the band killed, leaving only a few guerrillas in the hills. *Bandera Roja* was more successful in developing an urban activist group in 1972-73, which—according to Teodoro Petkoff—is today the most effective organization working to radicalize secondary school students in Caracas.[34] (Other groups in the high schools continue to function under the banner of the MIR youth wing, but reportedly with little success.)

The second insurgent group, which was formed in June 1970 as a splinter from the Betancourt band, has operated under the name *Organización de Revolucionarios* (Organization of Revolutionaries—OR). Under the leadership of Julio Escalona, a former MIR youth activist, it has undertaken sporadic terrorist activities, but it also probably numbers no more than 20 members.

Finally, several former MIR leaders (including Moïses Moleiro, Símon Saez Merida and Américo Martin) took advantage of the Caldera pacification program to reemerge as political leaders and revive the MIR as a nonviolent political party, eventually legalized by the COPEI government in 1973. The MIR has since participated actively with MAS in the election campaign, but its following is miniscule and its role more symbolic than real.

FLN/FALN. Meantime the FLN/FALN had also disintegrated. Douglas Bravo and his chief lieutenant, Luben Petkoff (Teodoro's more erratic brother) parted ways, and Luben was eventually arrested and finally amnestied. Bravo's small band remained in the hills of Falcon State where, more like "the Hatfields and the McCoys" than like followers of Ché, they got involved in local family feuds, on occasion also harrassing villages and the military. The urban insurrectionist wing of the FALN conducted several bank robberies and other terrorist activities in 1969-70 but became less active after one of its key leaders, Freddy Carquez Márquez, chose exile under the pacification program in 1971. Another wing of the FALN was a group called *Punto Cero* (Hill Point), whose leaders apparently received some training in Cuba in the late 1960's and which conducted an active program of terrorism in Caracas in 1971-72; this group was nearly exterminated in a succession of shooting engagements with the Venezuelan police in 1972.

Other factions. In addition to the foregoing, a wide variety of groups have come and gone within the universities. *Poder Joven* (Youth Power) is a movement that seems less an organization than a ubiquitous anarchistic phenomenon attracting disgruntled university youth. Even Petkoff is called establishment by *Poder Joven*. There has also been a *Movimiento de Salvación Nacional* (Movement for National Salvation, or MOSAN), a *Partido de la Revolución Venezolana* (Party of the Venezuelan Revolution, or PRV), the *Izquierda Christiana* (Christian Left, an offshoot of COPEI that supports the ideas of the Colombian revolutionary, Camillo Torres), and many others. The most vocal Maoist, Victor Ochoa, has

[34] An interview with Petkoff published in the Dominican magazine, *Ahora!* (Santa Domingo), Jan. 15, 1973.

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thrown his personal support to the ruling Social Christian Party in the 1973 elections—an indication of the minimal seriousness of Maoism in the politics of the Venezuelan Left.

Marxism and the Future

As stated at the outset, by the time this article is in the reader's hands, the political campaign of 1973 will have culminated in the election of a new president and a new Congress. Most certainly the winning party will be either COPEI or AD, as in the three previous elections since 1958. No single third party has enough support to unseat these two strong democratic parties from control of Venezuelan political power at this juncture. While it is impossible to be exact, it seems likely that the aggregate vote of the two parties will amount to at least 60 percent of the electorate.

The remainder must go either to the left or to the right. On the right, there are several small parties and individuals desirous of attracting the support of those voters who would have cast their ballots for Pérez Jiménez had he not been barred from running by a constitutional amendment. The pull of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, with its overtones of the *caudillo* tradition, is not unlike the Peron phenomenon in Argentina. Certainly, there are a large number of Venezuelans who yearn for the tidier and less complex days of the dictatorship.

To the left of the democratic parties, MAS and the Nueva Fuerza combined could possibly gain between 10 and 15 percent of the vote. This would represent a significant expansion of popular support for the Marxist Left in Venezuela and would result in a significant increase and consolidation of Marxist forces in Congress, local government administrations and other institutions. Should this happen, the Marxists will have gone a long way toward overcoming the setbacks of the insurgency years.

Certainly, the current problems and prospects of the Venezuelan economy and the mounting need for social reform seem to augur well for a Leftist expansion. Official unemployment figures are around 6 percent,[35] but when underemployment is added to unemployment, the real figure is probably closer to 20 percent of the potential work force. Another serious problem is the strain created by a population expanding at a growth rate of over 3.5 percent a year—one of the highest in the world.[36] The university and secondary school system are so bogged down by political turmoil and overpopulation that this one situation alone could seriously jeopardize the efforts of whatever party wins the elections to establish and maintain a stable government. Still another critical problem is the fact that Venezuela's petroleum reserves are dwindling and its daily production will likely begin to decline significantly in the 1970's, perhaps by as much as one million barrels per day by the end of the decade, unless significant new reserves are developed. In this situation, the economic growth needed to keep up with population growth and industrial expansion will have to come from either dramatically increased petroleum prices (a real possibility) or significant new domestic savings—or both. Less than 2 percent of the Venezuelan population pays income tax, and less than 4 percent of the nonpetroleum GDP (gross domestic product) comes from income tax revenues.[37]

These problems notwithstanding, the fact remains that Venezuela is still an essentially conservative country whose relatively large middle class has prospered under the present system of democratic government. Certainly, the core of the political Left comes from that very middle class, and as it expands so will the Left. But there is serious doubt whether enough popular support could be mustered to permit a Communist or radical socialist alternative to the democratic system, at least in this decade.

To suppose for a moment, however, that the Marxists could pull off a victory at the polls, another basic question arises concerning how the military would react. In Venezuela, where the military has not had a tradition of keeping hands off the government (as it had in Chile prior to the recent coup), there seems little chance that the Marxists would be left free to establish a ruling regime in the wake of an electoral win—at least one that excluded military influence. No wonder, then, that Petkoff keeps his options open and stresses publicly and privately the need not only to develop mass support but to establish lines to the military.

In any case, a Marxist victory certainly could not be achieved unless the Venezuelan radical Left could

[35] Bureau of International Commerce, US Department of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends* (Washington, DC), Feb. 9, 1973.

[36] *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*, Washington, DC, Inter-American Bank Annual Report, 1972.

[37] *International Monetary Fund Report (Consultation)*, Washington, DC, Document No. SM/70/207, Oct. 5, 1970, p. 6.

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learn to pull together, and—as has been underscored throughout this essay—there is little precedent for such cooperation. Instead the radicals have repeatedly exhibited a penchant for internal division and tactical blunders that have alienated rather than attracted followers. Whether MAS can maintain stability following the 1973 elections is in particular question, as differences that have been soft-pedalled during the campaign begin to surface and efforts are made to establish a more durable party organization. As already noted, the PCV/MEP relationship has not appeared to be very stable either.

In broader perspective, the recent bloody dénouement in Chile, the resurgence of and reaction to Peronism in Argentina, and the progressive decline of the democratic system in much of the South American continent leave little room for the Marxists of any country to look with optimism on their chances of winning and retaining power in Latin America by peaceful means. The dramatic impact of the Allende victory on Marxist radicals in Latin America should not be minimized: the Allende way certainly looked more sensible and logical than the Debray and Ché way. The question that is now being asked in desperation from the Left is: Can that way be traveled again?

The prospect of the combined Marxist political force in Venezuela emerging from the 1973 elections with 10 to 15 percent of the vote—but without much hope of achieving an eventual electoral victory—is sobering. Such a force could pose serious challenges to Venezuela's still youthful democracy. As an activist and critical Left, it could—with allies—further radicalize the youth population, press for extremist solutions, and gravely disrupt the programs of the ruling government and the Congress. On the other hand, if the AD and COPEI parties were mobilized by the challenge from the Left to move quickly toward a new and energetic phase of social reform and economic diversification, Venezuela's resilient political democracy might point the way toward a new alternative to extremism in Latin America.

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Books

Marshal Zhukov and the Meaning of Soviet Military Memoirs

By John Erickson

G. ZHUKOV: *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*. Translated by Novosti Press Agency. New York, Delacorte Press, 1971.
OTTO PRESTON CHANEY, JR.: *Zhukov*, Tulsa, University of Oklahoma Press, 1971.

THERE IS a time-honored British ballad with a consoling refrain to the effect that old soldiers never die, but simply fade away. Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov assuredly provides a vindication of this piece of popular maudlin, though he obviously is taking his time to fade away. Indeed, he has enlivened the process with a formidable barrage of "recollection and reminiscence," all brought together in a massive volume which first appeared in the Soviet Union in 1969 and has now been rendered into English (or rather into Soviet officialese—which is a pity). The lesser fry have already had their say; now it is the turn of the master to speak, without rancor, without mean and competitive spite, but with the full weight of authority acquired by virtue of his position as top Soviet military commander in World War II.

In terms of simple military statistics, Zhukov is the general who never lost a battle, the first Soviet commander to inflict a savage defeat on the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1939 fighting at Nomon-Han (the Khalkin-Gol) in Outer Mongolia, and the first to visit defeat on the *Wehrmacht* at the approaches to Moscow in 1941. In 1942, he became Deputy to the Soviet Supreme Commander (Stalin) and played a key role both as planner and as operational commander in the gigantic battles that followed—Stalingrad in 1942, Kursk in 1943, the massive offensive in Belorussia in 1944, and the Soviet assault on Berlin in 1945. Twice after the war he suffered at the hands of his political masters, first being banished by Stalin to the Urals Military District and later being dismissed from his post as Defense Minister by Khrushchev in 1957 for alleged "Bonapartist" tendencies. Abruptly retired, he took to fishing-rod but also to pen, painstakingly jotting down his reminiscences in a series of notebooks much after the fashion of British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. These notebooks were later pieced together in the present memoirs, which are here reviewed in conjunction with an outside military historian's biography of Zhukov that takes in a period of the latter's career judiciously omitted from the memoirs.

Execrable though this English translation of the memoirs is, it does roughly duplicate the original Russian version and covers Zhukov's life and military career through World War II—his childhood, his service as a cavalryman with the Imperial Army in World War I, his entry into the Red Army and his subsequent career as a regular soldier, his Mongolian command in 1939, the period just before and during the German attack in 1941 when he was Chief of the General Staff, and the whole succession of swirling battles on the Soviet-German front. The latter sequence is familiar enough—the initial disasters in the frontier districts, the defense of Leningrad in September 1941 and the recovery before Moscow, the first Soviet counteroffensive in the winter of 1941-42, the ordeal of Stalingrad, the great cauldron of Kursk in 1943, the final expulsion of the German armies from Soviet territory in 1944, and the grand military finale of the Soviet attack on Berlin in 1945.

In point of fact, there was no major wartime command decision

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that was taken without Zhukov's cognizance or without his actual participation—even in a negative sense, as, for example, in July 1941 when he proposed the timely evacuation of Kiev, only to be rebuffed by Stalin and relieved as Chief of General Staff. Not surprisingly, it is the battle for Moscow that is most indelibly engraved on Zhukov's memory. Oddly enough, he is very sparing, not to say downright reticent, about his part in the defense of Leningrad, over which he was summarily placed in command by Stalin's order. On the other hand, he has offered something of a bonus in his first-hand account of the planning of the great Stalingrad counteroffensive of November 1942. That campaign has been much discussed but never really explained in terms of the transition from the Soviet forces' bloodily abortive "counterstroke" (*kontrudar*) to their dramatic three-front counteroffensive (*kontrnastuplenie*), with its double envelopment of the enemy—a maneuver never again repeated in this form.

MUCH OF THIS is grist for the military historian's special mill, but there is more to the Zhukov memoirs than mere military detail. For example, they are undoubtedly useful also as a commentary on Stalin's style and personality during this wartime period. At the time of publication, there were suggestions that the memoirs represented a deliberate effort at Stalin's rehabilitation, but close reading of the Russian text—a necessary precaution since the clichés and stilted style of this English version serve to obscure rather than elucidate the author's meaning—scarcely bears out this charge. Zhukov's portrayal of Stalin is less consciously sympathetic than overtly quizzical and not a little bemused at this extraordinary personality. He makes a special point of insisting that he studied the "military Stalin" very carefully (as indeed he had good cause to do), and what he says about Stalin's grasp of strategic ideas does not seem to differ markedly from the assessment of British Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, who dealt at close quarters with Stalin over some weighty issues of wartime strategy. What the memoirs make clear is that while Stalin in the early stages of the war confused tactical handling with strategic grasp and control, he later learned to distinguish between them, to good effect.

In every other respect, Zhukov's Stalin emerges complete with warts—stubborn, vengeful, domineering, and even rash, with a precipitate impatience at the wrong times, as in the winter of 1941-42. It is quite evident from these pages that Zhukov did not really like Stalin even though he seems to have arrived at a grudging respect for and accommodation with his Supreme Commander. For all the obfuscations of the text—and the integrity of this version is itself an intriguing theme, for there are now multiple versions of these writings in circulation—Zhukov's portrait of Stalin has the stamp of realism about it and could persist as an acceptable mean between savage denigration and that adulation which was larger than life.

All this simply reinforces the fact that Soviet military memoirs conform to very special laws, to which even Marshal Zhukov's are no exception. Not only are they about Soviet politics in the widest sense, but they are themselves a not unimportant part of these politics in that they are made to serve a variety of causes and reputations (hence the several editions and repeated emendations[1]). There is

[1] On this aspect of Soviet military memoirs published between 1966 and 1972, see Col. P. Ogarev, "The Great Patriotic War in the Recollections of Participants," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 5, 1972, pp. 101-09.

Reviewers in This Issue

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no better example than the memoir industry under Khrushchev, when the military-political myth-makers really got into stride. Whereas Stalin had manufactured his own myths, Khrushchev roped in the military to write expansively about his personal achievements —with the bonus of being able to extol their own talents. The most outrageous example, which raised furious protest in the Soviet military press, was the dramatic *mise en scène* which had Khrushchev and Marshal A. I. Yeremenko, the Soviet commander at Stalingrad, "think up" between themselves the design of the whole Stalingrad counteroffensive—a fictional passage rendered the more grotesque by the claim that this pair obligingly communicated their plan to Stalin, who naturally acted on it in a trice.[2]

Of the many scores of these memoirs, there are a few which defy all political vicissitudes and are of permanent value, such as Artillery Marshal N. N. Voronov's account of his wartime commands and connections, Marshal K. K. Rokossovksy's recounting of the Stalingrad campaign (half memoir, half history), Marshal J. Kh. Bagramian's recollections of the prelude to and early days of the war, or A. A. Lobachev's modest but human and harrowing account of his work as an army commissar, and one who was neither braggart nor bungler.[3] To this list must be added published extracts from an as yet unpublished work by the late Marshal M. V. Zakharov and yet another memoir which has so far seen the light of day only in fits and starts, namely Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky's account of the 1941-45 war.[4] As Chief of General Staff from 1942 to 1945, Vasilevsky was in many respects Zhukov's *alter ego*, and it will be impossible to make a truly accurate appraisal of the Zhukov memoirs until Vasilevsky's work appears in full. It is ready for printing —as indeed it has been for some time—but the passage of the years, coupled with probable political circumspection, may reduce it to something of an anticlimax that will shed additional light only on the details of Vasilevsky's prewar career. Thus it is that the historian must turn to a recondite work such as L. J. Suslov, Ed., *Radi zhizni na zemle 1941-1945* (For the Sake of Life on Earth, 1941-1945), published in Voronezh in 1970, to ascertain Vasilevsky's role in the important operations on the Voronezh front in 1942-43, and must perforce rake through back issues of *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* or *Istoriia USSR* for other insights.

FOR THE MOST PART, these are simple soldierly tales. But memoirs such as those of Marshal Zhukov represent much more than catalogues of martial achievement. While their dramatic interest may hinge on what they reveal about the personal wartime role of Stalin, the main issue they raise is the basic one of command and control in modern war. Yet another subliminal theme is the nature of the control—*i.e.*, political control—to be exercised over the Soviet armed forces. That there must be such control is not questioned, but there is a clash between two conflicting schools—those who believe in a less obtrusive party presence but a tight security-forces presence, as opposed to those who favor a proliferation of party organs within the armed forces but *without* too much of a KGB armlock. Stalin preferred the first mode, and so, apparently, did Zhukov, judging from his memoirs.

This divergence of views over political control is closely connected with the vexed question of *morale*, and it is here that military memoirs seem to be intended to serve not merely as cautionary tales but also as inspirational literature. It is also here that Marshal Zhukov's whole argument

[2] This claim was made by Marshal Yeremenko in his book, *Stalingrad*, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1961, p. 325. Yeremenko asserts that the idea of a counteroffensive "first came to him" while he was in Moscow at the beginning of August, 1942.

[3] N. N. Voronov, *Na sluzhbe voennoi* (On Military Service), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963; K. K. Rokossovsky, Ed., *Velikaia pobeda na Volge* (The Great Victory on the Volga), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965; I. Kh. Bagramian, *Tak nachinalas voina* (Thus Began the War), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971; A. A. Lobachev, *Trudnymi dorogami* (Along Difficult Paths), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960.

[4] An extract from Marshal Zakharov's work appeared under the title, "Pages from the History of the Soviet Armed Forces on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War," in *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 5, 1970, pp. 28-48. The extract refers to a larger work entitled *Generalnyi Shtab v predvoennye gody* (The General Staff in the Prewar Period), but to the reviewer's knowledge this volume has not yet been published. As for Marshal Vasilevsky, he has published a long list of articles in various places, the major items including: "On the Question of the Direction of the Armed Struggle in the Great Patriotic War," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 8, 1965, pp. 3-10; a series of three articles entitled "Unforgettable Days," *ibid.*, No. 10, 1965, pp. 13-25, No. 1, 1966, pp. 13-25, and No. 3, 1966, pp. 24-44; "The Liberation of the Donbas and the Left-bank Ukraine. The Struggle for the Dnieper," *Istoriia SSSR* (Moscow), No. 3, 1970, pp. 3-45; "The Strategic Planning of the Kursk Battle," in Major-General I. V. Parokhin, Ed., *Kurskaia bitva* (The Kursk Battle), Moscow, Nauka, 1970, pp. 66-83. Although the first of these articles was not identified as an excerpt from Vasilevsky's memoirs, the others have been so identified and clearly attest to the existence of a consecutive narrative. The central point that Marshal Vasilevsky seems to be making in these excerpts is the "underestimation" of the role of the General Staff in the war against Germany.

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seems to snap into place. The gist of it is that the technological complexity of modern warfare has not made the brave, efficient, and properly motivated soldier redundant, but at the same time has put a premium on leadership at all levels, not least at the national level. Hence the military homilies aimed in this direction. In that sense, too, Stalin must be taken as a symbol, presumably one implying strict social control and recognition of the primacy of national defense needs. It is true that some of this is extreme military conservatism, but it is not an unequivocal call for a return to Stalinism.

Thus, simple soldiers' tales turn out not to be simple at all. Marshal Zhukov's memoirs strike a balance in what proves to be an extremely sophisticated exercise—an exercise that entails speaking for the military elite but not disparaging the party and its leadership, exploring the respective limits of military competence and political authority, spelling out the *fundamental* issues of morale, and looking at the Soviet style of war in broad but cogent terms. Only Marshal Zhukov, with his prestige undimmed even now, could have undertaken a task of these proportions, and that is why his book, though demonstrably a personal record of vast military operations, will come to serve as a basic guideline on these difficult questions for a number of years to come. It has already taken its place in that complicated rubric of required quotation that accompanies both delicate discussion and patriotic exhortation—and that, by itself, is a tribute to the toughness of its texture. In sum, it is a book which not only records history but one which may contribute in its own singular way to the making of it.

UNFORTUNATELY, but perhaps inevitably, Marshal Zhukov draws his own narrative to a close with his return from Germany in April 1946. (There may well be a second volume as rumor has it, but even if there is, its chances of seeing the light of day are slim, for obvious political reasons.) Hence, to follow the fascinating and dramatic course of Zhukov's postwar career—his banishment by Stalin, his reappearance in 1952, his elevation to Defense Minister and later dismissal at the hands of Khrushchev—the reader must turn to Colonel Otto Preston Chaney's biography, which provides much-needed coverage of this stage of Zhukov's life. Not that Colonel Chaney's book is confined to these latter years; it covers the whole of Zhukov's career and, in its descriptions of the younger Zhukov, fills in much of his personal and professional background.

If anything, Colonel Chaney makes claims on behalf of Zhukov that are a little too expansive. There is really no solid or reputable evidence that Zhukov was sent to Germany in the 1920's to train and study in connection with secret Soviet accords with the *Reichswehr*, and the same has to be said about his rumored participation in the Spanish Civil War. Zhukov did not acquire his appreciation of tank warfare from these claimed external sources. Indeed, it remains something of a mystery exactly how he did acquire these insights, even allowing for the fact that he was basically a cavalryman and was involved from the outset in Soviet experimentation with "motor-mechanized" forces. To solve the mystery may require a closer inspection of Zhukov's contacts with the "brains" of the Red Army in the 1930's.

As for the postwar period, Colonel Chaney has produced a convincing portrait of a changed Zhukov whose toughness, while it got results, antagonized many (not all of them incompetents and buffoons) during his tenure as Defense Minister. Zhukov emerges here as a none too attractive person who, to the delight of his professional and political opponents, finally got his "come-uppance." All this and more Colonel Chaney has carefully chronicled in the valuable latter chapters of his book, thus adding greatly to our knowledge of the dimensions of Zhukov the man.

Zhukov has certainly earned a prominent place in military history as successor to a long line of distinguished Russian soldiers going back to Suvorov, Rumyantsev, and Kutuzov. His own "recollections and reminiscences" and Colonel Chaney's wide-ranging biography do much to fill out what has heretofore been either a shadowy picture or a simple stereotype, but all is still far from told or fully explained. From several quarters—be it the Kremlin, the Frunze Academy, or for that matter any quarter interested in the Soviet soldier and Soviet military performance—the cry must still be heard: Will the real Marshal Zhukov please stand up?

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The Soviet Economic Dilemma

By Holland Hunter

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE: *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973.

THIS VOLUME is the fourth major survey of the Soviet economy prepared under the auspices of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. It is a magnificient coliection of 30 papers, assembled under the able guidance of John P. Hardt of the Congressional Research Service. Together with a separate volume of hearings, published by the Government Printing Office in October, the collection provides a wide-ranging analysis of Soviet economic prospects, indispensable for anyone seriously interested in the subject.

The survey volume examines trends in the Soviet economy from the 1960's through the 1970's. After Hardt's nine-page summary introduction, the first group of seven papers deals with "plan and policy," analyzing the major problems now confronted in running the Soviet economy. The economic burden of Soviet defense efforts is then examined in four papers, which are followed by five papers evaluating prospects in the industrial sector. Two papers offer illuminating perspectives on current agricultural difficulties, and two others examine, respectively, the housing situation and trends in real per capita consumption. Four papers are devoted to the human resources area (population, labor force, and education), and the last six to Soviet external economic relations. Nearly all the papers represent the product of fresh research by well-known specialists in the field, and the collection as a whole offers both masses of background detail and nuggets of new knowledge.

The Joint Economic Committee hearings, chaired by Senator William Proxmire, involved three days of testimony by three-member panels, whose prepared statements generated spirited discussion. The issues touched upon included the wisdom of extending long-term credits to finance Soviet imports from the United States, the relation of such credits to altered Soviet domestic priorities, and the role of credits in overall relations between the United States and the USSR. Attention was also given to changes in institutional practice that would be necessary or desirable to facilitate ongoing normal trade. Past and prospective Soviet feedgrain imports were reviewed. The discussions generally reflected both the hopes and the uncertainties that surround these new developments.

For the reviewer (a participant in the hearings), this new survey of Soviet economic prospects brought into clearer focus a grand dilemma that now confronts the Soviet system. The dilemma stems from the emerging fact that the USSR, the second most powerful nation in the world, is finding it difficult to keep up with late 20th-century developments. Medium-sized powers all over the world are adapting to technological progress, raising their standards of living, trading increasingly sophisticated goods and services among themselves, and actively participating in further innovation; their societies are increasingly stressing quality rather than quantity. Meanwhile, although the USSR has "caught up with and surpassed" these countries in military strength, Soviet performance in other spheres has remained unimpressive. What has been holding the Soviet economy back? Why is it that the USSR, at a time when the economies of most Western and some Eastern countries are reaping the fruits of revolutionary new technological advances, has been lagging behind?

THE FORCES THAT govern the capacity of any economy to make full use of technological innovations are not completely understood or agreed upon by scholars. As for their operation in the USSR, the most that one can do

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at present is to describe those features of the Soviet political and economic system that are symptomatic of the basic problems. The magnitude of these problems has become increasingly evident in recent years. For some time, Soviet economic growth was spurred by a number of factors, *i.e.*, substantial absolute population growth and a more than proportionate expansion of the labor force; improvements in education and training; and the infusion of massive increments of fixed capital plant and equipment. Now, the USSR is experiencing tightness in the supply of skilled labor, and annual additions to capital plant, though larger than ever before, take as much as a decade to be built and often show low productivity after coming on stream. In short, Soviet management of both labor and capital resources has been inefficient by the standards characteristic of the world's advanced economies.

More importantly, qualitative gains in the overall effectiveness of productive activity have been modest for some time. Efforts to reform the management of the economy have been thwarted in practice. The agricultural sector, in spite of very large capital investments intended to modernize it, continues to hold the rest of the economy back. There is an appalling lack of infrastructure to support a modern housing sector: half the Soviet people still lack indoor plumbing, millions still carry water in pails suspended from wooden yokes, and paved roads are still a rarity outside the large cities. These deficiencies reflect longstanding neglect, but even where the authorities have seriously tried to make improvements, their efforts have been clumsy, and the results flawed.

Because the papers in this survey provide a remarkably clear picture of these linked dilemmas, the collection as a whole suggests a series of questions for further research. In narrow economic terms, for example, one needs to probe further into the precise location of bottlenecks in Soviet output expansion. This is a problem in interindustry analysis, and the Noren-Whitehouse paper in the present collection (pp. 206-45) contributes a pioneering test of the 1971-1975 Plan targets in this context. Further work could add a vital time dimension to such tests by seeking to ascertain whether projected additions to capital stock can be brought on stream in time to meet anticipated capacity requirements.

Overcoming bottlenecks frequently involves improvements in production methods that lower input-output ratios. In the West, this kind of technological progress spreads quite rapidly from firm to firm and industry to industry. In the USSR, by contrast, the spread of new technology has been notably sluggish—this in spite of the fact that the system admits of no commercial secrets and has long provided admirable arrangements for circulating scientific information. Thus, the persistence of bottlenecks in the economy poses a broader question that extends into the spheres of political science and public administration: What are the barriers to the diffusion of improved methods? If diffusion processes are already being fruitfully studied by geographers and sociologists, cannot non-diffusion also be profitably analyzed in similar ways? One case study that suggests itself is the marked contrast between the rapidity with which the USSR has built a large and technologically up-to-date merchant marine and the slowness which has marked the development of adequate modern residential housing. Why has the process of technology diffusion worked well in one case and badly in the other?

ALONG WITH such case studies, economists and political scientists might try to construct and test models of disincentives in action. The classic works of Joseph Berliner and David Granick long ago showed how the system of rewards and penalties in Soviet enterprises worked against overall economic efficiency.[1] Now perhaps, with a longer record of experience, it will be possible to look more closely into the question of how, specifically, the distorted structure of rewards and penalties inhibits technological progress and cost reduction. Our broadened understanding of the command economy should also permit us to construct systematic formal models showing how excessive pressures from above and defensive reactions from below mutually interact to form a rigid, inflexible system of economic administration.

The elaboration of such models, in turn, would no doubt spur the study of appropriate strategies of economic and administrative reform. One can readily imagine the greater use of simulation analysis in order to subject alternative means of depressurizing the command economy to quantitative testing. In several of the early East European attempts at economic reform, the transition toward a more efficient mechanism

[1] See Joseph S. Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957; and David Granick, *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1954.

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for resource allocation produced serious temporary imbalances, and the resultant shortages and gluts prompted reversion to the old system of administrative allocation. Under current Soviet conditions, one wonders what new strategies might be devised to minimize this formidable barrier to thorough reform.

In broader political and doctrinal terms, it would be instructive to see an attempt to sketch out a speculative and hypothetical application of "creative Marxism" which would anticipate changes in doctrine and procedure that might be grafted onto the Bolshevik heritage in order to pave the way for an acceptable scheme of reform. Just as Stalin "found the necessary quotations" in Lenin and Marx to support the institutions and outlook he imposed after 1928, might it not now be possible, while retaining basic Bolshevik concepts, to reinterpret them in such a way as to accommodate a flexible, adaptive, efficient Soviet economy and polity? Though the Joint Economic Committee compendium was not designed to respond to such questions, it does provide a foundation of evidence and analysis for their investigation.

Commerce and Conciliation

By Philip E. Uren

JOZEF WILCZYNSKI: *The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade.* New York, Praeger, 1969.
JAMES HENRY GIFFEN: *The Legal and Practical Aspects of Trade with the Soviet Union.* New York, Praeger, 1969.

THE QUESTIONS of whether and how to trade with the "enemy," "the other side," or a "different social and economic system" have been debated through the centuries. In 1802, when William Pitt suggested to the British Parliament that Napoleon could be weaned from his aggressive policies by conciliatory commercial gestures, Richard Sheridan made this sarcastic retort:

Let [France] have a good trade, that she may be afraid of war, says the Learned Member . . . that's the sure way to make Buonaparte love peace. He has had, to be sure, a military education. He has been abroad, and is rather rough company; but if you put him behind the counter a little, he will mend exceedingly. When I was reading the treaty, I thought of all the names of foreign places . . . Pondicherry, Chandenagore, Cochin, Martinico, etc., all cessions [to France].[1] *Not they . . . they are all so many traps and holes to catch this silly fellow in, and make a merchant of him! I really think the best way upon this principle would be this: let the merchants of London open a public subscription, and set him up at once. . . . Send all the money over to the First Consul, and give him what you talk of so much, capital, to begin trade with.*[2]

Now, the same questions are being intensively debated in the United States with respect to trading with the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Like Napoleon, Brezhnev, too, "has been abroad" and is also "rather rough company" in the eyes of many. Others, however, believe that he already shows signs of having "mended exceedingly." At any rate, there has been considerable change in both American and Soviet attitudes on the subject of trade relations—to such an extent, in fact, that many observers of recent Soviet-US relations are understandably confused.

One does not have to look very far back to find examples of official US opposition to trading with the Communist nations—even, ironically enough, to "Free World" importation of Soviet oil. On November 28, 1961, US Assistant Secretary of the Interior John M. Kelley wrote to Walter S. Hallanan, chairman of the US National Petroleum Council, in these terms:

The Department of the Interior views with concern the growing

[1] This is a reference to the Treaty of Amiens, concluded between Britain and France in 1802, which formalized the retrocession to France of several British conquests in India and the West Indies.

[2] Quoted in Leon A. Harris, *The Fine Art of Political Wit,* New York, Dutton, 1966, pp. 29-30.

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shipments of petroleum from the Soviet Bloc to the Free World. Because of the varied but widespread impact of these shipments upon Free World nations and upon international relationships between the United States and other nations, it is greatly in the interest of national security for this situation to be better understood.[3]

After extensive research, a committee studying this problem concluded:

In view of the above factors . . . continued expansion of Communist oil exports is a serious problem to the Free World. The impact of Soviet oil on Free World countries is far greater than the volume figures would indicate and goes beyond its immediate implication for the oil companies involved. . . . The seriousness of the Soviet economic offensive requires a concerted effort by the leading countries of the Free World to restrict further imports of Communist oil and the export of strategic materials to the Soviets. . . . The political alliances which Free World countries have formed to combat Soviet aggressions must now be extended fully to the equally important economic field. It is unrealistic to leave the Free World's economic flanks unprotected, particularly as the Soviets have clearly indicated that their trade is conducted "most for political purposes." [4]

Only a decade later, in 1972, the then US Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson produced a paper on US-Soviet economic relations which envisaged not only a substantial US investment—about $10 billion—in the development of Soviet energy resources in West Siberia but also long-term agreements for exports of Soviet natural gas to the United States. Secretary Peterson saw these prospective economic ties as helping to forge peace:

As we work to realize the President's vision of a new era in commercial relations, we do so in the expectation that future generations—prosperous and secure—will look back on this era and be able to read in its record that the President negotiated, not only the reduction of nuclear weapons for war, but the production of commercial weapons for peace. . . .

It is this larger vision of peace —shared by both sides—that gives me confidence that we will succeed in our negotiations.[5]

THE GREAT swing that has occurred in both the US and Soviet attitudes toward mutual trade has, not surprisingly, given rise to a rash of publications on the subject. To offer the public anything along the lines of these studies would have been out of the question in the early 1950's when Stalin was speaking about parallel markets and COCOM[6] believed that to trade in strategic materials, such as copper wire, nickel and modern trawlers, would threaten the survival of Western civilization. Now, however, such writings are much in demand as both US government leaders and specialists seek to chart a viable and safe middle course between the Scylla of "no trading with the enemy" and the Charybdis of "trade for the sake of trade." Jozef Wilczynski's book provides much useful background material on both the economic and political aspects of East-West trade, while James Henry Giffen's study explores the legal and practical questions involved in trading with the Soviet Union once the basic decision to do so has been taken. Both are excellent and valuable additions to the growing bibliography on the subject, but unfortunately neither offers clear-cut answers to such larger and more crucial questions as what effects increased US-Soviet trade and economic ties are likely to have on East-West relations in general and upon Soviet society.

There are essentially three notions about East-West trade that need to be explored more carefully: first, that trade is intrinsically good and, furthermore, profitable; second, that enlarged trade with the West will lead to a modification of the Soviet system; and third, that increased trade not only reinforces East-West détente but is essential to it. The first of these notions is probably the most defensible. If money can be made, and the North American economy strengthened, so much the better —although one wonders whether the investment of $10 billion in Canada's Athabasca tar sands and the North American arctic might not have something approaching comparable merit. One might argue that Canadian nationalism, though on the rise, is at least more predictable than the Great Russian variety. The second notion is more questionable, and many well-informed observers from Communist countries believe

[3] National Petroleum Council, *The Impact of Oil Exports from the Soviet Bloc*, Washington, DC, 1962, p. 1.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[5] Peter G. Peterson, *US-Soviet Commercial Relations in a New Era*, Washington, DC, US Department of Commerce, 1972, p. 24.

[6] COCOM was the coordinating committee set up by the United States, its West European allies, and Japan to control trade in strategic goods with the Soviet-bloc countries.

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that Western investment in the USSR will have the effect of delaying reform of the Soviet system rather than of encouraging it. With regard to the third notion, it must be pointed out that the origins of the current US-Soviet détente predate the two countries' interest in trade and are largely unrelated to it. The détente stems more from such factors as fear of mutual destruction, the loosening of alliances, and the emergence of China than it does from commercial aspirations.

With all the changes of recent years, some of the old, disturbing fundamentals still remain. The United States retains an openness that is at once embarrassing and admirable, or—perhaps more correctly—admirable because it is often embarrassing. On the other hand, the USSR—whatever may be the virtues of some of its programs of domestic reform—continues to maintain a close and often brutal surveillance, if not of elusive thought, then of recordable utterance. It must seem to many that however much we sublimate our frustrations by condemning injustices occurring in small countries, the real problem lies in the incompatibility of the basic philosophies of the two great global powers.

Hopefully, Mr. Brezhnev can be "put behind the counter a little," although members of the nongovernmental community must be forgiven if all they can muster is a cynical and restrained optimism. Nevertheless, to paraphrase Sheridan, let the merchants of New York (and Texas) open a public subscription and set him up in business at once.

China's Cultural Revolution: Personalities and Motivations

By A. M. Halpern

THOMAS W. ROBINSON, Ed.: *The Cultural Revolution in China.* Berkeley, Calif., London, University of California Press, 1971.
RICHARD BAUM, Ed., with LOUISE B. BENNETT: *China in Ferment: Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1971.
ROBERT S. ELEGANT: *Mao's Great Revolution.* New York and Cleveland, The World Publishing Company, 1971.

IN THE RELATIVELY calm and businesslike atmosphere that currently prevails in China, it is sometimes hard—but always salutary—to recall the passion and turbulence that gripped the People's Republic at the height of the Cultural Revolution. The three books under review deal with that period from several standpoints.

Elegant's book covers the background and events of the Cultural Revolution as seen by an observer based in Hong Kong, with access to sources who directly witnessed some of the events; his account is at times discursive and always full of circumstantial detail. The Baum-Bennett book is a selection of analyses and essays prepared concurrently with the events, almost all by American observers. The Robinson book contains five monographic studies done in somewhat longer retrospect but making full use of the unusually detailed documentation which became available during the combat phase of the Cultural Revolution.

One point that these books recall to our attention is that, however much the Chinese Communists may retain the long view of things supposedly characteristic of a people whose cultural identity has persisted for millennia, they are not patient men. Their true patron saint is Heraclitus rather than Confucius. When faced with a situation in a state of flux, they leap into the midst of it rather than stand by as fatalistic observers. The Baum volume also serves to remind us that the Western analyses written contemporaneously with the Cultural Revolution, by concentrating on one or another facet of the conflict, at times gave the misleading impression that the whole process could be understood in terms of just one of its elements—that is, alternatively in

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terms of an ideological conflict, a simple struggle for power, contention over economic strategies, or whatever. Now, of course, the time for arguing single-factor explanations of the Cultural Revolution is long past, but the various studies, to the extent that they throw light on one or another aspect of the process, remain relevant to an understanding of current developments in China.

Whichever aspect of the Cultural Revolution one looks at, the high emotional charge behind the issues is immediately apparent. The question of what aroused the mass emotions and why they reached such a pitch has not been adequately answered by anyone. The subject is not intensively examined in the volumes under review, although the thoughtful articles by Tang Tsou and Richard M. Pfeffer (in the Baum volume) put popular resentment against the bureaucratic establishment in useful perspective. The Maoist ideological (essentially moral) appeal and the extent of, and reasons for, its successes and failures are only lightly touched upon. On the other hand, all three books contain much valuable analysis of motives and actions in the interpersonal conflicts within the ruling elite. These conflicts admittedly were a more important factor than mass impulses in the initiation of the Cultural Revolution, and they also had a great deal to do with later moves to control its course.

Nevertheless, given the intensity of feeling displayed by the major actors, there is every reason to postulate motives at a level deeper than the conscious. The Baum volume makes a stab at probing this obscure area, presenting in abridged form the well-known thesis of Robert J. Lifton that the craving for "revolutionary immortality" was the central impulse that shaped Mao's aims and behavior.[1] Lifton also implies that the same impulse animated the behavior of others who associated themselves with Mao. The thesis is inadequate, not just because it fails to illuminate major areas of action but also because Mao is a more protean character than Lifton's interpretation allows for. Moreover, no matter how dominant Mao's personality, the revolt against Liu and Liuism must necessarily have been conducted by a coalition, and several strong personalities within the coalition also had both conscious and unconscious motives of their own, as well as varying degrees of ability to affect events. In the longer run, indeed, the interests of the partners proved not to be compatible beyond the point of initial success in the power struggle.

This point is relevant not only to the Chinese Cultural Revolution but also to a number of other revolutionary situations. Especially in anticolonial revolutionary movements, the emergence of a single dominant and charismatic leader is a recurrent feature. Such charismatic leaders typically define the objectives of the movements they head in accordance with their personal solutions of their own life crises. They offer themselves as models to be emulated on a mass scale and thus attempt to translate their individual life-styles into political cultures. The factors which govern the success of such models, and which consequently determine whether or not the leader's revolutionary program will achieve legitimacy, are not fully understood. If Lifton falls short in measuring the impact of Mao's private motives on the Chinese social-political process, the failure of this one venture into psychohistory does not invalidate the approach.

ELEGANT'S BOOK is of particular interest for its sketches of various personalities and for its portrayal of the background events preceding the onset of the Cultural Revolution. While there are problems in evaluating the quasi-eyewitness accounts of such events as the 1959 Lushan conference, these accounts can by no means be discarded. Elegant's explanations, however, suffer from partisanship. They boil down to the thesis that P'eng Te-huai and others were authentic spokesmen for the popular will, while Mao and his cohorts consistently tried to impose on the people their own dogmatic vision. It is difficult to see how anyone could be more confident of the correctness of this formulation than of the Mao-Lin-Chou charges alleging that a bourgeois headquarters was conspiring to restore capitalism. William Dorrill's analysis (in the Robinson volume) effectively refutes the anti-Liu charges by demonstrating that many of Liu's policies were products of collective decisions in which his later adversaries took part. But Dorrill almost succeeds in proving what surely cannot be correct—namely that there was no real conflict between Mao and Liu over basic revolutionary strategy.

Robinson's analysis of Chou En-lai's activity stands out as a solid contribution in the area of elite interpersonal relations. His study of Chou's handling of crises retains its value even if some of the conclusions about Chou's political style may need a bit of rethinking. For example, Robinson

[1] Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1968.

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describes Chou's technique in dealing with attacks on his associates as one of shifting the ground of discussion from principle to procedure, raising alternatives, but finally, if all else fails, sacrificing those under attack in order to retain his own leverage. This analysis conforms to the once prevalent image of Chou as a man relatively lacking in initiative, an executive rather than a mover and shaker, and flexible almost to the point of being short on principles. Subsequent events, including the rehabilitations of men Chou was once thought to have abandoned, show him in a different light—as more canny, more forceful, and more determined than he had been given credit for.

These remarks are not intended to pick flaws in Robinson's admirable study. The least that can be said for it is that it sets a standard against which any reevaluation of Chou's political style must be measured. Similarly, it would be easy to fault Robinson for an estimate he shared with dozens of other observers, namely, that the bonds of mutual loyalty between Lin Piao and Chou were firm. In Robinson's case, it can be said that he detected Lin's propensity for the sudden, dramatic stroke as a factor of difference between Lin's and Chou's styles.

The articles dealing with the political struggle in the narrow sense stand up better than most. In the Baum volume, the articles by Charles Neuhauser and Philip Bridgham have not lost their value as accounts of the stages through which the struggle passed and of the structural or institutional reforms undertaken at different times. Similarly Ralph Powell's account of the rise to power of the People's Liberation Army in the central organizations is still worth reading despite a somewhat faulty projection of the future. Melvin Gurtov's analysis of the fight for control of the Foreign Ministry (in the Robinson volume) provides an illuminating case study of the political infighting that took place in virtually every area of the Cultural Revolution. This is by no means a negligible aspect of the conflict, for no political struggle takes place without resort to such tactics. Unfortunately, in this respect as in regard to the pattern of elite interpersonal relations, studies of the Cultural Revolution often highlight the importance of the matter without providing satisfying answers. While we can derive some notion of why Mao found it necessary to destroy Liu Shao-ch'i, or why Mao and Chou decided to destroy Lin Piao, we have yet to be shown convincingly how the result was achieved, who was mobilized to join in the effort, and by what inducements.

IT MUST ALSO BE said that these volumes, like much other writing on the Cultural Revolution, fall short in treating the policy issues involved. Although Dorrill's treatment of policy disputes prior to the onset of the struggle is outstanding, and Harry Harding (in the Robinson volume) presents an interesting framework for analyzing decision-making, most analysts of the Cultural Revolution, including those represented here, seem to feel that policy questions were overridden by the combined ideological-moral and power struggles. Yet it is not enough to describe the Cultural Revolution as a comprehensive effort at revolutionary reform. Such an effort necessarily entails a program for a redefinition of values and a redistribution of duties and rewards throughout the society. To be sure, a few of the writers involved here do touch on such matters. For example, Richard Baum's account (in the Robinson volume) of the impact of the revolution in the countryside makes good use of the sporadically available data and contains an ingenious analysis of the "ecology of conflict." Several of the authors also suggest that the original program of the Cultural Revolution would have been dysfunctional for a modernizing social order. But taking the volumes as a whole, we find that analyses which take a substantive policy question as their point of departure are regrettably few.

As time passes and new developments engage the attention of students, it becomes less and less likely that points left obscure in contemporaneous analyses of the Cultural Revolution will receive the reexamination one would ideally hope for. Hindsight tells us that some things were not quite what they were portrayed to be at the time, and not all of the obscurities are resolved in the volumes under review. On the whole, however, they do reflect credit on Western scholarship. With due allowance for the difficulty of dealing with systematically incomplete information, the scholars' insight into major trends, the overall thrust of the movement, and the roles of leading actors is not far off the mark. Of the three volumes, the Robinson book is of the most lasting value because of the authors' intensive use of details in documentary materials and the refinement of their critical apparatus. If there is any other area in which one would have hoped for more, it is in the always uncertain area of prediction. As Sino-American relations move into new spheres, it would be wise to bear this in mind.

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Hungary on a Seesaw

By Andrew Gyorgy

GYÖRGY MAROSÁN: *Az Úton Végig Kell Menni* (One Has to Complete the Trip). Budapest, Magvetö Könyvkiado, 1972.
JÁNOS RADVÁNYI: *Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik.* Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1972.

THE POST-WORLD WAR II history of Hungary has been a landscape of alternating light and darkness. Détente has followed disaster, while periods of distress have often been succeeded by interludes of relaxation and liberalization in domestic and foreign policy. The terror of the Rákosi era of the late 1940's and early 1950's was followed by the promising "New Course" initiated by Imre Nagy. This "thaw" in turn led to the October 1956 revolution and its bloody suppression; yet only a few short years later the leadership of János Kádár was able to win a constructive base of public support and once again set a moderately liberal course in Hungarian domestic and foreign policies. By the late 1960's and early 1970's Hungarians could proudly claim that while they might have lost the "revolt" of 1956, they had managed in the long run to win their *national* revolution.

Both books reviewed here display the everchanging fortunes of Hungary and the Hungarians. Marosán paints a realistic and fascinating picture of the vicissitudes of Social Democratic party politics in the immediate postwar period, while Radványi successfully analyzes the intricate diplomatic maneuverings of a small Hungary caught between the two superpowers. The often exhilarating stories of both authors—themselves actors in the events they describe—inevitably end in failure: Marosán is fired from political office (twice) rather than rewarded, and Radványi chooses political asylum in the United States. Their two careers—reflecting a characteristic blend of Magyar exuberance and melancholy—are microcosms of the lives and political environment of ten million Hungarian citizens.

Marosán's lively study, first published in Budapest in the spring of 1972, describes in great detail the course of Hungarian domestic politics in the years 1944-49. The author, a colorful, opinionated and controversial figure, can best be described as the Grotewohl or Fierlinger of Hungary, that is, a Social Democratic politician who led his party, often almost singlehandedly, into the Communist camp.[1] His personalized account of the critical events of those early postwar years serves both as a personal apologia and as a retroactive justification of the role played by János Kádár in the Communist-planned destruction of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party. This may explain the decision of the Kádár regime to permit publication of this volume.

Beyond describing the intricate process of party merger, Marosán also offers case studies of Soviet-American-Hungarian relations. Thus the book provides useful first-hand insight into the politics of Eastern Europe in the years immediately following World War II. The author's evaluation of Josef Stalin as "the most outstanding Communist leader of international politics of any period" (p. 241) may seem incredible from the perspective of the 1970's, but it is indicative of a significant strand of political opinion among East Europeans in the early postwar period.

Marosán's inside view of intraparty politics on the eve of the artificial and involuntary merger of the Hungarian Communist and Social Democratic parties is well worth reading. The merger occurred in June 1948 with the formation of a new "Hungarian Workers' Party." The process was greatly aided by the efforts of the opportunistic Marosán, who clearly dominated his colleagues in the leadership of the Social Democratic Party. In retrospect, the au-

[1] Otto Grotewohl led the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of East Germany into merger with the German Communist Party to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED)—the Communist organization which rules East Germany today. Zdenek Fierlinger was Premier of Czechoslovakia in 1945 and engineered the absorption of his Social Democratic Party by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after the coup of 1948.

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thor's emphasis on "independence and cooperation" between these two political movements smacks of tragicomedy and utter futility. Despite warnings by senior colleagues that he was "smashing the party" and "surrendering to the Communists," he persisted in his determination to guide Social Democracy toward communism. Having completed the fateful political transaction, Marosán received the usual reward: first, a brief moment in power, then arrest by the terror-inclined Rákosi regime. Subsequently, he spent many years in prison, where he was tortured and kept in solitary confinement. Finally, having served out his sentence, he was partially rehabilitated by the Kádár regime and now lives quietly in Budapest. His important documentary on Hungarian politics in the late 1940's deserves prompt translation into English to enable a wider audience to reflect on the incredible naiveté of Marosán and many of his contemporaries.

WHILE MAROSAN'S account provides new perspectives on early postwar domestic politics in Hungary, Janos Radványi's enriches our understanding of recent East European diplomacy as it operates in the context of big-power politics. As Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski points out in his Foreword, Radványi's book is an unusual combination of personal recollections and historical insight from a man who was for a time intimately involved in Hungary's relations with the superpowers. Radványi was Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires in Washington from 1962 until 1967, when he chose to remain in the United States. Previously he had served as Country Director for the USSR and Yugoslavia, and as Department Head for Western Europe and the US in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Writing from this perspective, Radványi has not aimed his book at the general reading public. Instead he provides a microscopic, almost day-by-day analysis of the "thrust and parry" of diplomacy both within Eastern Europe and between Eastern Europe and the West.

Radványi's well - documented study poignantly depicts the perilous position of Hungary as a small country at the mercy of shifts in the precarious balance of power between East and West. The only recourse the author sees for Hungarian diplomacy in such an uncertain environment is to seek maximum "room to maneuver"—a phrase which he selected as the title of his concluding chapter. Yet it is patently clear that the room for maneuver is painfully small.

Neutrality for Hungary and increasing independence of that country from the USSR seem to be Radványi's *desiderata.* This quest curiously may have lain behind Hungary's insistence that the bloody suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was an internal matter, not subject to international, and particularly United Nations, debate. Over protests of both Budapest and Moscow, the UN General Assembly and Security Council year after year discussed "the situation in Hungary," passing 16 resolutions in all condemning Soviet aggression and calling for a restoration of freedom to the Hungarian people. Finally, in June 1963, UN Secretary-General U Thant paid a three-day visit to Hungary, which

formally marked the end of a seven-year period of tension between the world organization and the Kádár regime. From this time onward the Secretary-General considered his mission on Hungary closed. The United States observed the tacit understanding worked out directly with Hungary and indirectly with the USSR, and the question of Hungary simply ceased to exist (p. 151).

Resolution of this painful issue may have given the Kádár government a greater sense of self-esteem, as well as a bit more political elbow room.

As Hungarians eye the future, Radványi emphasizes, they cannot predict with any confidence how the diverse great-power interests in the vital eastern third of Europe will respond to new political developments or crises, or whether this region will permanently remain part of a Soviet empire or sphere of influence. While such developments are of crucial importance to Hungary's future, control over them lies largely beyond her borders or means.

It is hardly surprising, then, that both books manifest a strong sense of historic inevitability. Hungary's difficult geopolitical location and turbulent past certainly justify this psychological syndrome. Marosán's assumption that the Social Democrats were bound to be swallowed up by the Communist Party (sooner or later) proved to be just as prophetic as Radványi's conviction that the "Hungarian Question" would eventually vanish from the world scene as a result of enormous Soviet pressures. Yet, while both writers failed personally in their attempts to alter the course of events, they have produced invaluable political handbooks for future navigators in the uncharted whirlpools of East European domestic and foreign politics.

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NOTE: *Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

SOLZHENITSYN

TO THE EDITORS: Mr. Ronald Hingley takes a dim view of Solzhenitsyn's *August, 1914*; "very little new in it," he says. If he means thematically—the ordeals of war and death and loyalty sorely tried—even Homer must have been aware that it had been done before. If he means formally, one may readily admit that Solzhenitsyn is neither Tolstoy nor James Joyce and that the use of a number of hastily adapted modernist devices is not one of the novel's happier features, without necessarily feeling that the Nobel Prize Committee made a big mistake, or that the book is unworthy of the author of *Cancer Ward*.

There are at least two vivid, fully created, resonant major characters in the novel: General Samsonov and Colonel Vorotyntsev. Mr. Hingley does not even mention the first, a historical figure, but a gray and shadowy figure in the historical documents, with a character entirely of Solzhenitsyn's creation, a masterpiece. He is meant to represent the best of the old Russia—the beauty of the kenotic tradition in religion, together with the loyalty, perseverance, and alert but subordinate intelligence that all too rarely, but sometimes quite spectacularly, manifested itself in the Petrine secular state. Surely the scene in which, realizing his defeat, Samsonov takes farewell of his troops and asks their forgiveness (the same Russian verb expresses both) is one of the more moving and at the same time grimly humorous sequences in modern literature. His confrontation with the deserter Lenartovich, who fully expects to be shot when discovered by the general, but who instead is asked for his forgiveness, is at least as good as anything in Gunter Grass. The whole sequence leading up to and including Samsonov's suicide is written in a Russian prose that can compare with the best.

Mr Hingley does mention Vorotyntsev, but only in passing. He seems to have no idea of the historical significance of this fictional character, out of the memoirs of Generals Shaposhnikov, Bonch-Bruevich and other general staff officers, the overwhelming majority of whom Trotsky later managed to recruit for the Red Army. Vorotyntsev poses the central problem of the novel. One has the sense of a lively, restless, alert, fully informed, secular intelligence, who, in the failure and collapse of the old regime, tries to find some emotional-ideological common ground with the primitive patriotism (perhaps "matriotism" is the better word) of the common soldiers, whose suffering and endurance and capacity in battle he takes as a token of future possibilities that should not be betrayed. As Samsonov represents the best of the old order the Tsar and his time-servers betray by their incompetence and irresponsibility, so Vorotynstsev represents the best of a new order that is in process of formation and refuses simply to lie down before the overwhelming fact of betrayal. The sequence in which Vorotyntsev leads a retreat of the defeated, including the deserter Lenartovich, through the German lines, back to their own troops, has an eerie and effective poetry to its prose.

Solzhenitsyn's argument with Tolstoy, upon which Mr. Hingley touches, is on the highest level and by no means boring. It has to do with the role of rational intelligence in history and the responsibility of individuals for their decisions in the conduct of events. As in Tolstoy, the argument is not limited to the discursive passages alone (which indeed need to be interpreted as a kind of commentary on the action—something like a Greek chorus) and cannot be done justice by reductive paraphrase. My point is simply that I hope Mr. Hingley would not be so philistine as to claim the argument is *per se* uninteresting because it is "not new."

What astounds me more than anything else is the accusation against Solzhenitsyn of infantile *narodism* and a kind of *kvas*-patriotism. Solzhenitsyn is certainly a *narodnik*. He admires a number of qualities he feels have traditionally manifested themselves in the Russian common people—a fact that should come as no surprise to the translator of *Ivan Denisovich*. Mr. Hingley seems to have little sympathy with this emotion, even when comparing Solzhenitsyn favorably with Tolstoy, as when he calls Tolstoy's Platon Karataev "a cardboard bumpkin." (An *emblematic* and therefore rather flat character Karataev

NOTICE OF ERRATUM

Michael Kaser, author of "East-West Trade: Comecon's Commerce," (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1973) has called to the editors' attention a typographical error in the source cited for the tabular material in footnote 15 (p. 9): the citation should read *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 9, 1972.

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certainly is; but nobody who can, before going to sleep, pray God to "lie down like a stone and rise like new bread," can be said to be made out of cardboard!) There is, of course, no reason why Mr. Hingley should share Solzhenitsyn's *narodism*; but it is a fundamental mistake for him as a critic to confuse its manifestation in literature with tokens of idiocy and incompetence. The emotion of patriotism is not, in Solzhenitsyn's novel, presented as mere propaganda, as an emotional rallying cry meant to sweep the reader along in sympathetic two-step with the characters. It is, on the contrary, presented as something *problematic*. Vorotyntsev, for instance, whom Solzhenitsyn uses more than any other character as the central sensibility of the novel—the shaping mirror, in other words—*feels* it as a problem when he has to attempt to rally the shattered Russian troops. How can he appeal to the powerful, primitive, rather benign, potentially creative patriotism of "unwashed Russia" in a way that at the same time is true to his own alert, competent, up-to-date, secular intelligence, in a way that does not ring false and is not demagogic, while capable of reaching the powers of receptivity of his sorely tried and much put-upon audience? Solzhenitsyn does not suggest a simple or obvious solution, or even that there was a solution. Similarly, he poses the closely related problem of modernization and technology, and it is *not* solved, as some other critics have suggested, by "technocracy," though technocracy *is* a theme. In this connection, the East Prussian locale is used to rather powerful symbolic effect, and Solzhenitsyn is by no means as simple-minded in his approach to the theme as these critics have implied.

While Mr. Hingley accuses Solzhenitsyn of *kvas*-patriotism, the latter has been accused in the Soviet press of being pro-German. In a vicious article in *Literaturnaia Rossiia*,[1] Jerzy Romanowski not only accused Solzhenitsyn of preferring German virtues to those of "the Slavs," but concludes from this a secret sympathy with the Nazis. Romanowski, in an act of dubious generosity toward an American writer, compares Solzhenitsyn's novel very unfavorably with Barbara Tuchman's *Guns of August*, which, on a smaller scale and as nonfiction, tells of the same historical events and uses many of the same sources. The two books are indeed strikingly similar. Yet there is one crucial difference: whatever one may think of it, Ms. Tuchman's bias is distinctly anti-German; Solzhenitsyn's is not. His treatment of the Germans—including his rather sympathetic account of the "inspired" General von François—is almost unique in Russian literature. And yet it is as far from being pro-German as from being pro-technocrat. Toward the end of the novel, after the Russian rout and the German victory in East Prussia, it is pointed out rather quietly but ominously that the prisoners are being herded into what will prove to be the "first concentration camps."

The novel has many rough places and imperfections. So do many other great novels I admire: *The Possessed, Père Goriot, Lucien Leuwen, An American Tragedy*. It is, after all, only the first "*uzel*," the first package or tangle or *junction*, of a long epic work, the subsequent *uzly* of which have not yet appeared. (I like Solzhenitsyn's calling it an *uzel* and think it a pity the American edition has dropped that heading.) It has enough life to satisfy those of us who consider this the *first* criterion of a novel—those of us who feel reluctant to apply to a novel of such a scale formal standards more suitable for a short story or a lyric poem.

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MR. HINGLEY REPLIES: Solzhenitsyn's novel does of course, as Mr. Monas suggests, contain elements of documentary interest . . . as, indeed, do Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* and Gladkov's *Cement*. But that does not, alas, make it a good novel. Whether it is or isn't must, in the last resort, remain a matter of personal taste.

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[1] April 7, 1972, No. 15. The essay first appeared in Warsaw in the Polish Catholic Weekly, *WTK*, on March 26, 1972; an English version is available in *Soviet Studies in Literature* (White Plains, New York), Vol. 8, No. 4, Fall 1972.

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